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CHAPTER I 
THE RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
The image of Ireland as the disaffected and rebel-
lious child of the British Empire had been grounded in a 
lengthy and strong tradition. The Irish question played 
havoc with British politics and politicians and all attempts 
to evolve a successful relationship failed~ Not content with 
colonial status, the Irish, utilizing both constitutional 
and revolutionary means, long had harassed Westminster with 
demands for more political freedom, agrarian change and an 
acknowledgment of their cultural uniqueness. The years 
between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
Century saw the various strands of nationalism begin to 
coalesce into a loosely knit movement from which would 
emerge the pattern of national independence. 
The bitter and divisive fall of Parnell in the 1890's 
disillusioned the Irish people somewhat with respect to 
parlia~entary nationalism. The Irish Parliamentary Party, 
under the leadership of Charles Stewart Pa~nell, had captured 
the imagination and allegiance of the people. Parnell had 
created an efficient political machine and by skillfully 
exploiting Parliamentary custom and procedure made the I.P.P. 
a force which could not be ignored. He entered into an 
1. 
---
2 
alliance with Gladstone and the Whigs, promising Irish 
support in return for Home Rule. However, Parnell's 
involvement in a divorce scandal, his subsequent condem-
nation by the British and then the Irish church and his own 
refusal to resign the leadership of the I.P.P., split the 
party into two warring, hostile camps. Parnell himself 
died in 1891 and subsequent negotiations between the two 
factions resulted in reunification in 1900 under John 
.... 
Redmond. However, as one historian noted: "The divorce 
scandal, followed by the party split, disillusioned some 
nationalists and made others cynical about politics. After 
party unity was restored, these people were psychologically 
incapable of transferring to Redmond the emotional commit-
ment they had once given to Parnell."l The Irish then turned 
their energy and attention away from parliamentary politics 
to the cultivation of cultural expressions of nationality. 
The Irish literary Renaissance became the most 
polished expression of the new cultural nationalism. Yeats, 
Synge, A.E. and Lady Gregory wrote and produced plays in the 
Abbey Theater which they felt would enhance the intellectual 
and spiritual growth of the country. They were a significant 
force in awakening and stimulating the national conscious-
ness. Other creative forces were also at work. In 1884, 
Michael Cusak started the Gaelic Athletic Association to 
lLawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Question (Lexington, 
Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), p.l34. 
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encourage participation in native Irish games rather than 
foreign imports, Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill, nurturing 
their own vision of nationality, jointly founded the Gaelic 
League in 1893, dedicated to reinvigorating and re-establish-
ing the endangered Irish language. The Gaelic League quickly 
became a meeting ground for nationalists. Although it was 
theoretically outside the realm of politics, by 1915, the 
more radical elements had gained control and gave the League 
a definitely political~character.2 
Labour, too, was in a state of ferment. James Larkin, 
labour organizer, syndicalist and leader of the Irish Trans-
port and Workers Union, led his men in a series of successful 
strikes, culminating the great lockout of 1913. The 
Union was beaten, if not broken, in this encounter and Larkin 
himself departed for A~erica in 1914. James Connolly, who 
then assumed the leadership of the labor movement, blended 
socialist theories with nationalist feelings. He wanted to 
establish an Irish Socialist Republic. In pursuit of this 
aim and in order to defend his men from the police during 
the lockout, he created the small but skilled Citizen Army 
to fight for political and economic freedom. Connolly's 
belief in the need for and the desirability of both 
political and economic action would eventually lead him to 
2Kevin B. Nowlan, "Torn Clarke, MacDermott and the 
I.R.B., '' in Leaders and r1en of the Easter Rising: Dublin 
1916, ed. f.X~Martin (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1967} p.ll8. 
--
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join other nationalists in the ?ost Office in 1916. 
Arthur Griffith contributed to the intellectual 
vitality of the period through his writings and the founding 
of the Sinn Fein movement. Griffith preached the doctrine 
of separation through passive resistance and emphasized the 
uniqueness of Irish nationality in all its expressions -
language, literature, history and the arts. He exhorted his 
countrymen to develop a state which, through the development 
of its home industries, would be economically self-sufficient, 
politically independent with its own parliament and govern-
ing bodies and culturally free of the alien influence of 
the English. Griffith's Sinn Fein began as a small almost 
obscure party which, however, provided the embryo which 
would grow and develop into an all encompassing and success-
ful nationalist movement. 
The Irish Republican Brotherhood (the Fenians), 
which began in 1858 and became the bulwark of revolutionary 
nationalism, revitalized and regenerated, linked arms with 
all these groups and demanded an independent Irish republic. 
Stagnating through inactivity and eclipsed by the predom-
inance of the Irish Parliamentary Party, the Brotherhood 
had been in a state of decay. However, the release from 
prison of Tom Clarke, an uncompromising and determined 
revolutionary, and his return to Ireland in 1907, together 
with the influx of young and ambitious men like Sean 
MacDermott, Bulmer Hobson and Denis McCullough, reinvig-
orated the Brotherhood. They assumed the leadership of the 
, 
organization and shed the passive, cautious, demoralized 
cloak which the Supreme Council had previously been content 
to wear. Although small in numbers, the I.R.B. managed 
to infiltrate and assume positions of authority in every 
major nationalist organization. 
Turn of the century.Ireland was a time of awakening 
and a time of cultural and intellectual revolution creating 
the climate which sparked the Rising of 1916. While 
5 
cultural nationalism fashioned the backdrop necessary for the 
events of Easter Week, renewed political activity acted as 
the immediate catalyst. Once again the Irish Parliamentary 
Party focused the attention of the nation on Home Rule. The 
overwhelming Liberal victory of 1906 was followed by close 
elections in January and December, 1910, which gave the 
Irish party the balance of power at Westminster. However, 
while Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and his party had 
recognized their dependence on the I.P.P., they had not 
foreseen the degree to which Home Rule would be resisted by 
the Ulster Protestants. Similarly the Liberals did not 
realize the "treasonous" depths to which their Conservative 
opponents would sink in pursuit of power. Abetted and 
buoyed up by the Tories in England, the men of the North, 
under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson and Sir James 
Craig, prepared to resist the advent of Home Rule. They 
organized and armed the Ulster Volunteers to uphold their 
covenant of defiance. Against this display of determination, 
the weakness of Asquith and his Cabinet colleagues was 
6 
apparent and their pledge to Redmond and his follo'<vers 
became more and more qualified. A suggestion was made of 
special treatment for Ulster or part of Ulster. Talk of 
partition of Ireland~ an idea repugnant to Redmond and his 
party and to the nationalists, was beginning to be heard. 
However, the example of Carson and the Ulster Volun-
teers had an important effect on nationalists in the South. 
Deliberate flaunting of legality, Orange drilling and arming. 
of men, and talk of treason was succeeding with the English 
Government while their own adherence to constitutional 
procedure was not enhancing prospects of Home Rule for a 
united Ireland. According to Bulmer Hobson and Eoin 
MacNeill, the events in the North shook the rest of Ireland 
out of its legal lethargy and eventually led the way to 
rebellion. Hobson wrote: 
The Carsonite movement in Ulster shattered this futile 
reliance on legal agitation and on the manoeuvring of 
an Irish Party in the English Parliament; it rudely 
broke up the political make-believe on which the 
majority of the Irish people had subsisted for years 
and compelled them to face reality.3 
MacNeill claimed that it was Carson who "transformed the 
whole situation in Ireland and opened the way for the 
3Bulmer Hobson, "The Foundation and Growth of the 
Irish Volunteers," in The Irish Volunteers, ed. F.X. Martin 
(Dublin: James Duffy and Co., Ltd., 1963), p.l7. 
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overthrow of the English regime."4 While these men perhaps 
overstated the importance of Carson and neglected to account 
for other factors, the fact remains that the Irish Volun-
teers were founded as a direct result of the arming of the 
North. MacNeill himself sounded the clarion call to arms 
on 1 November 1913 1 in An· Clardheanch Soluis, the official 
organ of the Gaelic League. In an article entitled "The 
North Began,u the author suggested that the rest of Ireland 
follow the example of Ulster and create their own Volunteer 
force. There were no barriers to the creation of such a 
group as " .•• it appears that the British Army cannot now be 
used to prevent the enrollment, drilling and reviewing of 
Volunteers in Ireland. There is nothing to prevent the 
other 28 counties from calling into existence citizen forces 
to hold Ireland 'for the Empire.t"S MacNeill's suggestion 
was greeted favorably, especially by members of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood who had been drilling secretly in 
preparation for the formation of some type of open, respect-
able military association. Bulmer Hobson, an I.R.B. member, 
and The O'Rahilly, an ardent nationalist, approached MacNeill 
and as a result of a series of discussions, the Irish 
4Eoin 14acNeill, "How the Volunteers Began," in The 
Irish Volunteers, ed. F.X. Martin (Dublin: James Duffy and 
co., Ltd., 1963), pp.74~7s. 
SEoin MacNeill, "The North Began,u in The Irish 
Volunteers, ed F.X. Martin (Dublin: James Duffy and Co., 
Ltd., 1963), p.6. 
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volunteers were founded on 25 November 1913, at the 
Rotunda Rink in Dublin, The response was overwhelmin~ ~ 
an estimated 3,.500 men enlisted! planting the seed that 
would grow to become the Iri.sh Republican Army and even-
tually the National Defence Forces of Ireland. 
From its inception, the Irish Volunteers considered 
themselves to be a defensive, protective force, "founded 
expressly in response to a popular urge. It was a people's 
army."6 The Irish Volunteers' objectives were succinctly 
stated in their Constitution: 1. To secure and maintain 
the rights and liberties common to all the people of 
Ireland; 2. To train, discipline and equip for this purpose 
an Irish Volunteer Force which will render service to an 
Irish National Government when such is established; 3. To 
unite in the service of Ireland, Irishmen of every creed 
and of every party and class. 7 Thus it was to be a volun-
tary, democratic, national and non-sectarian permanent force. 
The formation of the volunteers altered the balance of 
power in Ireland. The island now had a military group 
dedicated to insuring Home Rule, as well as one opposed to 
this measure. However, the men of the South did not intend 
to be in opposition to the Ulster force. Their leaders 
envisioned a time when the two groups would stand together. 
6F. X. Hartin, Introduction to The Irish Volunt·eers 
ed. ;F.X. Hartin (Dublin: James Duffy and Co. Ltd., 1963), 
p.IX. 
7The Irish Volunteers, Constitution (1914), art. 1, 
sec. 1-3. 
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MacNeill expressed this sentiment very clearly when he said: 
The more genuine and successful the local Volunteer 
movement in Ulster becomes, the more completely does 
it establish the principle that Irishmen have the right 
to decide and govern their own national affairs. We 
have nothing to fear from the existing Volunteers in 
Ulster nor they from us. We gladly acknowledge the 
evident truth that they have opened the way for a 
National Volunteer movement, and we trust that the day 
is near when their own services· to the cause of an 
Irish Nation will become as· memorable as the success 
of their forefath~rs.8 
The Irish Volunteers were, from the beginning, infi~­
trated by the I.R.B., becoming almost a public front for the 
underground militant wing of the Brotherhood. As a military 
organization, the Brotherhood was in a position to act as the 
core of the Volunteer movement. I.R.B. members trained Vol-
unteer recruits and moved into key positions within the new 
organization. Th~ I.R.B. refrained, however, from making 
public the degree of control it had attained. In fact, some 
of the more well known Republicans deliberately refused 
positions of prominence in order to avoid associating the 
Volunteers with any particular philosophy. MacNeill, 
himself, thought to be a Redmonite, believed that all shades 
of opinion should be reflected on the governing Committee .. 
Despite this attempt at political neutrality, the I.R.B. 
covertly shaped the early Volunteers to suit their own 
purpose, rebellion. 
The creation and development of the Volunteer 
8F.X. l-1artin, ed., The Irish Volunteers (Dublin: 
James Duffy and Co., Ltd., 1963), pp.ll2-ll3. 
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movement had begun independently of the Irish Parlimentary 
Party. Its growth was impressive, numbering 75,000 by May, 
1914 and increasing to 180,000 by September, 1914.9 Redmond 
could not afford to ignore such a force. He had at first 
viewed the Volunteers as a threat to his party. However, in 
his effort to steer a Home Rule bill through Parliament and 
to strengthen Asquith•s resolve vis~~-vis a united Ireland, 
he realized the strategic value of being able to speak with 
the force of the Volunteers behind him, a la Carson. In 
June of 1914, Redmond publicly demanded that twenty-five 
men, nominated by his party, be added to the Provisional 
Committee of the Volunteers, or he threatened to create a 
rival body. He rejected the board's suggestion to hold 
general elections in each of the counties to achieve broad 
sectional representation and preserve the elective spirit of 
the organization. In order to avoid a split in the movement, 
the Volunteer Executive acquiesced to Redmond's demand, 
though not without grave dissension and dissatisfaction, 
especially among I.R.B. members. The agreement was short-
lived. The unity which MacNeill and his followers sought to 
preserve in June was shattered by September by the outbreak 
of World War I. 
Redmond's initial support for the war was limited 
to pledging the Irish Volunteers to defend Ireland, leaving 
the British troops stationed there free to fight in France. 
9F.X. Martini ed., "Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 Rising," 
Irish Historical Studies 12 (March, 1961) :227. 
11 
However, he soon had a change of heart. :Perhaps he believed 
that Irish participation on the side of the British would 
diminish the possibility of partition when Home Rule came 
into effect after the war. Perhaps it was "due to his 
personal involvement in the war, ••• or a chivalrous reaction 
to the placing of Home Rule on the Statute book, or .•• was 
inspired by Carsonts appeal to the Ulster Volunteers to 
enlist for service overseas ••• nlO Regardless of motivation, 
in a speech at Woodenbridge on 20 September 1914, the Irish 
leader called on the Volunteers to enlist and fight as mem-
bers of the British forces, an idea totally alien to their 
spirit and purpose. The original leadership immediately 
repudiated Redmond's statement, thus dividing the infant 
organization into two camps. Most of the men followed 
Redmond. They became known as the National Volunteers and 
went to fight for the British. The rest, some 11,000 men, 
the bulk of these from the Dublin area, remained loyal to 
MacNeill. They retained their original name. The Irish 
Volunteers made a strenuous effort to recruit men into 
this truncated body. Organizers were sent throughout the 
country to whip up enthusiasm and increase enrollment. By 
October, 1914, they could claim 13,500 members. By April, 
1916, the Volunteers numbered approximately 16,000 for the 
lOF.S.L. Lyons, John Dillon (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1968), p.359. 
pat 
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whole country, with 2f500 men located .in the Dublin a:~;ea.ll 
The war itself caused ~ further shift in the intern~l 
policy of the Volunteers. Fear of a British attempt to 
disarm them led the officers- to contemplate and prepare for 
actual hostilities, The governing body of the Volunteers 
announced it would resist any attempts of suppression. 
Training and organizing were intensified and due to the 
successful gunrunning at Howth in July, 1914, some arms and 
ammunition were available. Among the members of the I.R.B. 
the advent of the war caused great excitement. Following 
the old maxim, England's difficulty is Ireland's oppor-
tunity, the revolutionary body sought to take advantage of 
England's involvement in the war and proclaim an independent 
Irish republic. Political developments in Britain could 
only have strengthened their determination and further 
convinced them of the righteousness of their cause. Bonar 
Law, F.E. Smith and Carson, leading conspirators in the 
Ulster rebellion, were now members of the reshuffled 
English coalition governrnent.l2 As early as 1915, the 
Supreme Council of the Brotherhood established a military 
committee to plan, organize and execute a general rising of 
the Volunteers throughout the country. The Military 
llF.X. Martin, ed,, "Eoin MacNeill on the 1916 
Rising,'' Irish Historical Studies, 12 (March, 1961): 24 3 
ff.lS. 
1 2John Redmond, also, had been offered a place in 
the Cabinet, but the tradition of an independent Irish 
Parliamentary Party dictated that he refuse. 
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Council originally consisted of Joseph Mary Plunkett, 
Patrick Pearse, Eamon Ceannt, Thomas Clarke, and Sean Mac-
Dermott. Later James Connolly and Thomas MacDonagh were 
co-opted. Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett were the poets, 
the visionaries of the Rising. Pearse, especially, was 
imbued with the idea of a blood sacrifice which would cleanse 
the soul and regenerate the spirit of Ireland. These men 
would be the seven signatories of the Proclamation of the 
Republic and the firs·t members of the Provisional Govern-
ment. That the I.R.B. could contemplate the staging of a 
rebellion without the cooperation of the Chief of Staff, 
MacNeill, is an indication of their dominance within the 
Volunteers. Ceannt was Director of Communications, Plunkett, 
Director of Military Operations, and Pearse, Director of 
Organization. All the Volunteer commandants appointed in 
March, 1915, with the exception of The O'Rahilly a~d de 
Valera (.who subsequently joined the society for a brief 
time} were Brotherhood members who were aware of the plans 
for a Rising.l3 Pearse was the chief link between the two 
groups as he was in a position to order general manoeuvres 
for Easter week-end without arousing suspicion. The 
Military Committee felt that absolute secrecy was the key 
to success. Haunted by the memories of past revolutionary 
attempts gone asunder due to informers and spies, the Rising 
13Maureen Wall, "The Background to the Rising: from 
1914 Until the Issue of the Countermanding Order on Easter 
Saturday, 1916," in The Making of 1916, ed. Kevin B. Nowlan 
(Dublin: Stationary Office, 1969}, p.l73. 
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leaders kept vital detailed information from their own 
members~ While this tactic Preserved security, their fail-
ure. to enlighten sufficient officers throughout the country 
that a secret military council existed within the Volunteer 
structure and that orders: i'ssued from them were to be obeyed 
regardless- of any otlier instructions:, led to the disastrous 
breakdown in communications during tfie insurrection.l4 
The Military Council selected Easter Sunday, 1916, 
as the date of the rising. While the most elaborate plans 
were devised for the Dublin area, the revolutionary strat-
egists did not ignore the provinces. The entire country 
was to participate in the military struggle. Pearse and 
his fellow leaders attempted, primarily through John Devoy 
and the Irish American Clan-na-Gael, to acquire arms from 
Germany. Arrangements were made to land the weapons off 
the coast of Ireland during Holy Week. 
Through a series of mishaps and miscalculations, 
the plans of the rebels went awry. Hobson overheard a dis-
cussion at a Volunteer meeting vis-i-vis a rising and 
hurried to consult MacNeill. The two men then confronted 
Pearse, who acknowledged the secret plans. He persuaded 
MacNeill not to alter the military plans by showing him a 
bogus "Castle Document," which purported to be of British 
plans for the suppression of the Volunteers and the mass 
arrests of nationalists. Pearse strengthened his argument 
14Ibid. 
15 
by informing the Chief of Staff of the promise of arms from 
Germany. However, the Aud, the German submarine carrying 
the arms, was unable to make contact with the Irish off the 
coast of Kerry and the captain was forced to scuttle his 
ship when British warships appeared in the waters. Moreover, 
the Royal Irish Constabulary captured Sir Roger Casement, 
previously sent to seek German assistance in a rising and to 
recruit an Irish brigade from among the prisoners of war in 
Germany, almost immediately after he landed in Ireland on 
Good Friday. When MacNeill heard that the cargo from Ger-
many never landed and that Casement himself was captured, 
he rescinded his decision and called off the general manoeu-
vres for Easter week-end. To insure that all commands 
would know of his countermanding order, he inserted a copy 
of it in the Sunday Independent. The Military Com_mittee 
was undaunted by either the failure of the arms landing or 
MacNeill's refusal to go along with their plans. The 
Rising was re-scheduled for Easter Monday. Some officers 
never received this latest dispatch; and some, having 
received contradictory instructions, were so confused that 
they did nothing. The failure of the I.R.B. to establish 
a competent chain of communication effectively hindered the 
outbreak of insurrection throughout the country. 
In Dublin itself, the Rising took place as planned, 
but with fewer men than originally expected and with no 
other centers of rebellion throughout the country to relieve 
the pressure on the main body of rebels, The Irish Volunteers 
16 
and the Citizens Army of James Connolly occupied strategic 
defensive positions in the city. At noon, the tri-color was 
raised over the General Post Office and Pearse read the 
Proclamation of the Republic establishing Ireland as a free 
and independent country. 15 The Easter rebels, approximately 
1,000 men and women, kept the city paralysed for about a 
week. The British poured in troops and bombarded Sackville 
Street from a gunboat brought up the Liffey. After almost 
a week long struggle, the Irish were forced to surrender. 
The civilian population, of course, was unprepared for this 
event and reacted with surprise and contempt. They did not 
come out "with knives and forks" to join the Volunteers. 
Rather their general attitude was distinctly hostile. Many 
of them had sons, husbands or fathers fighting for the 
British; many were swept up in war fever and war profits. 
The reaction of the British to the events of Easter 
Week, however, guaranteed its success. General Maxwell, 
hence called "Bloody Maxwell" by the Irish, summarily execu-
ted the leaders of the Rising, after the charade of a court-
martial, stretching out the procedure by shooting only two 
a day. In particular the execution of Willie Pearse, killed 
simply because he was the brother of Patrick, and James 
Connolly, shot while strapped to a chair, made a deep 
15The tri-color, green for the Catholics, orange 
for the Protestants and white for the bond of love between 
them, became the nation's official flag. Another flag, 
green, with a gold harp in the center and proclaiming in 
Irish the "Irish Republic" was also raised. 
F 
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impression on the people of Ireland. So did the gallant, 
brave conduct of the men. Their last words, their last 
poems leaked out and before long, the rebels who had been 
hooted and jeered at became the martyrs of 1916. Militar-
ily they had failed, but as Pearse foresaw they had awaken-
ed the dormant spirit of nationalist Ireland. 
Coupled with the executions, the British embarked 
upon the mass arrests of nationalists. In the prison camps 
of Frognoch and Lewes, the Irish Volunteers started to re-
group and reorganize. Converts were made; beliefs deepened; 
and leaders emerged. Eamon de Valera, spared a death sen-
tence perhaps because of his American citizenship, or perhaps 
because the British authorities felt that continuing the 
executions would be a mistake, was the natural choice as 
heir apparent to the movement. Released from internment, 
the veterans of 1916 were greeted with cheers and adulation. 
As Sinn Fein political candidates they were now gaining 
support among the people as the results of some key by-
elections of 1917 amply demonstrated. In North Roscommon 
in January, 1917, George Noble, Count Plunkett, father of 
the Easter martyr, Joseph Plunkett, was elected. In South 
Longford, Joseph McGuiness, still a prisoner in Lewes jail, 
was victorious. In East Clare, in the summer of 1917, de 
Valera, declaring his adherence to the Proclamation of the 
Republic trounced his Irish Parliamentary Party opponent. 
De Valera's victory was an endorsement of 1916, a vote which 
showed "beyond a shadow of a doubt that the old party could 
no longer claim to speak for Nationalist Ireland as a 
whole."l6 
18 
The leaders of this new-movement were plagued with 
disunity and divergence of aims and ideals. The English had 
dubbed 1916 the Sinn Fein rebellion. Unfortunately, no such 
consensus was present among the nationalists. Three main 
groups existed to compete with the ·Irish Parliamentary Party 
for the allegiance of the people: Sinn Fein, the Irish Vol-
unteers and the Irish Repuolican Brotherhood. In the fall 
of 1917, the Sinn Fein and Volunteer Conventions took a major 
step towards uniting these diverse elements. At the Sinn 
Fein Ard-Fheis, a compromise formula was worked out that all 
groups could adhere to. Sinn Fein would work to secure the 
international recognition of Ireland as an independent 
Republic. Having achieved that, Sinn Fein left to the 
people the right to choose their own form of government. 
To further harmonize relations, Griffith stepped down, and 
Eamon de Valera was elected President of Sinn Fein. The 
Convention achieved the tenuous unity so vital to the young 
movement. The vague formula of 1917 was an umbrella under 
which all nationalists could take shelter. After the storm 
when it was necessary to translate ideals into specfic real-
istic terms, discord and dissension would break through. 
The Volunteer Convention followed the example of 
16F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland Since· the Famine (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971}, p.383. 
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Sinn Fein and elected de Valera its President~ In addition, 
six of the twenty members elected to the National Executive 
were also members of the Sinn ~ein governing body. 17 Thus 
a certain degree of cooperation between the two groups was 
assured, even though the Volunteers remained an autonomous 
body, entirely independent of Sinn Fein. The inter-relation-
ship of political and military personnel set a pattern which 
would endure through the establishment of the Irish Free 
State. According to Richard Mulcahy, "the work done at the 
two Conventions of 1917 provided the basis of the Government-
Army relationship which came so instantaneously and auto-
matically into operation on the establishment of the Dail 
and endured so effectively."l8 
Just as the pre-1916 Volunteers had been infiltrated 
by the I.R.B., so too was the post-rising organization. The 
Brotherhood was forced to reorganize following the decemation 
of their leadership and the reduction of their rank and file 
during Easter Week. Men like Michael Collins and Richard 
Mulcahy were determined that the old secret society should 
again provide the leadership to guide and direct the liber-
ation movement. A new constitution was drawn up and a new 
17The six members were: De Valera, Cathal Brugha, 
Michael Collins, Austin Stack,. Diarmuid Lynch and Sean McEntee. 
18General Richard Mulcahy, "The Irish Volunteer Con-
vention 27 October 1917", The Capuchin Annual, p.409. 
Richard Mulcahy was the first Minister for Defence in the 
Irish Free State and Commander-.in-Chief following the death 
of Michael Collins~ He was previously deputy Chief of Staff 
of the Volunteers, Chief of Staff and assistant Minister for 
Defence in first Irish Governments. 
Supreme Council formed. Sean McGarry became President; 
Michael Collins, Secretary; and Diarmui~ Lynch, Treasurer. 
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On the Volunteer Staff, Collins \'las the Director of Organ-
ization; Lynch, Director of Communications; Sean McGarry, 
General Secretary; and Richard Mulcahy, Deputy Chief of 
Staff. However, two powerful offices remained outside the 
I.R.B.•s control and hostile to it. Both de Valera, Pres-
ident, and Cathal Brugha, Chief of Staff, were former mem-
bers of the Organisation and were now opposed to its revi-
talization. They thought it unnecessary to continue a secret 
society, condemned by the Catholic Church, when an open and 
popular movement existed in Ireland. But their antagonism 
to the I.R.B. was not all-consuming and they managed to 
cooperate with their former comrades. Thus while all three 
groups managed to paper over their differences with vague 
formulas and inter-locking leadership, sizeable obstacles 
remained which would eventually have to be overcome. 
In 1917, however, the British conveniently provided 
enough external stress to solidify the Irish. Faced with a 
growing shortage of manpmver, Lloyd George and his colleagues 
toyed seriously with the idea of extending conscription to 
Ireland. Southern Irish opinion reacted violently against 
this threat. Irish Parliamentary Party leaders, Sinn 
Feiners 1 and the Catholic clergy shared the same platforms at 
mass rallies to resist conscription, As if they themselves 
were trying to intensify the problem, the English Cabinet 
revised the old policy of coercion, arresting most of the 
p 
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Sinn Fein leaders on the very dubious evidence of a German 
plot. Michael Collins was one of the few leaders to escape 
arrest, a costly error for the British. Now in a position 
of dominance both in the Volunteers and in the I.R.B., he 
began to gather around him the men who would destroy Dublin 
castle, the heart of British rule in Ireland. 
British activity gave the Irish an impetus and a 
direction which they had previously lacked. As Piaras 
Beaslai, a prominent Sinn Feiner, Volunteer, and I.R.B. man 
wrote: 
The English Government's proclamation, arrests, and 
other forms of coercion were of great assistance to 
Sinn Fein. They helped to strengthen popular sympathy 
and to create a united front in the face of the enemy. 
They also helped to save Sinn Fein from the embarrass-
ments of framing and putting into execution a practical 
constructive policy.l9 
The ranks of the Volunteers swelled to approximately 
100,000 men in October, 1918, as the issue of conscription 
drove men into their arms. To shape raw recruits into 
anything like a professional army was an exceedingly difficult 
task. Training took place without weapons, officers were 
part-time, and there were few instructors and fewer manuals. 
General Headquarters was unable to do more than issue overall 
directives on policy and organization. Control was left in 
the hands of local leaders who, to a large extent, determined 
19piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the Makin of a 
New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: arper an Brot ers, n.d. 1:180. 
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the shape of the Volunteer movement.20 The Irish Volunteers 
had the men and the spirit with ttlhich to begin an anny. The 
threat of conscription gave them something to fight against. 
This sense of purpose "gave cohesion to the nationalist 
effort, and it was this also which inevitably brought near-
er the possibility of an armed conflict betwen the volun-
teers and the military authorities."21 
Politically, events were working for the benefit of 
Sinn Fein. The Irish Parliamentary Party had not yet been 
able to secure the implementation of the Home Rule Bill, 
and despite conferences and negotiations, a unified Ireland 
was becoming more and more illusory. During the war, Home 
Rule had been passed but with the provisions that it not 
come into effect until after the end of the war and that the 
Ulster question be decided by special amending legislation. 
In 1917, Prime Minister Lloyd George had offered Redmond 
immediate Home Rule for the twenty-six counties, a proposal 
which the Irish leader totally rejected. Lloyd George then, 
on Redmond's suggestion, arranged a conference wherein 
Unionists and Nationalists could work out a solution to their 
differences. Sinn Fein and organized labour refused to at-
tend the Convention. The Ulster Unionists remained obdurate 
and the Convention 't'l7as a failure. Redmond himself died in 
2
°Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press, Ltd., 1954), pp.28~3o. 
21F.S.L. Lyonst Ireland Since the Famine (Ne\'T York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.395. 
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March of 1918, during the final sputterings of the confer-
ence. Dillon, now leader of the I.P.P., and his colleagues, 
were tainted by their identification with the Liberal party, 
associated with a policy which the Convention had demonstrat-
ed to be futile and plagued by the anger of the Irish peopte 
at the British for the execution of the 1916 leaders, the 
threat of conscription and the policy of coercion. The post-
war election of 1918 showed the depth of Irish disillusion-
ment with their traditional leaders and their desire for 
change. It was a bitterly fought contest. Sinn Fein was an 
outlawed party with most of her leaders in prison. Their 
platform was an affirmation of the republican ideal: absten-
tion from Westminster; the promise to drive the English out 
of Ireland by whatever means necessary; the creation of a 
national assembly; and an appeal to the Peace Conference for 
recognition. Charges of fraud and intimidation abounded. 
Moreover, both sides were competing for the affection of the 
new electorate created by the Representation of the People 
Act of 1918. The results surpassed even the pessimistic 
prediction of John Dillon. The Irish Parliamentary Party 
suffered a defeat from which it never recovered, winning only 
six seats, four of which were in border constituencies and 
thus not contested. The Unionists won twenty-six seats. 
Sinn Fein won seventy-three seats. An analysis of the 
voting pattern shows the strength of Sinn Fein. In the 32 
counties, Sinn Fein received 47.7 per cent of the vote cast. 
However, this figure is misleading as a more thorough 
24 
examination reve~ls; 
Put in these terms, Sinn Fein strength is undoubtedly 
understated since these figures include heavily Unionist 
areas in the north .... east which were contested for symbol-
ic rather than expectant reasons ••.• A better estimate 
of Sinn Fein strength can be arrived at by calculating 
the vote obtained in the contested constituencies in 
the •26~County' area of the country. Here Sinn Fein 
capture 46.73 per cent of the votes on the register and 
64.86 per cent of the votes actually cast.22 
The republican-nationalists rose from obscurity to 
power in meteor-like fashion. They now were the legally 
accredited leaders of Ireland. The next step would be to 
translate the ideals and rhetoric of revolution into reality., 
21Brian Farrell, The Founding of Dail Eireann (Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillan, 1971}, p.48. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR 
The victors of the 1918 elections in an attempt to 
establish themselves as the de facto as well as the de jure 
leaders of Ireland convened An Dail Eireann, a national 
assembly, on 21 January 1919. A small nucleus of Sinn 
Feiners, their ranks depleted by arrests,l began the task 
of constructing a government. 
The first priority of the Dail was to reaffirm the 
free and independent Irish republic proclaimed on Easter 
Monday, 1916. The Declaration of Independence asserted that: 
••• we, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish 
people in National Parliament assembled, do in the name 
of the Irish nation, ratify the establishment of the 
Irish Republic and pledge ourselves and our people to 
make this declaration effective by means at our command. 
We solemnly declare foreign government in Ireland to 
be an invasion of our national right which we will never 
tolerate and we demand the evacuation of our country by 
the English Garrison.2 
1of the 69 representatives elected, 34 were in prison, 
5 were on missions abroad, 1 had been deported and 2 were 
absent because of illness. Three significant absentees were 
Eamon de Valera and Arthur Griffith, who were in prison, and 
Michael Collins, who was in England, although his presence 
was acknowledged during the roll call to mislead authorities. 
2Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the First Parliament of the Republic of Ireland: 16. 
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While both the tone and content of the Declaration 
of Independence were resolute and revolutionary, tragically 
adhering to the fatal flaw of die-hard Republicanism, the 
Constitution which the Dail ratified reflected the political 
values of the new leaders. The Constitution of 1919 demon-
strated a strong commitment to a democratic parliamentary 
form of government, fully embracing the concept of popular 
sovereignty. 
In an attempt to delineate the social and economic 
policy of the new State, the Dail adopted the Democratic 
Programme, a radical manifesto, not really reflective of 
the thinking of most of the representatives. It said: 
We declare in the words of the Irish Republican 
Proclamation the right of the people of Ireland to the 
ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of 
Irish destinies to be indefeasible, ••• we declare that 
the Nation's sovereignty extends not only to all men 
and women of the Nation, but to all its material posses-
sions, the Nation's soil and all its resources, all 
the wealth and all the wealth-producing processes within 
the Nation, and ••• we reaffirm that all right to 
private property must be subordinated to the public 
right and welfare. 
It shall be the first duty of the Government of the 
Republic to make provision for the physical, mental 
and spiritual well-being of the children, to secure 
that no child shall suffer hunger or cold from lack of 
food, clothing, or shelter, but that all shall be 
provided with the means and facilities requisite for 
their proper education and training as Citizens of a 
Free and Gaelic Ireland.3 
The Democratic Programme was a pragmatic political 
expedient necessary to strengthen the Irish Labour Party's 
claim to full representation at the upcoming international 
3Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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socialist conference. The Dail hoped the conference would 
recognize its claim to independence and thus further its 
bid for international recognition.4 The adoption of the 
Programme reflected the high degree of politicization of 
the new leaders, rather than their vision of Irish society. 
Many of the political revolutionaries feared that extending 
the parameters of the movement in this way to include social 
and economic issues would destroy the fragile unity already 
achieved and so desperately needed. The emphasis of the 
struggle was to be political; its main concern was to drive 
the British out of Ireland, not to create a utopian society. 
In general, an examination" •.. of the original Dail Eireann, 
of its constitutional documents, its decrees, its priorities 
and policies adds to the original impression of an assembly 
at least as intent on maintaining the framework of an estab-
lished society and its associated values as with attempting 
to change it."s 
To bolster its claim to independence, the Dail sent 
a "Message to the Free Nations of the World," outlining the 
Irish claim to independence and calling on the international 
community to recognize and support her new national status 
at the upcoming Peace Congress. It was an idealistic and 
vain hope to assume that the victors of World War I, the 
countries which had proclaimed loudly about the right of 
4Brian Farrell, The Founding of Dail Eireann (Dublin: 
Gill and Macmillan, 1971}, p.60. 
5Ibid., p.78. 
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small nations to self-determination, would impose this 
standard on any but the vanquished. To President Woodrow 
Wilson and the rest of the delegates to Paris, Ireland would 
remain an internal British problem. If freedom were to be 
won, only the Irish themselves could achieve it. 
Having sketched the theoretical framework of the new 
state, the Dail began to deal with the practicabilities of 
state-building. On January 22, 1919, it appointed a 
temporary ministry consisting of Cathal Brugha, Prime 
Minister; Eoin MacNeill, Minster for Finance~ Michael 
Collins, Minister for Home Affairs; Count Plunkett, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs; and Richard Mulcahy,Minister for De-
fence. Plagued by arrests and the threat of arrests and 
groping its way through the darkness of inexperience and un-
certainty, Dail Eireann did not become a serious reality 
until April 1, 1919, with the escape and release of some of 
its most notable members, " •.. and from the proceedings of 
this second session dated what might be called the permanent 
constructive work of the Dail."6 Mr. de Valera at that time 
became President of the Dail or Priomh-Aire. He selected for 
his Cabinet: Arthur Griffith, Home Affairs and the President's 
deputy; Michael Collins, Finance; Cathal Brugha, Defence; 
Count Plunkett, Foreign Affairs; Countess Markievicz, Labour, 
William Cosgrave, Local Government, Eoin MacNeill, Industry; 
and Robert Barton, Agriculture. The Cabinet, with most of 
6F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.403. 
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its members on the run, was unable to keep permanent records 
and was left very much to its own initiative. In spite of 
the obstacles, some departments achieved striking successes. 
For example, the Minister for Finance was able to float a 
National Loan, the Ministry of Local Government ultimately 
would dominate the local councils, and Dail Eireann Courts 
would eventually supercede those of the British. 
One area which remained unsettled was the relation-
ship of the Minister for Defence to the autonomous Volunteers. 
Catha! Brugha did not exercise direct control over the 
"army" nor did the Volunteers ever officially swear alle-
giance to the Dail. One difficulty was " that the armed 
forces of the republic had existed before the republic had 
actual parliamentary institutions,"? that is, the Volunteers 
were organized before the 1918 elections and the convening 
of the Dail. Thus, the army had an independent tradition 
outside the realm of civilian control. The Dail itself did 
not accept responsibility for the actions of the Volunteers 
until March, 1921, four months prior to the cessation of 
hostilities. This abdication of authority not only encour-
aged independent action but also led to a skeptical and 
distrustful attitude on the part of some officers vis-~-vis 
the government's ability and wisdom in making decisions 
7Kevin B. Nowlan, 11 Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity 
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond 
Williams (Toronto: Un1vers1ty of Toronto Press, 1966), p.67 
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. h '1' 8 affect1ng t e m1 1tary. It established the precedent of 
the autonomy of the military which would plague the govern-
ment through 1924. In 1919, the question of government con-
trol of the army drifted along without resolve as the actions 
of the Volunteers seemed to be pushing Ireland into a state 
of war with England. 
The first dramatic incident of the upcoming guerilla 
war occurred at Soloheadbeg, simultaneously and coincidentally 
with the convening of Dail Eireann. Led by Dan Breen and 
Sean Treacy, the Third Tipperary Brigade attacked a Royal 
Irish Constabulary guard in order to acquire guns and explo-
sives. The I.R.C. resisted and two policemen were shot and 
killed, thus opening the initial phase of the war. It was, 
in essence, a struggle between the Volunteers and the police.9 
Soloheadbeg was condemned by the clergy, the public 
and the press. Even a section of Republican opinion did not 
support the men from Tipperary.l 0 The incident was initiated 
by local leaders and not sanctioned by General Headquarters. 
It grew out of the conditions and frustrations of the Volun-
teer movement. The conscription issue had died with the end 
of the war; the political activity of the 1918 elections had 
8Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954), p.200; Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish 
Freedom (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1944), pp.191-192. 
9F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.410. 
lOFlorence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954), p.41; Dan Breen, My Fight for Irish 
Freedom (Dublin: The Talbot Press, 1944), p.34. 
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been successfully completed; and the majority of the Dail 
seemed content to pin their hopes on the upcoming Peace 
conference. There was no official military policy compre-
hensible to the average Volunteer. Active, aggressive 
leaders like Treacy and Breen of Tipperary and Liam Lynch 
of Cork were faced with the problem of declining morale and 
the very real threat of disintegration of their Brigades. 
They felt they had to go forward or the paralysis of inac-
tivity would destroy the spirit of the movement. Up until 
this point, the policy of the Volunteers had been one of 
passive resistance. The British had been arresting men 
throughout the country for drilling or carrying arms and 
the Volunteers allowed themselves to be imprisoned without 
offering any resistance. Some of their leaders felt this 
policy was ineffective. Soloheadbeg was an attempt to spur 
the Volunteers to action. Dan Breen explained: 
•.. that this business of going to jail and becoming 
cheap heroes must stop. We wanted a real army, not a 
hollow mockery. Even if such an army numbered a few 
score only, it would be far better than the present 
organisation. We thought Soloheadbeg would have been 
followed by active operations all over the country.ll 
Soloheadbeg was not immediately effective in the manner Breen 
desired but it was the beginning of growing pressure on G.H.Q. 
to authorize and sanction a policy of action and aggressive-
ness. 
General Headquarters was aware of a changing 
llDan Breen, My Fight for Irish Freedom (Dublin: 
Talbot Press, 1944), pp. 68-69. 
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atmosphere and in An tOglach, the official organ of the 
Volunteers declared: 
Every Volunteer is entitled, morally and legally, when 
in the execution of his military duties, to use all 
legitimate methods of warfare against the soldiers 
and policemen of the English usurper, and to slay them 
if it is necessary to do so in order to overcome their 
resistance. He is not only entitled but bound to 
resist all attempts to disarm him.l2 
This attitude was further strengthened at the first meeting 
of G.H.Q. after the establishment of Dail Eireann when Cath~l 
Brugha, Chief of Staff and Minister for Defence, stated that. 
since Ireland now had a lawfully constituted government, 
elected by the people, the Volunteers became the army of that 
government and, as such, were entitled morally and legally 
to defend the Dail, " .•. to slay the officials and agents 
of the foreign invader ... to put to death all spies, inform-
ers and all Irishmen who acted as agents of the foreigners 
in the warfare against us.nl3 This major change in the 
policy of the Volunteers was not universally accepted in 
1919; but by 1920 it would reflect both the mentality of 
and the reality in most of the country. 
The Anglo-Irish War, which grew both in extent and in 
intensity from 1919 until the Truce in 1921, developed 
because of the exigencies of the time. As a guerilla war, 
a model for future wars of liberation, it was a radical 
departure from 1916. In all previous Irish attempts at 
12Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the 
Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, 
n.d.) 1:275. 
13Ibid., p.270. 
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rebellion, the rebels directly challenged the military 
superiority of Britain, committing all their men to the 
field at one time. In 1919, the Volunteers did not have 
the men or the arms for another general rising against the 
military machine of the victor of World ~var I. No foreign 
allies were there to help them; no ship load of arms pre-
pared to land on their shares. However, the Volunteers 
could claim legitimacy as the army of a popularly elected 
government. They 11 ••• were fighting within a democratically 
established framework and this not only enhanced their own 
morale but was in part responsible for the support extended 
to them in their rural 1 theatres of war. 1 ~·14 The Volunteers 
fought in the only way available to them which gradually 
developed into a full scale guerilla war of liberation. As 
lvlichael Collins said, 11 We organized our army and met the 
armed patrols and military expeditions which were sent 
against us in the only way possible. We met them by an 
organised and bold guerilla warfare."l5 
The Volunteers were organized on a territorial basis. 
The smallest unit was the section. Next came the Company, 
then the Battalion, and finally the Brigade. Each Brigade 
was composed of seven Battalions. The number of men per 
Company might vary from fifty to a hundred. The men were 
14John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.l4. 
15Quoted in G.A. Hayes-McCoy, "The Conduct of the 
Anglo-Irish War," in The Irish Struggle, 1916-1926, ed. 
Desmond Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 
p.61. 
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part-time soldiers, fighting at night and then returning 
to their regular occupations during the day. Training was 
irregular. Many of the men, for example, never had target 
practice because of the lack of ammunition. In a real sense, 
much of their training carne from participation in actual 
combat. As the war progressed, more men joined in full-time 
service but their numbers were always limited by the small 
quantity of arms available. The structure of the Volunteers 
was elastic, flexible, based on the dernographical and geo~ 
graphical factors of the region. According to Tom Barry, an 
officer in Cork, this was all important because "it allowed 
for the development of a fighting machine under changing 
conditions and growing enemy pressure."16 The Irish real-
ized that if they were to succeed, they had to adapt their 
fight to their unique circumstances and not adhere to tra-
ditional military structure. Writing in An tOglach in 1918, 
Michael Collins said: 
Forget the Company of the regular army. We are not 
establishing or attempting to establish a regular force 
on the lines of the standing armies of even the small 
independent countries of Europe. Our object is to bring 
into existence, train and equip as riflemen scouts a body 
of men, and to secure that these are capable of acting · 
as a self-contained unit .•.• 17 
The activity and aggressiveness of the Volunteers 
varied from area to area. Counties like Cork, Tipperary, 
16Torn Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: 
Irish Press, Ltd., 1949), pp.8-9. 
17Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and 
the Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and 
Brothers, n.d.) 1:205-206. 
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and Longford were very busy, while the West and Midlands, 
for example, generally remained quiet. The attitude of 
the local leaders was often the determining factor in decid-
ing the degree of participation. The men elected their own 
officers. ·Clan loyalties and rivalries played as importan·t 
a part as martial skills. General Headquarters did not 
interfere. They accepted and worked with the men chosen. 
Sometimes G.H.Q. found it necessary to exhort them to fight; 
sometimes, to proceed with more caution and prudence. In 
fact, General Headquarters exercised little control over 
what actually happened throughout the country. In the view 
of one historian, 11 ••• the military policy in 1919-1920 was 
left very much to the leaders of the Volunteers," al-
though 11 ••• headquarters' staff kept a reasonably close 
grip over the major actions in the provinces, ••• "18 Dublin 
was hampered by the lack of a rapid communications system, 
a paucity of funds and a scarcity of weapons and ammunition. 
Most importantly, the nature of the struggle itself demanded 
a great deal of local autonomy. Clashes with the British 
were determined by the movement of enemy forces and the 
availability of men and equipment, factors either beyond the 
control of Dublin or which of necessity had to be left to 
the discretion of local personnel. Dublin staff officers 
were hampered by their unfamiliarity with and their 
18Kevin B. Nowlan, "Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity 
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond 
Williams (Toronto: Univers1ty of Toronto Press, 1966), p.72. 
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inexperience in fighting in the country, a fact not lost on 
provincial leaders. However, General Headquarters did set 
guidelines and coordinate policies gleaned from officers 
directly engaged in the fighting. Gradually, G.H.Q. would 
assume more control as the army became more structured. 
In one important area, G.H.Q. gave invaluable aid 
to the Volunteers. During the course of the war, Michael 
Collins organized an Intelligence System which baffled the 
British and cracked the walls of Dublin Castle. Collins 
recruited men from inside the Castle. They provided him with 
information on raids, arrests, and troop movements. He also 
established his own Intelligence Staff. Liam Tobin became 
Chief Intelligence Officer, assisted by Tom Cullen and later 
Frank Thorton. Collins' people were everywhere, in post 
offices, on the docks, in telegraph offices. This complex 
network supplied the Volunteers with much valuable infor~ 
mation. 
Collins himself became the very heart of the rev-
elution. He was not only Minister for Finance but also a 
member of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B., Director of 
Intelligence and, for a time, Adjutant-General of the Volun~ 
teers. Aptly nicknamed the "Big Fellow", he symbolized the 
liberation movement. Collins brought together the loose ends 
and synthesized the entire struggle against the British. 
Working with him were the officers who would form the nucleus 
of the Free State Army: Dick Mulcahy, Chief of Staff; Sean 
MacMahon, Quartermaster-General; Gearoid O'Sullivan, 
p 
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Adjutant-General. 
l'lhile G.H.Q. exercised only minimum control over 
the army, Dail Eireann had even less authority over the 
Volunteers. Speaking on April 10, 1919, Eamon de Valera, 
President of the Dail, said: "The Minister of National 
Defence( is of course, in close association with the volun-
tary military forces ...• ,"19 thus indicating that at this 
stage the army was " .•• associated with rather than sub-
ordinate to the Dail Ministry."20 It was a curious sit-
uation. Theoretically, the Volunteers remained an independ-
ent, autonomous body responsible only to its own Executive; 
yet they were commonly referred to as the army of the state. 
Dail Eireann regularly voted it funds and the Minister for 
Defence reported to the Irish assembly on its activities. 
However, the Dail, itself declared an illegal body in 1919, 
met less and less frequently and its meetings contained 
little discussion of military policy or objectives. In no 
sense did the Dail take an active role in the events of the 
war. 
In January of 1921, in one of the few major Dail 
discussions on war time policy, certain disagreements and 
complaints surfaced concerning the way the country had 
drifted into war. A number of Deputies believed that they 
1 9Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the First Parliament of the Republ1c of Ireland: 46-47. 
2
°Kevin B. Nowlan, "Dail Eireann and the Army: Unity 
and Division," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1926, ed. Desmond 
Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p.72. 
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had not been kept sufficiently informed, that the Dail had 
not been convened frequently enough and "that members in 
the country who were outside of the Dublin circle, knew 
nothing of what was going on, heard nothing to guide them 
and had to rely altogether on their own judgment." 21 Sean 
MacEntee, the representative from South Monaghan, claimed 
that the "Ministry did not seem to pay any attention to his 
arguments and he said they were of the opinion they [the 
Government] could continue to govern the country while the 
Dail was in a state of hibernation. He thought if that 
policy was continued the results would be disastrous to the 
country." 22 
Approval of the direction the revolution had taken 
was not unanimous. Some deputies were uneasy with the 
military policy of the government. Roger Sweetman, the 
representative from North Wexford, resigned his seat in pro-
test of the growing violence in January of 1921. He said 
that he was "in total disagreement with the policy pursued 
for some time back .•.• He thought there was a number of 
people outside the Dail who did not see eye to eye with them 
on the present policy. He wanted to see nothing done 
which they as moderate men could not stand over in the 
main ... "23 
Generally, however, the Dail endorsed the status quo, 
22rbid., pp. 245-246. 
23 rbid., pp. 243-244. 
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rejecting any suggestion of lessening the activities of the 
Volunteers or diminishing the struggle.24 In effect, they 
as a body abdicated responsibility for the conduct and pros-
ecution of the war. Due to the nature of the guerilla strug-
gle, the result was that a small clique of dedicated and 
zealous men ran the revolution. A breakdown in the tra-
ditional chain of authority occurred with the local Volunteer 
units enjoying a great deal of independence from G.H.Q., 
with the army Executive not legally bound to the government, 
and with the Ministry effectively free from Dail control. 
The revolution maintained its cohesiveness because its lead-
ers simultaneously occupied co-ordinated positions of author-
ity in the Dail, the government and the army. Volunteer 
officers were elected to Dail Eireann and six members of 
G.H.Q. staff became Deputies: Michael Collins, Richard 
Mulcahy, Gearoid O'Sullivan, Owen O'Duffy, Piaras Beaslai 
and Liam Mellows. Distinctions between military and civilian 
became blurred and muted. 
Clearly, the issue of civilian control of the army 
was not a paramount concern. The Dail seemed to have no 
fear of the military extending and usurping its rights. The 
discussion of March 11, 1921, on the establishment of a mili-
tary dictatorship evidenced this. The House agreed that when 
24 De Valera had been in America from June 1919 to 
December 1920 and the discussion on whether the struggle 
against the British should be lessened arose on his sugges-
tion. His critics claimed that this proved how out of touch 
with the movement he was. 
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its membership fell to five, "the Army should take con-
trol."25 Unquestionably, the leaders were worried about the 
survival of the Republic, the liberation of their country, 
the unity of the revolutionary movement; and not ethereal 
abstractions concerning the role of the military in society. 
That the Army was free from central military and political 
control to such a great extent had great importance in 1922. 
"The Army did defend the Republic from 1916 to 1922 but it 
did so in its own way with little concern about the Govern-
ment's attitude."26 The question which remained unanswered 
was whether Dail Eireann could control the Volunteers if it 
ever chose to do so. 
An attempt was made to clarify the relationship 
between the Dail and the Volunteers in August of 1919. The 
Minister for Defence, Cathal Brugha, proposed that the sol-
diers swear an oath of allegiance to the Dail. He said that 
he regarded "the Irish Volunteers as a Standing Army and 
that as such they should be subject to the Government.~. 
The important thing was that the Irish Volunteers under 
their present Constitution owed allegiance to their own 
Executive. Since the Dail had come into existence there 
had been no Volunteer Convention, but one would be held as 
25 1 d , 1 , , .c h p d. Ire an , Da1 E1reann, M1nutes or t e rocee 1ngs 
pf the First Parliament of the Republic of Ireland: 280. 
26Joseph Curran, "Michael Collins and the Irish Free 
State" (PhD. dissertation, University of Chicago) p.29. 
p 
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soon as possible. It was necessary to have this matter 
adjusted." 27 Not everyone agreed. Collins feared that the 
intrusion of politics and politicians into the war effort 
would hamper the drive for independence, an apprehension 
shared by other officers. Those who opposed the oath 
questioned the wisdom of removing control from their own 
executive. But Brugha prevailed. Since a Volunteer Con-
vention would have been too dangerous, it was never held 
nor was the Constitution ever changed. The oath was admin-
istered by individual officers and the Volunteers officially 
became the Irish Republican Army, the I.R.A. This made no 
substantive difference because "the soldiers' first loyalty 
was to their commanders and the sywbol of the Republic."28 
Underlying the issue of Dail control over the army 
was the question of the power and influence of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood. Collins felt that the actual rea-
son for Brugha's insistence on an oath was to break the 
allegiance of the men to the I.R.B. In a sense, the oath 
issue was part of the struggle for control of the army. A 
rift was growing between Brugha and Collins. The I.R.B. 
was Collins' stronghold of power. By breaking its strength, 
Brugha would effectively reduce the Minister for Finance's 
influence. Exactly how powerful this secret organization 
was, is difficult to judge. In 1919, the I.R.B. had altered 
its Constitution, deleting from it the assertion that its 
28Joseph Curran, "The Decline and Fall of the I.R.B," 
Eire Ireland 10 (Spring 1975): 17-18. 
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President was also the President of the Irish Republic, 
and also giving its approval to the oath of allegiance to 
the Dail as the lawfully elected government of Ireland. 
These actions were an acknowledgment by the Brotherhood that 
their role in Irish society had changed since 1916. More-
over, in terms of numbers, the I.R.B. was not very potent. 
For example, in the counties of Cork, Kerry and Waterford, 
while the Army numbered about 31,000 men, the I.R.B. com-
prised only 1,170.29 One estimate of the strength of the 
I.R.B. was that its members did not exceed five per cent of 
the total strength of the Army.30 However, the Brotherhood 
did have control over positions of authority. Many officers 
were I.R.B. men; and three members of the Supreme Council 
were on the staff of G.H.Q.: Collins, O'Sullivan and O'Duffy. 
According to one source, the I.R.B. "controlled most of the 
administrative machinery of the Army and could direct the 
manner of its operation without offending against the dis-
ciplinary code."31 Actual meetings of the local circles 
diminished as the war intensified, but the myth of the I.R.B. 
remained strong and the influence of the Brotherhood in the 
Army continued to be questioned through 1924. To some, the 
Brotherhood was an anachronism which had outlived its use-
fulness and now tended to sap the unity of the revolutionary 
29Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954), p.l89. 
30Ibid., p.43. 
31Ibid., p.l99. 
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movement and to divide the allegiance of the men. To 
others, "it had vitality and significance in that it bound 
a group of men into a historic and respected brotherhood 
which evoked loyalty of a high order without undermining in 
any way the Army discipline under which they served." 32 
Not until March of 1921 did the Dail define its 
relationship, however, inaccurately, with the I.R.A. At 
the suggestion of de Valera, the Dail agreed to take formal 
responsibility for the actions of the I.R.A. and publicly 
acknowledge that a state of war existed between Ireland and 
England. This declaration would belie enemy claims that the 
I.R.A. was an irresponsible force, "a murder gang," and 
deny England this advantage in the propaganda war being waged 
in the press. Therefore, in an interview on March 30, 1921, 
de Valera stated: 
•.. This army is, therefore, a regular state force, under 
the civil control of the elected representatives, and 
under officers who hold their commissions under warrant 
from these representatives. The Government is, there-
fore, responsible for the actions of this Army. These 
actions are not the acts of irresponsible individuals 
or groups, therefore, nor is the I.R.A. as the enemy 
would have one believe a praetorian guard. It is the 
national Army of defence.33 
The Dail's acknowledgment in 1921 that a state of 
war existed in Ireland was certainly belated (albeit one 
which England refused to make) . Slowly and gradually through 
1920 the clashes and skirmishes between the I.R.A. and the 
3 2 Ibid. I p. 4 3. 
33Quoted in Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law, 
(Dublin: Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l62. 
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British grew more numerous. The tempo of the war intensified 
and its tone grew more savage. The Royal Irish Constabulary, 
ostracized as armed agents of the British and the chief tar-
get of the I.R.A. in the first phase of the war, had grown 
demoralized and their ranks dwindled. In the summer of 1920, 
the R.I.C. was augmented by the addition of the Auxiliaries, 
ex-officers of the British Army and the Black and Tans, ex-
soldiers of the Crown, recruited for service in Ireland. The 
efforts of the British to quell the rebellion by arresting 
more and more suspected I.R.A. men only increased the number 
of full-time soldiers. It became increasingly dangerous to 
return to a place of employment after a night's engagement. 
Thus, more of the I.R.A. were forced "on the run." This 
necessitated a tightening of the organization. Training and 
instruction increased. Local Quartermasters developed plans 
for feeding and clothing their men. Communication and coopera-
tion between units were expanded so that, by the spring of 
1920, a coordinated operation to burn vacated police barracks 
throughout the country could be carried out. This was part 
of a new campaign by the I.R.A. to attack the enemy's strong-
hold in order to destroy them and thus hopefully to drive 
them out of the country. 
Terror and counter-terror grew in ferocity and 
frequency throughout 1920, a year which witnessed the murder 
of Tomas Mac Curtain, Lord Mayor of Cork; the death of his 
successor, Terrence Mac Swiney, on a hunger strike in prison; 
and the wanton burning of Cork city itself. It was also the 
year of "Bloody Sunday". On November 21, 1920, Collins' 
46 
squad was responsible for the systematic elimination of 
British spies. Eleven men were killed. It was a ruthless 
action, justifiable in content, if not in style. British 
revenge was brutal. That same afternoon the soldiers fired 
on an innocent crowd attending a Gaelic football match in 
Croke Park, killing 12 and wounding 60. Overall, the death 
toll for 1920 was 176 R.I.C. killed, 251 wounded; 54 British 
soldiers killed, 118 wounded; and 43 I.R.A. men killed, In 
comparison, between May and December of 1919, 18 policemen 
had been killed.34 
In November and December of 1920 the I.R.A. devel-
oped a new weapon with which to fight the British: the 
Flying Column. A group of about thirty men in each Brigade 
were recruited to become the elite units of the I.R.A. 
These men were given special training in defence tactics, 
attacking exercises, musketry, discipline, security measures, 
ambushes, town fighting and elementary sign and map reading. 
The mission of the Flying Columns was "continually to harass, 
kill, capture and destroy the enemy forces; to keep in check 
his attempts to rebuild his badly shaken civil adrninistra-
tion; to guard and protect the building of their •.• own 
State InstitUtions and the people who were establishing and 
using them." 35 The establishment of the Flying Columns 
34 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York; 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 410-415. 
35Tom Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: 
Irish Press, Ltd., 1949), p.23. 
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gave the Irish a mobile striking force which allowed them 
to expand their activities into more reluctant and apathetic 
areas. 
The success of the guerilla campaign depended on 
the support and sympathy of the people. The I.R.A~, espe-
cially the Flying Columns, needed food, sleeping accomrno-
dations, medical aid and information from their countrymen. 
Initial repugnance to Volunteer violence was considerably 
lessened by increased British terror. While some aided the 
I.R.A. out of fear, most of the local people, especially 
those in battle ridden areas, took great risks to help the 
guerilla forces. For the most part, aid and succor were 
extended" •.• by a people steeped in the tradition of resist-
ance to established authority. In turn, the courage and 
persistence of the ordinary Volunteer derived in large 
measure from the knowledge that his cause had popular back-
ing."36 In Tom Barry's view 11 11 The year 1920 closed with 
the struggle well-defined between Ireland and her ancient 
enemy. Now there could be no turning back. All Ireland 
had accepted to some degree the challenge of the growing 
British terror.n 37 
The last six months of the war were characterized 
by full scale guerilla conflict. The I.R.A. had grown into 
3 6John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.20. 
37Tom Barry, Guerilla Days in Ireland (Dublin: The 
Irish Press Ltd., 1949), p.60. 
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a more disclipined, better trained army. Its increased 
confidence and efficiency were demonstrated in May of 1921 
by the burning of the Customs House in Dublin. This action 
was sanctioned by the government because the destruction 
of the files contained there would severely hamper British· 
administration throughout the country. While the I.R.A. 
paid dearly in loss of men, 5 killed and 80 captured, in 
terms of morale and dramatic effect, it was a success. 
An tOglach evaluated the operation euphorically: "The 
burning of the Customs House symbolized the final collapse 
of English civil administration in the country."38 
However, the British military forces refused to 
collapse. Sir Neville Macready, Commander-in-Chief of the 
British forces in Ireland, calculated that there were 
40,000 soldiers and policemen occupying Ireland by July of 
1921. Other estimates put the figure as high as 50,000 
soldiers and several thousand police. The Irish were greatly 
outnumbered. While its total membership may have been as 
high as 15,000 the number of I.R.A. men on active "working" 
service only ranged from 3,000 to 5,000 men.39 Its numbers 
were consistently limited by the shortage of arms and 
ammunition. The strain and tension of war was having its 
effect. Martial law had been proclaimed in various parts 
38Quoted in Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the 
Making of a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, 
n.d.) 11:222. 
39F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 414-415. 
49 
of the South. At a conference of officers of the Southern 
Brigade, one of their most urgent demands was that the 
conflict become "more widespread and truly national in 
scope." 40 This would ease the burden on the military and 
civilian population in the heart of the war who were being 
pushed to the limit of endurance. In spite of certain 
inherent advantages of guerilla warfare, the I.R.A. was 
faced with tremendous obstacles and whether they could 
ever have truly and unconditionally defeated the British 
remains questionable. As one historian noted: "Terror 
and counter-terror had in fact resulted in a stalemate."41 
When the British realized that Ireland was not going 
to be quickly pacified, they actively began to seek a 
political solution. Prime Minister Lloyd George and his 
coalition government was coming under increased pressure 
from both English and world opinion to settle the Irish 
struggle. In December of 1920, Lloyd George asked Arch-
Bishop Clune of Perth to act as intermediary between the 
two hostile forces. Both sides agreed that it was neces-
sary to stop the killings, burnings and raids and to create 
an atmosphere favorable for peace negotiations~ One very 
serious obstacle existed, however. The British insisted 
that the Irish turn over their arms. This would have been 
4
°Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: The 
Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l53. 
41John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.22. 
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tantamount to surrender for the I.R.A., leaving them at the 
mercy of the British at the negotiating table. During the 
next six months, Lloyd George vascillated between talk of 
peace and talk of victory. While distinguished visitors 
were being sent to Dublin in search of a formula to end the 
conflict, the Prime Minister and the "die-hard" faction in 
the Coalition, were claiming they had the rebels on the run, 
"had murder by the throat," and were confident of victory 
very soon. 
A turning point in British policy came on June 22, 
1921, with the opening of the Northern Irish Parliament by 
Kind George V. Prior to this, in March of 1920, the British 
had passed the Better Government of Ireland Bill (the Par-
tition Act) which created two separate Irish governments: 
the Dublin Government, with responsibility for 26 counties; 
and the Belfast Government, ruling over the 6 predominately 
Protestant counties. 42 The King's speech expressed the 
wish that Ireland enter into an era of peace, contentment 
and goodwill. It was a signal that the Coalition Government 
was now serious about a truce. Lloyd George rescinded his 
demand for the surrender of weapons and arrangements for a 
cessation of hostilities proceeded. 
42The Partition Act curiously defined "better govern-
ment" as a mixture of the outdated Home Rule idea and the 
new and dangerous concept of partition. This Bill had little 
relevance in the South, but it was of striking importance 
in the North. It provided the Ulster Protestants with a 
strong barricade behind which they could retreat if any 
pressure for unification or reconciliation was applied. 
They were now masters of their own house. 
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On Monday, July 11, 1921, a truce was declared. 
war was over, at least for a time. To the Irish, it was 
greeted as victory. The Truce was partially necessitated 
by Ireland's military condition: lack of arms and munitions 
and a growing shortage of manpower. A respite would give 
the I.R.A. a chance to regroup its forces. However, 
serious drawbacks to an armistice also existed. A period 
of peace would break the momentum and intensity of the war. 
More importantly, the truce would destroy an important and 
vital weapon of the I.R.A. - secrecy. This fact was not 
lost on Michael Collins, whose life depended on his anonym-
ity: 
Once a truce is agreed and we come out into the open, 
it is extermination for us if the truce should fail. •a• 
We shall be ... like rabbits coming out from their 
holes; and pot-shots for the 'farmers' should the truce 
ever fail.43 
The terms of the Truce were: On behalf of the British Army 
it is agreed as follows: 
1. No incoming troops, R.I.C., and Auxiliary Police and 
Munitions and no movements for military purposes of 
troops and munitions, except maintenance drafts. 
2. No provocative display of forces, armed or unarmed. 
3. It is understood that all provisions of this truce 
apply to the martial law area equally with the rest of 
Ireland. 
43Rex Taylor, Michael Collins (London: New English 
Library, Ltd., 1970), p.llO. 
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4. No pursuit of Irish officers or men or war material or 
military stores. 
s. No secret agents, noting description or movements, and 
no interference with the movements of Irish persons, 
military or civil, and no attempts to discover the 
haunts or habits of Irish officers and men. 
6. No pursuit or observance of lines of communication or 
connection. 
On behalf of the Irish Army it is agreed that: 
a. Attacks on Crown Forces and civilians to cease. 
b. No provocative displays of force, armed or unarmed. 
c. No interference with Government or private property. 
d. To discountenance and prevent any action likely to 
cause disturbance of the peace which might necessitate 
military interference.44 
If the Truce were terminated, seventy-two hours 
notice would be given. I.R.A. units were granted leave but 
were advised to stay in close contact with their commanders 
in the event the negotiations broke down. Upon returning 
home, the young freedom fighters were greeted like a vic-
torious army. Their ranks swelled with ntrucileers," men 
who joined the I.R.A. after the fighting had ceased. It 
was a time to bask in glory, to forget the hardships, the 
stench of war, and the fear of death, and to try to return 
to normalcy, though not to the conditions of ante-bellum 
44Quoted in Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic 
{London: Transworld Publishers, 1968), pp.434-435. 
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society. The years of fighting had altered the normal 
sociological development of a large segment of the popula-
tion. They had become accustomed to danger and excitement. 
They were heroes. Coupled with and urged on by the brag-
gadocio of the non-combatant trucileers, the "army of the 
people" grew disdainful of the non-military population and 
began "to domineer over civilians and despise politi-
cians."45 The I.R.A. came to believe that they had actually 
won the war with England. 
The Truce brought an end to the army's predominance. 
The emphasis now shifted from military to diplomatic skir-
mishes. A war of letters ensued. The British offered lim-
ited Dominion Status. The Irish spoke of independence and 
self-determination. Finally, after two and a half months of 
vying for position, both sides agreed to discuss "how the 
association of Ireland with the crnnmunity of nations known 
as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish 
national aspirations." 
As their plenipotentiaries, the Cabinet selected 
Arthur Griffith, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as chairman 
of the delegation; Michael Collins, Minister for Finance, as 
second-in-co~mand; and Gavan Duffy, T.D. (Dail Deputy), 
Robert Barton, Minister for Economic Affairs, and Eamon 
Duggan, T.D., the latter two having been responsible for 
negotiating the truce. Erskine Childers was appointed 
45Ibid., p.492. 
secretary to the delegation. The selection of the nego-
tiators was surprising since de Valera had seemed the 
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obvious choice to the Cabinet and the Dail to lead the Irish. 
He had headed the preliminary negotiations with Lloyd George 
and, in general, was the most experienced diplomatically. 
To his colleagues' dismay, however, the President refused 
to attend, claiming that his place as head of state was in 
Ireland. He cited the tragedy of President Wilson at Ver-
sailles as precedent. Moreover, as the symbol of the Re-
public, he wanted to keep himself free from the taint of 
compromise in order to rally the people, if necessary, to 
resume the fight. However, de Valera was the one figure who 
could unify the different political factions and, as such, 
was needed in London. By not attending the conference, de 
Valera jeopardized any potential agreement. 
By October of 1921, the beginnings of a serious 
split in the Cabinet became apparent. A significant differ-
ence of opinion existed between the self-styled die-hard 
Republicans, like Brugha and Stack, who refused to go to 
London, and the more moderate approach of men like Griffit.h. 
Cathal Brugha exhibited open personal hostility towards 
Collins. Griffith had opposed the appointment of Childers. 
In spite of this, Griffith and Collins were chosen to lead 
the delegation and Childers was selected as secretary. The 
internal tensions and strain with its resulting disharmony 
worked against any proposed settlement, a difficult task 
even in the most congenial atmosphere. As de Valera noted: 
Their plenipotentiaries would go over to do the best 
they could for the Irish nation and· the Irish people. 
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He again warned them of the fact they were sending men 
to do a thing a mighty army and navy could not do. 
They had got to face facts no matter how high their 
ideals were and to deal with a practical situation as 
they found it. The time was come to get to serious work. 
The men going over would be going to face a most 
difficult task.46 
Negotiations began in London on October 11, 1921. 
Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead, Austin Chamberlain and Winston 
Churchill constituted the very formidable opposition the 
Irish had to face at #10 Downing Street. The strategy of 
the Irish Cabinet was to concentrate on matters of finance, 
trade and defense, and to leave the more difficult, more 
illusive problems of Ulster and the Crown for last, when 
the hostile and strange atmosphere would hopefully have 
begun to evaporate. The advantage of such a battle plan to 
begin negotiations in less sensitive areas was that the 
Irish would have time to evaluate the determination and 
commitment of the British, but there was also a great risk. 
If negotiations broke down, it would most probably be over 
these two issues and prolonging the period of artificial 
peace was creating an unhealthy atmosphere in Ireland, one 
neither of war nor peace but a type of limbo. 
The second prong of Irish strategy was to ensure 
that any break in negotiations would be over Ulster and not 
over allegiance to the Crown. On the question of national 
unity, they felt they would retain world sympathy, claiming 
46Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of the 
Second Dail, ( 1921} ; 96. 
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that a small minority, the North-East, was blocking a 
settlement. A break over the oath to the King would make 
them appear merely obstinate and turn world opinion against 
them. 
The British were offering Dominion Status, with lim-
itations on defense, finance, and trade. In effect, they 
abrogated the right of the Irish to defend themselves and 
made special demands for the use of her ports. The Irish 
argued for neutrality, reasoning that a neutral, free Ire-
land would be more sympathetic to British interests. In 
the area of trade, the British wanted to guard against the 
possibility of tariff barriers. The Irish delegation main-
tained that their industrial development demanded that they 
have the freedom to decide what their tariff structure 
should be. In addition, the Irish demanded complete inter-
nal fiscal autonomy. 
The Irish response to Dominion Status was de 
Valera's formula of External Association, an idea decades 
ahead of the evolution of the Commonwealth. Its salient 
feature was the inclusion of the Irish Republic within the 
broad confines of the British Empire as a neutral saver-
sign state, externally associated with the states of the 
British Empire for purposes of con~on concern-like defence, 
peace and war. Conspicuous by its absence was a direct 
oath of allegiance to the King although Ireland would 
contribute to his annual tribute. The British did not agree 
to this new arrangement. To them, the question was simply 
p 
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would the Irish accept the Crown or not. 
The Ulster problem was perhaps the most complex 
issue facing the negotiators. For unity, the Irish would 
probably accept the Crown in some manner. In a statement 
to the Dail on August 17, 1921, President de Valera said: 
As far as I am concerned, I would be willing to suggest 
to the Irish people to give up a good deal in order 
to have an Ireland that would look to the future with-
out anticipating distracting internal problems.47 
The Irish strategy vis-~-vis Ulster was to guide events so 
that Sir James Craig, leader of Northern Ireland, would have 
to maintain his position without English support. The 
Irish were convinced that Ulster would join them if the 
English removed their backing. However, the Partition Act 
of 1920 presented the Southern Irish with a fait accompli, 
a separate government in the six county area with its own 
Constitution and Parliament and both Dublin and London had 
previously agreed that there would be no coercion of 
Ulster. 
The question of Dominion Status or External Associ-
ation was examined in detail. One of Ireland's strongest 
arguments against accepting status equal to the Dominions 
was its geographical proximity to England. The very real 
fact of distance insured that the activities of the Irish 
would be of infinitely more concern to the residents of 
#10 Downing Street than those of a country as far away as 
47Ireland, Dail Eireann, Minutes of the Proceedings 
of the First Parliament of the Republ1c of Ireland, 
(1921): 15. 
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canada. Since the position of the States within the 
commonwealth was so ill-defined and dependent on practice 
rather than on existing law, the closeness of the two is-
lands strongly indicated that, while the Crown would be 
merely a symbol elsewhere, in Ireland it would be a reality. 
The British would have effective control over Ireland be-
cause the Crown, through its Ministers and Parliament, could 
make laws, veto bills, and appoint the Governor-General. 
In order to meet this objection, the British gave the Irish 
delegation the option of inserting any clause they desired 
to insure that the position of the Crown in Ireland would 
be no more in practice than it was in Canada or any other 
Dominion. In coming to terms with one of Ireland's main 
objections to Dominion Status, the British made a definite 
concession. 
In the beginning of December, the negotiations 
reached a climax. The British had presented a draft agree-
ment and the Irish Cabinet had rejected it. On December 4, 
1921, Griffith, Duffy and Barton presented their counter-
proposal of External Association to the English. The Prime 
Minister maintained that, instead of furthering the negotia-
tions, the Irish draft was a step backwards. They could 
not understand the difficulty in accepting a status equal 
to that of Canada. At that, Gavan Duffy blurted out that 
their difficulty was coming into the Empire. A wave of 
excitement immediately swept through the room. The central 
problem which the Irish had carefully refrained from 
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verbalizing was now out in the open. This simple statement 
revealed the entire rationale behind the concept of 
external association. 
A crisis atmosphere now surrounded the conference. 
On December 5th, the Prime Minister decided to apply max-
imum pressure and force the Irish to reach a decision, 
either to come to terms or face the prospect of terrible 
and immediate war. Lloyd George offered some final conces-
sions, including a modified oath in which the Irish swore 
allegiance to their Constitution but pledged themselves to 
be loyal to King George in his role as head of the Common-
wealth. The British also relented in their demand for 
complete control of Irish defence. They acknowledged the 
right of Ireland to build vessels necessary for the pro-
tection of revenue and fisheries. In addition, a phrase was 
included implying that Ireland would undertake a share in 
her coastal defence. The Irish were allowed a restricted 
army and the entire defence issue would be reviewed at a 
conference in five years. As a final inducement, Lloyd 
George offered fiscal autonomy. 
On the problem of Ulster, the British proposed the 
establishment of a Boundary Commission composed of one 
representative from each of the three sides involved. By 
leaving the inhabitants free to decide their own political 
destiny, the Prime Minister strongly suggested that the 
Dublin government would save Tyronne and Fermangh, and parts 
of Derry, Armagh, and Down. Assuming the inclusion of these 
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areas, the North would be forced economically to join 
the South. 
The Irish were not totally in favor of the Com-
mission. They hesitated; and, in that moment of hesitation, 
Lloyd George showed himself to be a politician par excel-
lence. To insure the acceptance of his scheme, the Prime 
Minister produced a memorandum which Griffith had signed on 
November 12 promising not to publicly repudiate the proposal 
of a Boundary Commission as an alternative to an all-Irish 
Parliament while the Unionist Conservative Party conference 
was going on. Lloyd George, the "Welsh Wizard", interpreted 
this pledge to mean that negotiations would not be broken 
over Ulster and Griffith would accept the Boundary Com-
mission if necessary. He asked the Irishmen if he would 
honor his word. Griffith replied: I have never let a man 
down in my whole life and I never will."48 
One man had been won over. Not satisfied, the 
Prime Minister melodramatically declared that all members of 
the delegation must sign or bear the responsibility for the 
dire consequences which would follow. He issued an ultima-
tum: the Irish delegates must decide that night whether it 
would be peace or war. They were allowed no time to return 
to Dublin to discuss it with their colleagues. 
The Irish retired from the conference room and a 
heated and passionate debate ensued. Unfortunately, no one 
48Quoted in F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p.435. 
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thought to telephone de Valera in Dublin. Finally, Collins 
decided to sign and the rest followed his example. At 3 
o'clock in the morning of December 6th, a tired and trou-
bled team of plenipotentiaries executed the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty. 
Why did the Irish sign? For three of the five rep-
resentatives, the answer is fairly obvious. Duffy, Barton, 
and Duggan acquiesced because they would not bear the 
responsibility for the war that Lloyd George had prophesized 
would follow. 
Michael Collins executed the agreement primarily 
because he thought that the Treaty was the best Ireland 
could obtain from Britain and that the Dominion Status 
offered them gave Ireland the basics, the substance of 
freedom which would allow Ireland to grow and develop in 
peace. The modified oath eased his conscience while the 
Boundary Commission held out at least the promise of unity. 
Moreover, as a military man, Collins more than any other 
Irish leader, knew the massive onslaught which could be 
directed against Ireland if Britain so desired. He also 
knew that it was questionable whether Ireland could with-
stand it. He believed that the decision of war or peace 
belonged to the Irish people alone. They should have the 
opportunity to decide their fate. 
Arthur Griffith was perhaps the most satisfied with 
the Treaty. To him, it was the fulfillment of his life's 
work. It gave Ireland what he felt was necessary for her 
62 
development as a nation - economic and domestic freedom and 
control over her own education. While the memorandum of 
November 12th had indeed placed the Chairman in a difficult 
situation, nothing in it could actually have forced him if 
he was not at least practically predisposed to sign. The 
promise he had given Lloyd George was limited and dictated by 
the Liverpool Convention. Griffith signed because he was 
basically in agreement with the terms of the Treaty and, 
like Collins, cognizant of the fact that this was the best 
compromise they could attain. 
When news of the agreement reached Dublin, it was 
received with neither joy nor satisfaction. On December 8th, 
de Valera released a statement to the press urging the 
people to reject the Treaty. He said: 
The terms of this Agreement are in violent conflict with 
the wishes of the majority of this nation as expressed 
freely in successive elections during the past three 
years. I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that 
I cannot recommend the acceptance of this Treaty either 
to Dail Eireann or the country~ In this attitude I am 
supported by the Ministers for Home Affairs and Defence. 
The Army as such is of course not affected by the polit-
ical situation and continues under the same orders and 
control. The greatest test of our people has come. Let 
us face it worthily, without bitterness and above all 
without recriminations. There is a definite constitu-
tional way of resolving our political differences - let 
us not depart from it, and let the conduct of the Cabinet 
in this matter be an example to the whole nation.49 
An open split was now apparent. Both sides began preparing 
for the all important treaty debates in An Dail Eireann. 
49Quoted in Dorothy r1acardle, The Irish Republic 
(London; Transworld Publishers, 1968), p.544. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CIVIL WAR 
The Treaty debates began in December of 1921. Pas-
sion, emotion and personal hostility saturated the proceed-
ings. The veil of war time unity which had cloaked deep 
differences was now lifted to reveal numerous factions and 
grave divisions. The men and women of Dail Eireann who 
gathered in the Council Chamber of University College, 
Dublin, were very much aware that they were being called 
upon to determine the future of Ireland~ The debates cen-
tered primarily around the oath of allegiance to the Crown, 
inclusion in the British Empire, the nature of Dominion 
status and the abandonment of the Irish Republic. Iron-
ically, deputies said very little about the partition of 
Northern Ireland. They were being forced to choose between 
the ideal of the liberation struggle and the practical 
realities of the political climate. The weight of the dead, 
especially the most recent martyrs, bore heavily on them. 
Friendships dissolved. Former comrades who had trusted each 
other with their lives found themselves hurling epithets at 
one another. It was a bitter time, in part, perhaps, because 
of the gravity and consequences of the issue, the alternative 
to the Free State was resuming the war with Britain. The 
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choice was simple: vote for or against the Articles of 
Agreement between Ireland and Great Britain, vote for or 
against the Treaty. 
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Outside the Dail, a substantial majority of the 
people were satisfied with the agreement, a fact which would 
become increasingly more evident as the debates progressed. 
To them, it was an honorable peace. The press, the bus-
iness community, the clergy, the County Councils, for the 
most part, all urged ratification. However, a significant 
segment of the population viewed the Treaty as a sell-out of 
the revolution~ The negotiators had not brought back a 
Republic, and nothing less would be accepted. The I.R.A. 
was split on the issue of the Treaty·. The majority of 
G.H.Q. officers favored acceptance: Richard Mulcahy, Chief 
of Staff; Eoin O'Duffy, Deputy Chief of Staff; J.J. O'Connell, 
Assistant Chief of Staff; Gearoid O'Sullivan, Adjutant-
General; Sean MacMahon, Quartermaster-General, Piaras 
Beaslai, Director of Publicity; Emmet Dalton Director of 
Training; Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Director of Organization; and, 
in his role as Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins. 
Opposed to the Treaty were: Liam Mellowes, Director of Pur-
chases; Rory O'Connor, Director of Engineering; Seamus 
O'Donovan, Director of Chemicals; and Sean Russell, Director 
of Munitions. While those against the Treaty were in a 
minority on Headquarters Staff, they had strong backing from 
divisional commandants, like Liam Lynch, brigade leaders 
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like Oscar Traynor, and their rank and file.l Vocal dis-
content was especially prominent from the Southern divisions. 
Very often, the attitude of the local officers determined 
whether his men would accept or reject the Treaty. 
The Truce had been a mixed blessing for the army of 
the Republic. They had used the opportunity to reorganize 
and revamp their forces. The process of forming divisions 
was extended throughout the country. Recruiting was vig-
orous. Some arms and munitions were acquired. However, the 
absence of war time conditions and restrictions also meant 
a relaxation in discipline and a breakdown in control. Nu-
merous violations of the Truce result·ed. Segments of the 
I.R.A. grew belicose, romanticizing and overstating their 
struggle of the last two years. Their disdain of the non-
military increased and "large numbers of them developed a 
militaristic spirit, regarding themselves as superior to mere 
civilians and politicians."2 A state of lawlessness grew in 
the country as "the nominal control of local units exercised 
by General Headquarters and the Dail Government during the 
war became even less meaningful, while the personalities and 
opinions of local commanders assumed even greater impor~ 
tance .... The I.R.A. became more and more a law unto itself."3 
lcalton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), pp. 235-236; J. Bowyer Bell, !he 
Invisible Army (London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1972), p.46. 
2Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish Rev-
olution: The Free Staters" University Review V (Spring, 1968): 
38-39. 
3~. 1 PP• 39r-40 • 
And, according to Liam Lynch, "We have declared for an 
Irish Republic and will not live under ~ny other law."4 
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The underlying question tormenting the Deputies was 
whether the army would accept the dictates of the Dail, 
regardless of the outcome of the vote on the Treaty. Having 
allowed the I.R.A. freely to chart its own course during the 
war, the Dail was unsure whether it could now establish 
control. Because the I.R.A. was not a professional army, 
because it was not accustomed either to strict discipline or 
complete subservience to civil authority, the possibility of 
a rebellion by the army was very real indeed. In fact, the 
I.R.A. had a tradition of independence and political aware-
ness and involvement. The men of the republican army were 
citizen-soldiers, motivated to fight by their ideals and 
beliefs, successors to the men of 1916 and guardians of the 
Republic. As Seamus Robinson, Commandant of the Tipperary 
Brigade and T.D. for Waterford, said: "If we had no political 
outlook, we would not be soldiers at all."S President de 
Valera's statement that the army was not affected by the 
Treaty debates was unrealistic, given the history and devel-
opment of the army. As one observed noted: "The Army, be-
cause of its spirit and character, because of the very factors 
4Quoted in John Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Cen-
tury (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.49. 
Srreland, Dail Eireann, Debates on the Treaty between 
Great Britain and Ireland, (1921-1922): 289-290. (Herein-
after referred to as Treaty Debates) . 
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that had made it an effective weapon of liberation, could 
not be insulated against the storms of passion and controver-
sy which began to rage around the question of the Treaty."6 
The problem was not that the men of the I.R.A. had their 
own opinions on the Treaty, but that some of them might 
attempt to dictate to the Dail, to enforce their views with 
arms. 
Deputies were subjected to intimidation and threat-
ened by soldiers. For example, a notice was given to the 
senior Deputy for Cork City which stated: 
To all T.D. 's in Cork No. 1 Area: 
(1} On December lOth the Staff of the First Southern 
Division and all Brigade Commandants met and sent 
forward to G.H.Q. a unanimous demand for the rejection 
of the Treaty proposals. 
(2} You are reminded it is your duty to support this 
demand. 
(3) To act otherwise would be treason to the Republic 
to which we have sworn allegiance.7 
Mr. Fahy of Galway claimed: "I was approached by a member of 
the I.R.A. as I came here today and told if I voted for the 
Treaty I would be shot."8 Ev-eryone condemned the threats of 
violence. The Minister for Defence gave repeated assurances 
that the discipline of the army would be enforced. President 
de Valera declared: "If the army as a national army does not 
6Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954}, p.l96. 
7Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second 
Da i 1 , ( 19 21-19 2 2 ) : 18 2 • 
aibid., p.l28. 
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obey the Government and until the Dail is dissolved any man 
who does not obey the Government, if there is any scrap of 
an army left to arrest him, he will be a·rrested. "9 The Chief 
of Staff, Richard Mulcahy, affirmed his belief that the 
army would remain loyal no matter what occurred. He explain-
ed that the army leaders were just expressing their opinions 
and that any lack of discipline was unintentional and would 
be corrected. With a characteristic insensitivity to the 
fears of those not directly involved with the military, a 
trait which would later plague him during his tenure as 
Minister for Defence, Mulcahy stated: "I don't know what 
undercurrent of irritation is troubling people in regard to 
the army."lO 
Trying to keep the situation in balance, the Minister 
for Defence issued instructions that the army, as an army, 
was not to interfere in non-military affairs. That proved 
a difficult order to follow. The presence of officers of 
the I.R.A. in the Dail guaranteed that no matter how scru-
pulously they tried to separate their roles as soldiers and 
Deputies, the pressure of the army would be felt during the 
debates. The dilemma of Gearoid O'Sullivan, Adjutant-
General and County Carlow T.D., illustrates this confusion 
of roles: 
9rreland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second 
Dail, (1921-1922) : 134. 
lOrbid., pp. 132-133. 
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When I was summoned to this meeting of the Dail I thought 
it my duty to consult the people who elected me to the 
Dail and I went on Monday evening to Carlow .•.. I met 
the people \vho proposed me, seconded me, and elected 
me. I met the Brigade Commander and he spoke on this 
matter and I said, 'I have been discussing this matter 
with people I have a right to discuss it with. I can't 
discuss it with you.•ll 
Not all I.R.A. Deputies were as particular as the Adjutant-
General. 
Moreover, both sides used the popularity and in-
fluence of army leaders to gain support for their positions. 
The pro-Treaty leaders selected Commandant Sean McKeon, 
famous as the "Blacksmith from Ballinalee" and recognized 
hero of the "Troublesn, to second the motion for ratifica-
tion of the agreement. The anti-Treaty people produced a 
statement from well-known and respected officers, Liam Lynch, 
Ernie O'Malley, Oscar Traynor and Michael MacCormaic, which 
protested ''against the use of our Division of the Army to 
influence public opinion and the opinion of members of Dail 
Eireann in the direction favourable to the Treaty; and we 
desire, secondly, to state that we maintain unimpaired our 
allegiance to the Irish Republic and to it alone."12 
Like the I.R.A., the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
could not keep itself aloof from the debate on the Treaty. 
Collins, now President of the organization, tried to place 
the prestige and influence of the Brotherhood behind the 
llibid., pp.l29-130 
12Treaty Debates, pp.289-290. 
p 
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Treaty. He argued that they could use the Treaty to gain 
their ultimate aim of a Republic and that the present mili-
tary situation made an accommodation advisable. But unity 
could not be secured in the I.R.B. anymore than in the 
I.R.A. or in the Dail. While a meeting of the Supreme Coun-
-
cil on December 10, 1921, endorsed acceptance of the Treaty, 
the vote was not unanimous (12-4). The Council issued the 
following order; 
The Supreme Council, having due regard to the Consti-
tution of the Organisation, has decided that the present 
Peace Treaty between Ireland and Great Britain should 
be ratified. 
Members of the Organization, however, who have to take 
public action as representatives are given freedom of 
action in the matter.l3 
Throughout the country, various local I.R.B. units rejected 
the order to accept the Treaty and the entire South Munster 
Division declared against the Treaty.l4 The split certainly 
hampered any attempt by Collins to secure support for the 
agreement. Traditional historians have credited the I.R.B. 
with being one of the major forces behind the Treaty's 
majority in the Dail. Revisionist interpretation, however, 
argues that the role of the Organisation has been over 
emphasized, citing the opposition to the Treaty within the 
I.R.B. and the freedom given to Brotherhood deputies to vote 
13Quoted in Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law 
(Dublin: Irish Press Ltd., 1954), p.l90. 
14rbid. 
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In the Dail, Arthur Grif·fith moved for the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland. He 
argued that it provided for "an Ireland developing her own 
way of existence, and rebuilding the Gaelic civilisation 
broken down at the battle of Kinsdale," and that it would 
end the bitter conflict which for centuries had poisoned 
the relations between the two countries. 16 
In response, President de Valera appealed to the 
Dail to vote against ratification of the agreement because 
it was "absolutely inconsistent with our position; it gives 
away Irish independence; it brings us into the British 
Empire; it acknowledges the head of the British Empire, 
not merely as the head of an association, but as the direct 
monarch of Ireland, as the source of executive authority in 
Ireland."l7 Thus, the debate continued. 
Those who supported the Treaty did so for a variety 
of reasons. Some agreed with Arthur Griffith that it was an 
honorable document, justifiable in and of itself. Others 
felt as Michael Collins did that "it gives us freedom, not 
the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, 
15see, for example, Joseph Curran, "The Decline and 
Fall of the I.R.B.," Eire Ireland X (Spring, 1975): 14-23. 
16Treaty Debates, pp. 22-23. 
17Ibid., p. 26. 
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but the freedom to achieve it."l8 Still others believed with 
Richard Mulcahy that although the agreement was a defeat, it 
could be utilized for the development of the nation. He did 
not want the Treaty, but felt that while "none of us want the 
Treaty ... I see no solid spot of ground upon which the 
Irish people can put its political feet but upon the 
Treaty."l 9 Many concurred with Gavan Duffy that there was 
simply no other alternative to immediate war but acceptance 
of the agreement. 
President de Valera had tried, in private session, 
to provide the Dail with an alternative, Document #2. In 
an effort to secure unity and avoid an open split, the 
President tried to modify the agreement so that the Irish 
could put forth a unanimous counter-proposal. As he often 
said in the course of the debates, he was trying to find 
something, some formula, which everyone could accept. Bas-
ically, Document #2 was an updated edition of de Valera's 
idea of External Association. Ireland would remain a Republic, 
an associated Republic. All legislative, executive and ju-
dicial authority would derive from the Irish people. For pur-
poses of common concern,however, she would be associated with 
the states of the British CommomV"ealth and "for the purposes 
of the Association, Ireland shall recognise His Britannic 
1 8Treaty Debates, p.32. 
19Treaty Debates, p.l42. 
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' h d f h ' . n 20 h T . MaJesty as ea o t e Assoc1at1on. T e pro- reaty1tes 
reminded the Dail that the British had already rejected 
these terms. They insisted that this was not a viable 
alternative but an effort to obfuscate the real issue. 
Furthermore, they charged that the difference between the 
two documents was not so great that those who were prepared 
to accept the one, could not, in principle, accept the other. 
Die-hart Republicans also rejected Document #2. 
They wanted an isolated republic with no oaths, no ties, 
no "association" with the British Empire. Their demand was 
for total and complete sovereignty. Facing further dissen-
sion, de Valera withdrew his proposal. As one of his biog-
raphers noted "the President was forced to conclude that if 
the deputies themselves did not understand his proposition, 
it might be interpreted generally as an unworthy departure 
from the old idea of an isolated Republic. Political in-
stinct made him wary of the taint of compromise." 21 
The main objection to the Treaty was one of principle. 
These men and especially the women members of the Dail had 
sworn an oath to uphold the Republic, had been prepared to 
die for Irish freedom and could not in conscience now accept 
Dominion Status. It was a question of honor and there could 
20Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second 
Dail, (1921-1922), Appendix 18: 321. 
21Mary Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation 
(London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1956), p.l52. 
be no compromise on such an issue. 
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As Liam Mellowes said: 
To my mind the Republic does exist. It is a living 
tangible thing, something for which men gave their 
lives, for which men were hanged, for which men are 
in jail, for which the people suffered, and for which 
men are still prepared to give their lives. It was not 
a question so far as I am aware, before any of us, or 
the people of Ireland, that the Irish heifer was going 
to be sold in the fair and that we were asking a high 
price so that we would get something less. There was 
no question of making a bargain over this thing, over 
the honor of Ireland, because I hold that the honour 
of Ireland is too scared a thing to make a bargain 
over.22 
Those who argued for acceptance of the Treaty empha-
sized that above all else, the agreement gave the Irish the 
substance of freedom. Under the terms of the Treaty, Ireland 
would be able to control her own domestic affairs. She 
would be free to develop her own economy and to end the 
British exploitation of her resources. Irishmen, in charge 
of their own education, consequently would be able to 
nurture and foster a Gaelic society complete with Irish 
values, culture and language. According to Piaras Beaslai, 
the Treaty offered them the chance "to realize the visions 
of Thomas Davis, of Rooney and Pearse, of a free, happy and 
glorious Gaelic state." 23 Under the terms of the Treaty, 
moreover, Ireland would finally be rid of the hated British 
forces and legally able to raise her own army. This was 
especially important to the I.R.A. Deputies. That the agree-
ment would bring the evacuation of the British Army was a 
22Treaty Debates, p.l80. 
23Treaty Debates, p.23. 
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reoccurring theme in their speeches. As Commandant Sean 
McKeon stated: 
To me this Treaty gives me what I and my comrades fought 
for; it gives us for the first time in 700 years the 
evacuation of Britain's armed forces out of Ireland. 
It also gives me my hope and dream, our own Army, not 
half-equipped but fully equipped, to defend our interests. 
If the Treaty were much worse in words than it is 
alleged to be, once it gave me these two things, I would 
take it and say as long as the armed forces of Britain 
are gone and the armed forces of Ireland remain, we can 
develop our own nation in our own way.24 
In dealing with the question of the Crown and the 
oath of allegiance, the pro-Treaty forces attempted to min-
imize their importance. They explained that the oath the 
Irish would take was different from that of the other Do-. 
minions. The Irish would swear true faith and allegiance 
solely to the Constitution of the Irish Free State and would 
only agree to be faithful to King George and his heirs by 
virtue of common citizenship and membership in the British 
Commonwealth. This, they claimed, was not an oath to the 
King, but to the Irish Free State. The anti-Treatyites 
argued that this was a distinction without a difference. 
They would swear no oath either of allegiance or faithful-
ness to the British monarch, symbol, to them, of English 
oppression and tyranny. 
Inextricably coupled with the problem of the oath of 
allegiance was the question of inclusion within the British 
Commonwealth. The Republicans rejected the idea of equal 
status with the other Dominions. Those countries were 
24Treaty Debates, p.23. 
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former colonies with strong ties to England. Ireland was a 
nation in her own right, herself a mqther country. Moreover, 
Ireland did not desire to enter into this particular 
community of nations and was being forced, under threat of 
war, to join a supposedly voluntary association. The pro-
Treaty party spoke of entering the Commonwealth with their 
heads up. As one Republican wag noted, it would be more 
accurate to say they were going in with their hands up. In 
addition, England was demanding of Ireland what she required 
of no other Dominion - the use of Irish ports, a definite 
compromise of Irish sovereignty. The anti-Treaty represent-
atives claimed that this demand of port facilities was in-
dicative of England's real attitude toward Ireland. Only 
sixty miles from the Irish coast, England would never allow 
Ireland to attain real freedom and thus possibly sever her 
relationship with the Empire. Occupation of the ports would 
provide the British with a convenient base to interfere with 
and retard any Irish movement towards complete independence. 
The Collins-Griffith group admitted that the geo-
graphical proximity of the two countries presented special 
problems. To compensate for that proximity, the plenipo-
tentiaries insisted that the Treaty include the provision 
that the relationship between Ireland and England be the 
same in law, practice, and constitutional usage as that of 
Canada and England. Any attempt by the British to violate 
the rights of the Free State would thus be a threat to all 
the Dominions by establishing a dangerous precedent. Collins 
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himself felt that the other Dominions w~re "in effect, 
introduced as a guarantee of our freedom, which makes us 
stronger than if we stood alone."25 Moreover, Dominion status 
offered Ireland the international recognition, which she had 
long sought in vain, and admission to the League of Nations, 
steps towards achieving complete and full partnership in 
the family of nations. 
The question of the partition of Northern Ireland 
received little attention in the Treaty discussions. As 
one of the biographers of de Valera noted: "The most remark-
able feature of the debates, including the President's 
speeches, was the lack of emphasis on the partition clauses 
of the Treaty. Almost everyone seemed to accept the con-
tention of Griffith and Collins that the boundary commission 
clause would mean the ending of partition, by cutting off 
so much of the northern area as to make the rest non-
viable."26 Those opposed to the settlement could do little 
more than to state the obvious fact that the agreement did 
not guarantee unity and protest that they were deserting 
their Republican comrades in the North. Short of coercion, 
however, a policy previously rejected, they had no alter-
native to offer. Moreover, as one pro-Treaty deputy pointed 
out, "a Republic would definitely alienate the North-East 
25Treaty Debates, p.34. 
26Thornas P. O'Neill and The Earl of Longford, Eamon 
De Valera (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p.l79. 
, 
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Ulster corner and divide our unfortunate country into 
two separate and distinct areas and into t\vo races for all 
time." 27 
Possible alternatives and their consequences were 
debated at length. A rejection of the Treaty would probably 
mean a resumption of war - "terrible and immediate war~!' 
Were the British bluffing and could the Irish afford to 
gamble? The Minister for Defence claimed that the army was 
"in a much better position to fight now than when the Truce 
started." 28 Some of his officers disagreed. While the 
army had more men, they were still short of arms, despite 
the efforts to import guns during the Truce. Commandant 
Sean McKeon reported: 
I know perfectly well I have charge of four thousand 
men •..• But of that four thousand I have a rifle for 
every fifty. Now that is the position as far as I am 
concerned and I may add that there is about as much 
ammunition as would last them about fifty minutes for 
that one rifle.29 
Those who favored risking a return to war emphasized 
the Irish military efforts of the Black and Tan period. They 
felt the I.R.A. could continue the fight effectively enough 
to force the British to agree to a Republic. To these 
claims 1 the Chief of Staff 1 Dick .Mulcahy, responded that "we 
have not been able to drive the enemy from anything but a 
28Ireland, Dail Eireann 1 Private Session of Second 
Dail, (1921-1922): 128. 
29Ibid., p.225. 
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fairly good-sized police barracks." 30 
The two sides also disagreed on whether the people 
would support the army if the Dail rejected the Treaty. All 
felt that without popular support, any military effort was 
doomed to failure. The pro-Treaty faction argued that the 
Irish people alone had the right to determine the question 
of war or peace. They proposed that the Republicans abstain 
from voting against the Treaty, thus insuring its ratifica-
tion by the Dail, and thus allowing the people in a referen-
dum either to accept or reject the agreement. Collins argued 
that: 
I would not be one of those to commit the Irish people 
to war without the Irish people committing themselves 
to war •••. I don't want a lecture from anybody as to 
what my principles are to be now •••• I can state for 
you a principle which everybody can understand, the 
principle of government by the consent of the governed."31 
The proponents of the Treaty highlighted the benefits 
and blessings of peace which would accrue to the nation 
under the Irish Free State. The Republicans argued that not 
peace but chaos and dissension would flow from such a state. 
Mary MacSwiney promised to be the "first rebel" of the new 
government.3 2 Seamus Robinson asked: "Will the Volunteers 
follow this new Government? I know that I can speak at any 
rate for my own brigade and I do not believe they will. 
30Treaty Debates, p.l43. 
31Treaty Debates, pp.34-35. 
32 Ibid., p.lll. 
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Many Volunteers will think that this will be ultra vires 
and will have no binding, moral, legal or any other weight 
with us."3 3 And Liam Mellowes prophesized that the Treaty 
would not bring peace because: 
..• there will be restless souls in the country who will 
not be satisfied under this Free State to make peace 
possible. I use no threats, but you cannot bring peace 
by compromise ..•. We stand, some of us, where weal-
ways stood and despite all that has been said in favour 
of this Treaty we mean to continue standing where we 
stood in the past. Whatever may happen, whatever the 
road may be in front of us, we intend with God's help to 
travel it.34 
After the Dail recessed for Christmas and the Deputies 
returned home, they fully recognized the support the Treaty 
commanded among the vast majority of the people. Certainly 
this fact weighed heavily on those who were waivering in 
their decision. Some delegates switched their position as 
a result of the pressure of public opinion~ The Christmas 
respite gave the Free Staters a definite edge. To their 
repertoire of arguments, they could now add the certainty 
that the people were strongly in favor of ratification. The 
de Valera party contended that the populace was being st:amped-
ed into favoring the Treaty especially by the press and the 
pulpit, and that they did not truly understand what the 
Treaty meant. If they realized the implications of the 
agreement, the people would reject it. As President 
33Ireland, Dail Eireann, Private Sessions of Second 
Dail (1921-1922): 239-240. 
34Treaty Debates, pp.227-234. 
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de Valera explained: "and whenever I want to know what the 
Irish people wanted I had only to examine my own heart and 
it told me straight off what the Irish people wanted."35 
Before the recess, passage of the Treaty was at best 
questionable; after the Christmas interlude, it was fairly 
certain. Speechmaking continued through the first week of 
January, but it had now degenerated into bitter accusations 
and personal recriminations. Cathal Brugha's vicious 
denunciation of Michael Collins as a fraud, a war hero only 
in the annals of the press, was but one extreme example of 
the poisonous atmosphere permeating the Dail.36 Finally, 
on January 7, 1922, the Speaker called the roll and Dail 
Eireann approved the Articles of Agreement beb~een Great 
Britain and Ireland, 64 to 57, a margin of merely seven 
votes. Immediately following the vote, the Minister for 
Defence said: "So far as I am concerned I will see, at any 
rate, that discipline is kept in the army ... 37 
In retrospect, the Treaty proved to be what Collins 
had claimed it was, a stepping stone to a Republic, albeit 
a 26 county Republic. Dominion status was the most far 
reaching offer the British ever made to the Irish~ Given 
their imperialistic attitude, it was unrealistic to expect 
them to forgo the trappings of monarchy and Empire .in 1922. 
35Treaty Debates, p.274. 
36Treaty Debates, pp.326-334. 
37Ibid. p.347. 
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The most unsatisfactory aspect of the Treaty proved to be 
the sections dealing with Northern Ireland. In a grevious 
error of judgment, the Irish delegates trusted the promises, 
interpretation and implication given them by Lloyd George, 
without receiving any firm guarantees. 
The ratification of the Treaty ushered in a period 
of confusion and chaos. While an armed conflict may not 
have been inevitable, 38 from January to June, the country 
drifted inexorably into civil war despite the numerous 
attempts to restore unity and harmony. The solidarity and 
friendship of the past two years were soon replaced by 
enmity and discord and finally by a war of brother against 
brother. 
On January 9th, Arthur Griffith succeeded de Valera 
as President of the Dail. De Valera lost re-election by 
only two votes. Reluctantly, the deputies realized that if 
the Treaty were to be implemented, de Valera's continuation 
in office would be impossible. Republicans stomped out of 
the Dail in protest of the election of a President whose aim 
was to dismantle the Republic. A period of governmental 
confusion and ambiguity followed. The Republicans returned 
to the assembly and Griffith formed his Dail ministry. In 
addition, according to the terms of the Treaty, a tran-
sitional Provisional Government was to be established to 
supervise the transfer of power. On January 14, the 
38John A. Hurphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century 
(Dublin; Gill and Macmillan, 1975), p.47. 
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Parliament of Southern Ireland, established by the Partition 
Act of 1920 and ignored in the South until this date, was 
convened. Sixty pro-Treaty deputies and four University 
representatives elected the necessary Provisional Government 
officials and adjourned. Michael Collins was selected as 
Chairman. Most of his ministers held duplicate positions 
in the Dail Government. Collins himself was Minister for 
Finance in Griffith's Cabinet. 
The Republicans made much of the duality of ministe-
rial positions, demanding assurances from each Minister that 
they acknowledge the Dail as the sov~reign parliament of 
the nation and recognize that the authority to act arises 
only from that body. The entire proceedings took on an air 
of unreality. Michael Hayes, Minister for Education in both 
the Dail and Provisional Governments, cut through the absurd-
ity of this procedure, when upon being asked what was the 
relationship between the Minister for Education of Dail 
Eireann and" ... another Minister for Education that we hear 
spoken of" replied that the relations were of "an intimate 
and cordial character."39 The policy of the Republicans was 
to obstruct and obsfucate. They harassed and hampered the 
Government with questions, amendments and constitutional 
traps. Neither side displayed much restraint; and the war 
of words, verbal attacks as stinging as bullets, only 
39rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 
{28 February 1922 to 8 June 1922) :93. 
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exacerbated the already volatile temper of the country and 
the army. 
Initially, the anti-Treaty elements in the army, 
later known as the Irregulars or Executive Forces, were 
appeased by the statement of the new Minister for Defence, 
Richard Mulcahy, that 11 the army will remain the army of 
the Irish Republic. 1140 They watched and waited as Dublin 
castle, symbol of British rule, was handed over to the Irish. 
on January 16th. Two weeks later, the Irish Republican Army 
marched into Beggar's Bush Barracks to occupy their new 
headquarters. The British had begun to evacuate military 
posts throughout the country. The Black and Tans were moving 
out and the Royal Irish Constabulary was being disbanded. 
By April, Mulcahy was able to report to the Dail that the 
evacuation of the R.I.C. was practically complete and that 
the army had taken over approximately 40 military posi-
tions.41 
The policy of the army was to allow local I.R.A. 
units, regardless of their position on the Treaty, to occupy 
abandoned barracks~ To a great extent, this decision was 
necessitated by the fact that the Government did not have 
enough loyal troops to occupy all posts throughout the 
country, particularly in the South where a majority of the 
40Treaty Debates, p.424. 
41Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February 
1922 to 8 June 1922): 250. 
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army was anti-Treaty. It was also a reflection of the hope 
that the I.R.A. would remain loyal and that hostility to the 
Treaty would abate once it became obvious that the British 
army was leaving Ireland, or at least leaving the 26 counties. 
The Minister for Defence assured the government that the 
"troops occupying such posts shall not use their power to 
interfere with the expression of the people's will at the 
pending General Election, and will not turn their arms 
against any Government elected by the people at that elec-
tion."42 This, however, was not a condition imposed on the 
43 I.R.A., but appeared only to be a personal commitment from 
Mulcahy, based perhaps on his faith in the army. 
A unified Republican army was daily becoming more 
difficult to sustain. The British officials handed over 
posts to representatives of the Provisional Government; a 
segment of the I.R.A. accepted them on behalf of the Republic. 
Moreover, the Minister for Defence and his staff were attempt-
ing to create a regular National Army. Beginning with the 
segment of the Dublin I.R.A. which had remained loyal to 
G.H.Q. and supported the Treaty, they formed the nucleus of 
the Free State Army which was intended to be a paid, 
professional force, housed in barracks, subject to strict 
army discipline and controlled by the government through the 
42Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February 
1922 to 8 June 1922}: 140. 
43Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954), pp.203-204. 
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Minister for Defence and General Headquarters. A portion 
of the Volunteers would be retained on a part-time basis, 
constituting a reserve force. Those I.R.A. men who either 
could not or would not accept these new conditions were to 
be demobolized. At first, recruitment was limited to those 
who had served in the I.R.A. This policy was changed, how-
ever, and enlistments increased, helped by the high unem-
ployment in the country and the disbanding of the R.I.C. 
That the army accepted men who had not fought in the Anglo-
Irish war hurt the popularity of the Beggar's Bush Force, as 
did the fact that certain officers were being excluded from 
high posts which, at times, were being given to professional 
officers who either had not fought at all or had contributed 
little to the struggle. 44 These men felt they were being 
treated badly. As Sean Mayland said: 
I am not as quick on the draw as I would like to be but 
I am a gunman. During the war, the British enemy called 
me the leader of a murder gang. The ~1inister for Defence, 
in his report, yesterday called me the leader of a robber 
gang. I am as free from the crime of robbery as I am free 
from the crime of murder ...• We took men away from their 
employments ... and got them ready to fight .... Those 
men have been out of employment, without a smoke, ill-
shod, badly clad and - we are not all Pusseyfooters - in 
want of a drink too. That is the fault of the men who 
told us that the Truce was a breathing space. We were 
guaranteed payment for those men .... We did not get it. 
I have always seized every opportunity I could get to 
try and get comforts for my men .... I robbed nineteen 
44Desmond Williams, "From the Treaty to the Civil 
War," in The Irish Struggle 1916-1922, ed. Desmond l\Tilliams 
(Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1966), pp.l21-122. 
Post Offices •..• During the war, my word went in 
North Cork. In spite of any terms that would be 
applied to me today, my word goest there yet.45 
The problem with accommodating old soldiers to a new army 
was not limited to the pre-Civil war army but would also 
cause difficulties for Headquarters in 1924. 
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The anti-Treaty segment of the I.R.A. could not help 
but notice that the Republic and the Volunteers were being 
effectively, if quietly, dismantled. To prevent this from 
continuing, dissident members of G.H.Q. and divisional 
commandants wrote the Minister for Defence on January 11th 
demanding an Army Convention to consider these resolutions: 
That the Army re-affirm its allegiance to the Irish 
Republic. 
That it shall be retained as the Army of the Irish 
Republic, under an Executive appointed by the Convention. 
That the army shall be under the supreme control of 
such Executive which shall draft a Constitution for 
submission to a subsequent Convention.46 
Mulcahy replied that the supreme control of the army is 
vested in the Dail, the elected Government of the Irish 
Republic, and that "the proposal contained in the resolution 
to change the supreme control of the army is entirely outside 
the Constitutional powers vested in the Dail Executive by 
the Dail." 47 
The Republicans' demand for a Convention and an 
Executive was theoretically reasonable and not unprecedented. 
45Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 Feb-
ruary 1922 to 8 June 1922): 340. · 
46Ireland, State Paper Office, Dublin (hereinafter 
cited as SPOD), Army, Negotiations for Unification, Sl233. 
47rhid . 
.......---..-
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The right to hold general army meetings had existed since 
the creation of the Volunteers and no change had been of-
ficially made in the Constitution to abrogate that right. A 
convention was deemed necessary because of the crisis over 
the Treaty. The Republicans felt such a meeting was the 
best way to preserve both the unity of the army and its 
democratic and voluntary character. 
The proposal for an Executive also echoed the early 
Volunteer days, pre-Dail Eireann and pre-Volunteer oath. 
Mulcahy's own interpretation of the establishment of an 
army executive was: 
•.. it reverts the control of the Army back to the days 
before the disbandment of the Volunteer Executive. The 
object of this is to restore to the Army a control which 
shall be expressive of their feelings, and in which the 
Army as a whole may expect to have confidence •••• The 
setting up of an Executive in this way does not in actual 
fact take the Army away from the control of the Dail. 
It but secures that just as in the earlier days of the 
recent operations, the work of the Army shall be along 
lines agreed to, not only by the Dail but by its own 
Executive.48 
This analysis of the Republican demands was most favorable 
and optimistic, arising, one suspects, more out of Mulcahy's 
desire for military solidarity than from a realistic 
appraisal of the situation; yet he was prepared to reco~nend 
this policy to the Dail. As ~1inister for Defence, Mulcahy 
was supporting a proposal which, in the context of the Re-
pulican demands, was a definite rejection of civilian control, 
an awkward and incongruous position for a government minister. 
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Mulcahy, however, was also an army man and knew that the 
times were such that doctrinaire adherence to abstract 
principles might well cost lives and threaten the very exist-
ence of the government in which he served. Mulcahy was 
attempting to act as a bridge between the Government and the 
Republicans. He would recommend the convention to the Dail; 
he would also try to delay such a meeting, and, at the pro-
posed Convention, try to induce the army to accept a moder-
ate position. In the interests of peace and solidarity, 
both he and Collins were willing to negotiate and compromise. 
The threat of fratricidal strife justified such action. 
On January 18, 1922, writing as the Chairman of the 
newly formed Acting Military Council of the I.R.A., Rory 
O'Connor informed the Chief of Staff, Eoin O'Duffy, that if 
the Minister for Defence would not authorize a convention, 
the Council would proceed on its own. He added that, while 
the signatories of the demand were anxious to cooperate and 
hasten the British evacuation of the country, they would now 
only act on orders countersigned by O'Connor.4 9 This was 
the beginning of the repudiation of the authority of G.H.Q. 
and Dail Eireann. That same day the General Staff and all 
Divisional and Brigade Commandants held a meeting in Dublin 
49rreland, SPOD, Army, Negotiations for Unification, 
Sl233. The signatories were Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes, 
Joseph O'Donovan, Sean Russell, all of G.H.Q., and Oscar 
Traynor, O.C. Dublin Brigade; A. McDonnell, O.C. Sth Dublin 
Brigade; Liam Lynch, O.C. 1st Southern Division; M. McCormack 
O.C. 3rd Southern Division; Thomas Maguire, O.C. 2nd Western 
Division; William Polkington, o.c. 3rd Western Division; 
M. MacGiollarnath, O.C. 4th Western Division. 
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to discuss the Republican proposals. Those favoring a Con-
vention argued that such a meeting was necessary to ascertain 
the point of view of the army on the national situation and 
that "the action of the majority in the Dail in supporting 
the Treaty involving the setting up of an Irish Free State 
was a subversion of the Republic and relieved the Army from 
its allegiance to the Dail." 50 Mulcahy restated his posi-
tion that the supreme control of the army was vested in the 
Dail. He argued that a Convention at this point would have 
a disruptive effect on the army, crystallizing their differ-
ences and moving them toward the precipice of an open split. 
Mulcahy stalled, hoping that the more time that elapsed 
before the Convention, the cooler and more moderate the meet-
ing would be. He thus suggested that since they had no 
definite policy to put before the meeting, they should wait 
until the Constitution, which would delineate the relation-
ship of the I.R.A. to the Free State, was drafted. A com-
promise, the first of many, was accepted. The participants 
set up a "Watching Council of Four" to "guarantee that the 
Republican aim shall not be prejudiced." 51 The Council 
consisted of two signatories and two Divisional officers. 
Any two members could veto a proposal of the Staff. The 
Minister for Defence agreed to hold a Convention in two 
months time. Mulcahy had succeeded in stalling, but the 
50Ibid. 
Slrbid. 
"I I 
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resulting interlude would ultimately prove dangerous and 
divisive to the army. 
The Divisions and Brigades were hardening in their 
attitude toward the Treaty, either for or against, and 
violence was threatening to erupt throughout the country. 
In early February, 1922, Ernie O'Malley and the Second 
Southern Division openly repudiated the Treaty, the author-
ity of the Dail and G.H.Q. They claimed they were now an 
independent Division. To acquire arms, they raided an R.I.C. 
barracks at Clonmel and captured guns, ammunition and 
grenades. To acquire funds, they imposed a levy on the 
people of their district. Beggar's Bush did not have enough 
loyal men in the area to meet this challenge, so the Second 
Southern's defiance went unchecked. 
Following the example of O'Malleyts Division, the 
Mid-Limerick Brigade issued the following proclamation on 
February 18th: 
The aims of the head of the army and the majority of its 
G.H.Q. Staffs are now unquestionably to subvert the 
Republic, support the Provisional Government and make 
possible the establishment of the Irish Free State. We 
declare that we no longer recognise the authority of 
the present head of the army, and renew our allegiance 
to the existing Irish Republic, confident we will have 
the support of all units of the I. R.A.. and of the loyal 
citizens of the Irish Republic.52 
The British were to begin evacuating that area, which included 
Limerick City, on February 23rd. General Headquarters, 
52Quoted in Dorothy MacCardle, The Irish Republic 
(London: Transworld Publishers, 1969}, p.6l2. 
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realizing the strategic importance of the Limerick terri t,ory 
as a gateway to both the south and west and as a command 
point of the river Shannon, ordered Commandant Michael Brennan 
of the 1st Western Division to march in and occupy the 
barracks with troops loyal to Beggars Bush. The Republicans 
described it as "the invasion of Limerick." Both sides sent 
in reinforcements and established their own posts. Fighting 
was prevented only by the intervention of Liarn Lynch, Oscar 
Traynor, Collins, Mulcahy and O'Duffy. They again worked 
out a compromise and defused the impending crisis. 
During the Limerick crisis, Griffith had urged his 
Cabinet to take action. He was forestalled by Collins who 
heartily endorsed the suggestion of a negotiated settlement. 
During the months preceding the actual outbreak of hostilities, 
the Cabinet was divided over the best method of dealing with 
the Republicans. Griffith, supported by O'Higgins and 
Cosgrave, favored a strong non-compromising stance. They 
felt it imperative to answer the challenge of the Republicans 
and uphold the decision of the Dail. The President and his 
allies had very little connection with the army and felt the 
situation grave enough to risk the possible outbreak of wide 
spread fighting. collins and Mulcahy, however, were Army men 
as well as politicians. They still retained a deep affection 
and affiliation for their old comrades. Unceasingly, they 
tried to avert a split in the I.R.A. and were loathe to 
take up arms against men with whom they had fought less than 
, 
a year before. To avoid this, they advocated a policy of 
accommodation. 
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Originally, the Cabinet had sanctioned the calling of 
the Convention. However, the Limerick crisis, coupled with 
the growing practice of selecting delegates to the meeting 
on a political basis and the rumoured threat that the army 
would prevent the upcoming election, caused the Government 
to reconsider. When Mulcahy informed his colleagues that 
"he could not guarantee that if this Convention was held 
there would not be set up a body regarding itself as a mil-
itary government not responsible to the people" nor could he 
see any hope of passing a resolution disclaiming military 
government and pledging the loyalty of the I.R.A. to what-
ever Government the people elected, the Dail Cabinet rescind-
ed its previous decision and on March 15th, proscribed the 
Convention. 53 To increase the impact of this prohibition, 
the Cabinet also decided that only officers who remained 
loyal and obeyed the orders of the Provisional Government 
would receive financial support.S4 This was an extension of 
an earlier decree of 27 February, 1922, which stated that 
"no funds or other assistance would be given to any unit 
which did not guarantee not to interfere with an election 
53rreland, SPOD, Army, Negotiations for Unification, 
81233. 
54 Ibid. 
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and that they would support the Government elected." 55 
Through the power of the purse, the Cabinet was trying to 
exercise and maintain civilian control of the army. 
The Republican Military Council defied the Govern-
ment's ban and summoned its own convention. On March 23rd, 
5 Divisional Commandants and 29 Brigade Commandants from 
a total of 14 Division and 71 Brigade Commands, signed the 
order. The decision to ignore the prohibition of the 
Cabinet caused a section of the Army openly to break from 
the Government. The Minister for Defence and his Chief of 
Staff held another conciliatory meeting with Liam Lynch and 
the 1st Southern Division on March 20th. The magic formula 
for unity again eluded them. While the Republicans agreed 
to frame some definite proposals for associating the I.R.A. 
with the elected Government, in return they demanded a 
convention to be held at a later date, and a halt to recruit-
ing for the Civic Guard, the police force, which the 
Republicans considered the para-military arm of the Provision-
al Government. The Cabinet rejected these terms as unaccept-
able. Consequently, Mulcahy had to instruct his Chief of 
Staff to regard any member who attended the Convention as 
severing his connection with the I.R.A. However~ the 
Minister added a softening touch. He informed his staff 
that the holding of a "Sectional Convention" while divisive, 
55rreland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, Gl/1, Vol.l. 
i 
i' 
II 
I 
95 
should not destroy the spirit of brotherhood in the army 
and cautioned them against antagonizing their recalcitrant 
brethren.56 Throughout the various attempts at maintaining 
army unity, Mulcahy exhibited a tendency, not to subvert 
the Cabinet's intentions, but rather to handle army matters 
in his own way. The endless negotiations among I.R.A. 
officers, to the exclusion and, sometimes disapproval of 
the politicians, established a precedent as to the manner 
in which army affairs would later be conducted. 
The Republican Convention was attended by 223 anti-
Treaty delegates, representing approximately 60 per cent 
of the army. 57 There were no surprises. The delegates 
reaffirmed their allegiance to the Republic and elected an 
Executive of 16 in whom they vested supreme control of the 
army. The Executive repudiated the authority of the Minister 
for Defence and the Chief of Staff. They discussed establish-
ing a military dictatorship and overthrowing all other govern-
ments in Ireland, Dail, Provisional, Northern and British. 
Rory O'Connor, one of the leading spokesmen, encouraged 
this speculation with his statements that "the holding of 
the Convention means we repudiate the Dail"; "We will set up 
an Executive which will issue orders to the I.R.A. all over 
the country"; and when asked if there were going to be 
56calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.253. 
57Florence O'Donoghue, No Other Law (Dublin: Irish 
Press Ltd., 1954), p.335. 
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a military dictatorship, O'Connor replied, "You can take it 
that way if you like."58 The contradiction inherent in 
simultaneously establishing a Republic and a dictatorship 
did not seem to bother the Convention delegates. What was 
probably intended was a temporary rule of the army until 
"loyal" 'politicians would reestablish a government. 
Following the Convention, on April 14th, the Ir-
regulars seized a number of buildings in Dublin, including, 
most prominently, the Four Courts. The occupation of the 
law courts building was a blatant challenge to the Govern-
ment. It was not met. The Cabinet was trying to avoid being 
manoeuvred into striking first. Collins was still not 
convinced that a peaceful solution was unattainable. More-
over, the Free State army was not yet ready to fight, es-
pecially against fellow Irishmen and former comrades. To 
wage a civil war would require a level of military discipline 
not yet present in the Beggars Bush force. 
However, the Provisional Government could not allow 
the situation to go unchecked much longer. Violence was 
spreading throughout the country, destroying property and 
preventing businesses from operating. Ambushes were numerous. 
Dublin itself, quiet since the Truce, now rang with the 
sound of gunfire and shook from the force of explosives. In 
Kilkenny, the conflict between the Irregulars and the 
58oorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic (London: 
Transworld Publishers, 1968), p.616. 
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National Army became so serious that it seemed as if full 
scale civil war was imminent. Once again, the army took the 
lead in arranging a compromise. 
Arising out of the Kilkenny crisis, ten army 
officers59 effected an agreement which they felt, could 
restore peace and avoid civil war. The Army Document of 
May 1st proposed: 
(1) The acceptance of the fact admitted by all sides, 
that the majority of the people of Ireland are 
willing to accept the Treaty. 
(2) An agreed election with a view to 
(3) Forming a Government which will have the confidence 
of the whole country. 
(4) Army unification on above basis.60 
A deputation of officers led by Commandant Sean O'Hegarty 
addressed the Dail on May 3rd. In a moving presentation, he 
pleaded with the Dail to act quickly on the Army Document 
in order to spare the country the horror of fratricidal 
strife: 
I conceive that it is the responsibility •.• particularly 
the responsibility of political leaders and army leaders 
and every member of this House to take a stand now 
definitely whether it will be civil war or this thing. 
I cannot conceive that there is any other way out nor 
can those associated with rne.61 
59The officials who drew up the Army Document were 
Collins, Mulcahy, O'Duffy, Gearoid O'Sullivan and Sean 
Boylan for the government; Torn Hales, Sean O'Hegarty, F. 
O'Donoghue, H. Hurphy and Dan Breen for the Irregulars. 
60Quoted in Calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War 
(London: Fontana Books, 1968), p.277. 
61Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report (28 February 
1922 to 8 June 1922): 359. 
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In the previous few months, the Dail had been unable to 
deal with the impending disaster. Since· ratifying the Sinn 
Fein Ard-Fheis agreement of February 22nd, wherein de Valera 
and Griffith had agreed to postpone the elections on the 
Treaty for three months because the state of the country 
would make a peaceful election, free from intimidation, im-
possible, the Dail had done little to ease the tension in 
Ireland. They redebated the Treaty numerous times. They 
quibbled and bickered, accused and denounced one another. 
O'Hegarty's plea spurred the nail to action. Both 
sides declared for a truce, to be effective as of May 4th, 
and selected a peace committee to negotiate a settlement. 
Unfortunately, it failed. While they all could agree to a 
Coalition, the Republicans could not accept even implicit 
recognition of the Treaty. However, on May 20th, Collins 
and de Valera were able to conclude a pact which made an 
election possible and, temporarily at least, reduced the 
threat of warfare. The two leaders agreed to contest the 
election jointly as a Sinn Fein panel, although independent 
candidates were free to enter the contest. They would then 
form a Coalition Government with each side keeping the same 
number of seats it presently held in the nail. The Govern-
ment would consist of an elected president, a Minister for 
Defence representing the army, and five ministers from the 
majority and four from the minority. While Collins' con-
cessions were substantial, he felt they were necessary if 
the Irish were not to lose all that the war of independence 
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had won for them.62 Some of his colleagues, especially 
Griffith, were not pleased with the pact, but acquiesced 
nevertheless. They felt that the Provisional Government 
was having a difficult enough time without succumbing to 
internal feuds. 
The Government was trying to reconstruct and ad-
minister a country ravished by a recently concluded guerilla 
struggle and on the verge of entering into a civil war. The 
British were harassing them about their failure to act 
against the Irregulars. Serious violence had broken out in 
the North putting Collins in the awkward position of col-
laborating with the dissident section of the I.R.A. in order 
to protect Northern Catholics. Throughout, the Provisional 
Government was attempting to write a Constitution for the 
Free State, a Constitution which would be republican enough 
to satisfy their opponents but would also comply with the 
terms of the Treaty. Implicit in the negotiations from 
January to June was the promise of a republican document 
around which all elements could unite. The British, however, 
were adamant. The Constitution of Sarostat Eireann, while 
embracing the concept of popular sovereignty, also embodied 
the political theory of the "British constitutional monarchy, 
with roots in pre-democratic monarchial theory and reflected 
in British Commonwealth symbols - the Crown, a governor-
62Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins and the Making of 
a New Ireland, 2 Vols. (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, n.d.) 
II;396-397. 
f 
general, on oath of loyalty, etc. - and the constitutional 
fictions connected with 'His Majesty's Government'."63 
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While Collins and de Valera were arranging a political 
settlemen~ and the Constitution was being prepared, the 
leading military officers were engaged in talks concerning 
Army unification. For a while, there was hope. The May 4th 
truce had been extended indefinitely, with partial success. 
Prisoners were to be released. The Irregulars consented to 
vacate all occupied buildings except the Four Courts and the 
Free State promised not to occupy any new posts. Collins 
and Mulcahy accepted the demand for a mixed G.H.Q. Staff, 
Irregular and Free State, and acknowledged the right of the 
I.R.A. to hold periodic conventions and to elect an Army 
Council which would have the authority to approve the choice 
for Minister for Defence. However, over the appointment of 
the Chief of Staff, the negotiations broke down. The Free 
State officers demanded this office, at least temporarily, 
and offered the Irregulars the two positions of Deputy Chiefs 
of Staff. The Republicans insisted that they nominate the 
Chief of Staff and refused to continue the meetings unless 
this demand was conceded. Mulcahy replied that the "respon-
sibility for future negotiations was a matter for the new 
Coalition Government and that in the meantime private 
63Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.64. 
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negotiations would be discountenanced." 64 
Inherent in these discussions, and expressly stated 
in the Collins-de Valera pact was the assumption that the 
Minister for Defence was a representative of the army and 
its interests. During his tenure in that office, Mulcahy 
will later be accused of just such a charge, that he was 
representing not the government but the army. Mulcahy's 
perception of his function and his role as Defence Minister 
must certainly have been influenced by the discussions and 
events of this period. 
The election was scheduled for June 16th. On June 
14th, Collins, knowing full well the Constitution made his 
pact with de Valera impossible, urged the voters to choose 
the candidate they thought would best represent them. The 
Constitution was published on the morning of the election 
but that made little difference. The Treaty was the only 
real issue in the 1922 election and the people endorsed it. 
Of 128 seats, the pro-Treaty candidates won 58 seats, the 
anti-Treaty panel, 35. The independent parties, mostly 
Treatyites, also collected 35 seats, consisting of Labour, 17; 
Farmers, 7; Independents, 7i and Dublin University, 4. The 
Irish had voted for peace, but four days after the results 
of the election were announced, they would again be at war. 
On June 22nd, Sir Henry Wilson was shot and killed 
at his home by two London I.R.A. men. Wilson had been an 
64 Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, P.G.23, Gl/2, Vol. II. 
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anathema to the Irish, indelibly marked and identified with 
the frustration of Ireland's nationalist ambitions and with 
the persecution and murder of Catholics in the North. No 
one knows for sure who ordered his assassination but the 
evidence suggests that it was Collins, either alone or as a 
member of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. The Chairman of 
the Provisional Government had been obsessed by the suffer-
ings of his co-religionists in the North. Wilson's associ-
ation with the pogroms may well have led Collins to issue 
such an order. One explanation offered was that Wilson's 
death was the last vestige of the Bloody Sunday mentality. 65 
The British blamed o•connor and the Four Courts Ir-
regulars. They issued a formal request to the Provisional 
Government to take action against the Republicans regarding 
the "toleration of this rebellious defiance of the principles 
of the Treaty as incompatible with its faithful execution."66 
Collins is reported to have snapped that Churchill could do 
his own dirty work.67 Unfortunately, that would not be the 
case. 
Four days after Wilson's assassination, in retal-
iation for the arrest of Leo Henderson, one of their officers, 
65calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.314. 
66rreland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, P.G.35, Gl/2, Vol.II. 
67calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.316. 
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(Ginger) O'Connell, 
Assistant Chief of Staff. The Provisional Government 
considered this to be an intolerable action and, at a meet-
ing of June 27th, decided that uNotices should be served on 
the armed men in illegal occupation of the Four Courts and 
Fowler Hall that night ordering them to evacuate the build-
ing, and to surrender up all arms and property and that in 
the event of their refusing to do so, the necessary action 
would be taken at once.n68 The Irregulars refused to 
surrender; and on Wednesday, June 28, 1922, the National 
Army began the attack on the Four Courts. 
Although the kidnapping of Ginger O'Connell may have 
sparked the Cabinet to action, it was only the immediate 
cause. Following the elections which confirmed the peoplers 
acceptance of the Treaty and established the Cabinet as the 
legitimate Government, the Ministers felt more secure in 
issuing an ultimatum to the Four Courts Irregulars. Griffith 
and his faction had urged that the continuing occupation of 
the Four Courts guaranteed constant outbreaks of violence. 
Wilson's murder, the British demand for action against the 
Republicans and 0 'Connell's kidnapping added t.o their con-
viction that the rebellion, to them a mockery of the prin-
ciples of democratic government, must be ended. Collins and 
the military, "though convinced of the soundness of the 
political argument for implementing the Treaty, needed 
68Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, P.G.37 1 Gl/2, Vol.II. 
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something to spark their anger, to overcome their reluctance 
to open fire on their friends.•• 69 Now, they could not ignore 
the kidnapping of one of their highest officers and expect 
to continue exercising military or political authority. 
The Republicans fought the Civil War to preserve an 
ideal and protest against the tyranny of the majority. The 
Provisional Government fought the war to vindicate the 
principles of democratic government and majority rule and 
to uphold the supremacy of civilian authority over the army. 
A section of the army had mutinied against Dail Eireann and 
the expressed will of the people to accept the Treaty. The 
Government had to quell this rebellion. 
The bombardment of the Four Courts lasted for two days. 
Using heavy artillery and equipment borrowed from the Brit-
ish, the National Army repeatedly shelled the Georgian 
structure. To the Irregulars, it was a repeat of Easter, 
1916, with only the uniforms changed. The Four Courts 
garrison held out until June 30th before being forced to 
accept unconditional surrender. Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes, 
Joseph McKelvey and Richard Barrett were among the Irregular 
leaders taken as prisoners. 
However, the Republicans maintained control of other 
buildings and the fighting continued to rage throughout 
Dublin, especially in O'Connell Street. After the surrender 
69calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.319. 
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of the Four Courts, the Government decided that the attack 
on the other Irregular strongholds "shorild be vigorously 
continued."70 In one engagement, Cathal Brugha, a revolver 
blazing in each hand, was killed as he rushed out from a 
burning hotel refusing to give himself up. The battles left 
the capital city scarred and deformed, an omen of things to 
come. For approximately one week of fighting, the cost was 
estimated at five million pounds. A higher price was paid 
in human life: 64 soldiers and civilians killed, and nearly 
300 wounded.71 Civil war had become a horrible reality. 
On July 6th, 1922, the Provisional Government 
issued a call to arms, appealing to the patriotism and valour 
of the men of Ireland to enlist in the National Army. 
Mulcahy convinced Collins to take command of the forces as a 
symbol around which the army could rally. Collins assumed 
the position of Commander-in-Chief and established a War 
Council of three, including himself, Mulcahy as Minister for 
Defence and Chief of Staff, and Eoin O'Duffy as General in 
Command, South Western Division. The Government and G.H.Q. 
realized that, while they claimed "to have broken the con-
spiracy to override the will of the nation," 72 a long and 
difficult fight lay ahead. Themselves veterans of a 
70Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, P.G.44, Gl/2, Vol.II. 
7lcalton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.342. 
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guerilla war, the members of G.H.Q. knew that if the Irregulars 
could harass the army and hamper the Government to such a 
degree that neither would be able to function effectively, 
victory would be theirs. A protracted struggle would be 
required to establish governmental authority in the country. 
The army had without question been seriously weak-
ened by the split in its ranks. In the Southern Division, 
it had lost to the Irregulars some of its best and most 
experienced fighting troops. Moreover, some of the I.R.A. 
remained neutral, further depriving the army of war-trained 
soldiers and officers. However, in such cases where those 
involved sympathized with the Republicans, non-participation 
was actually beneficial to the Government. 
With an initial nucleus of about 4,000 men, G.H~Q~ 
began to raise, train and equip a professional army. The 
Cabinet had authorized, until conditions returned to normal, 
a force of 35,000. 73 Collins, Mulcahy and their staff faced 
a tremendous challenge. Even the loyal I.R.A. veterans had 
little or no experience in the discipline and conduct of a 
regular army. In an intensive recruiting drive, G.H •. Q. en-
listed masses of the unemployed throughout Ireland including 
ex-British soldiers, Irishmen who had fought in the English 
army, especially those with professional skills. At first, 
training merely consisted of basic instructions. Discipline 
was uneven and irregular. New brigades were formed to replace 
73Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
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those which had gone Irregular. Each area generally re-
cruited and trained their own men, although G.H.Q. would 
eventually establish a training program at the Curragh. 
The National Army attempted to compensate for its 
dependence on raw recruits with centralized, coordinated 
strategy and with the utilization of its superiority in 
equipment and armaments. For example, Emmet Dalton led a 
coastal invasion of Cork with troops that, although well-
equipped, learned, it is alleged, how to use their rifles 
h f bl . 74 h f h' h 1 on t e voyage rom Du ~n. Anot er actor w ~c great y 
strengthened the National Army was the policy of deploying 
small groups of men from the Dublin Brigade who had remain-
ed loyal to Collins to various units throughout the country. 
These men were experienced soldiers whose presence bolstered 
the recruits, inspiring both confidence and discipline. 
The first phase of the Civil War can be loosely 
dated from the bombardment of the Four Courts to the death 
of Collins in August of 1922. This period witnessed a 
seemingly endless series of victories for the National Army. 
Town after town fell, partly due to the policy of the 
Irregulars themselves. They would occupy towns and then 
abandon them, leaving the barracks gutted by fire and of no 
use to the National forces, then fleeing to the hills and 
mountains to resume the old guerilla warfare of the Black 
and Tan era, to revert as Oscar Traynor said, "to the tactics 
74calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
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which made us invincible formerly.n 75 However, the govern-
ment's army soon controlled the Waterford to Limerick line, 
securing the East, the North and most of the West. The 
Republicans were forced to retreat into the South, making 
their stand in the province of Munster, their stronghold. 
In the first few months of the war, a certain 
restraint, a certain reluctance to strike down old comrades 
was evident. Although the Republicans had vowed to prevent 
the Government from implementing the Treaty and the National 
Army was pledged to uphold the decision of the Dail and the 
people, both sides avoided the cold-blooded killings and 
wanton violence which would later become commonplace. One 
historian characterized this attitude as a "lack of heart" 
which resulted in "flights of bullets hurtled through the 
air harmlessly as migrating birds." 76 Soon, however, serious 
hunting would begin. 
While the army was attempting to reconquer the 
country, the events of August, 1922, would seriously shake 
the stability of the Provisional Government. On the 12th 
of that month, Arthur Griffith died of a cerebral hemorrhage. 
Ten days later, on August 22nd, Michael Collins was killed 
in an ambush at Beal na Blath, County Cork, his home 
territory. Mulcahy pleaded with the army to remain calm: 
7Sibid., p.347. 
76Ibid., p.394. 
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Stand by your posts. Bend bravely and undaunted to 
your work. Let no cruel act of reprisal blemish your 
bright honour. Every dark hour that Michael Collins 
met since 1916 seemed but to steel that bright strength 
of his and temper his gay bravery. You are left each 
inheritors of that strength and of that bravery. To 
each of you falls his unfinished work. No darkness in 
the hour - no loss of comrades will daunt you at it. 
Ireland! The Army serves-strengthened by its sorrow.77 
Collins had gone to Cork, the heart of the resist-
ance, ostensibly to inspect the troops and buoy up morale. 
However, evidence suggests that he was on a peace mission. 
General McEoin felt that the Commander-in-Chief was hoping 
to use his powerful ties to the I.R.B. to end the fighting 
and also heal the Brotherhood, which had been rent by the 
struggle. 78 In his biography, Rex Taylor claims that 
Collins expressed his real intentions for making the fatal 
journey to Cork when he said: "'I am going to try and bring 
the boys around,' •.. adding, 'if not I shall have to get 
rough with them.'"7 9 A quest for peace makes intelligible 
an otherwise seemingly foolhardy trip. The death of Michael 
Collins was not only a severe loss to the Government and the 
army, but was also an inestimable tragedy for Ireland, es-
pecially coming at such a critical juncture in her history. 
The ambush at Beal na Blath effectively killed any real hope 
for an early peace and reconciliation. Now, it was to be 
77Ibid., p.439. 
78 Ibid., p.431. 
79 Rex Taylor, Michael Collins (London: New English 
Library, Ltd., 1970), p.l96. 
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war with a vengeance. 
With Griffith and Collins both dead, de Valera was 
the only national figure left. De Valera had seemingly 
abandoned any hope for a constitutional way to settle dif-
ferences. He had said that it might be necessary" ... to 
80 
wade through Irish blood" in order to achieve freedom. 
Although he explained that he merely intended it as a warn-
ing, the wisdom in making such an inflammatory remark and 
lending his name and prestige to the Irregulars must be 
seriously questioned. During this crucial period, the form-
mer President was content to follow and not lead. He did not 
take part in the Four Courts convention. When war started, 
he assumed the office of Adjutant to the Director of Oper-
ation, Sean Moylan - certainly not a position in keeping 
with his Easter Week record and experience. On Sept.ember 6, 
1922, when he secretly met Mulcahy81 in a futile attempt 
to secure agreement, all the former President could say was 
that some men were led by faith and some by reason. While 
men of faith, like O'Connor, were taking the stand they 
were, he was only a humble soldier following them. 82 De 
Valera seemed immobilized by the split, uncertain of his 
80calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War {London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.250. 
81In meeting de Valera, Mulcahy violated a decision 
of the Cabinet which emphasized the principle of collective 
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position. In late 1922, he set up a sham Republican minis-
try which the Irregulars recognized as 'the legitimate 
government of the Republic. However, the military leaders 
dominated the movement. Not until very late in the war did 
de Valera assert effective control over the Republicans. 
Liam Cosgrave, Kevin O'Higgins and Richard Mulcahy 
were now the dominant personalities in the Provisional/Free 
State Government. The Dail, prorogued since June 30th, 
assembled on September 9, 1922. With the Republican deputies 
obviously not in attendance, the Labour Party, led by 
Thomas Johnson, assumed the role of the Loyal Opposition. 
Because they had not participated in the previous Republican 
assemblies and had remained above the bitterness of the 
Treaty debates, Labour provided both a fresh perspective on 
the problems facing the nation and a critical analysis of 
the solution offered by the Cabinet. Labour was hampered 
by the Government's disciplined majority and, more effec-
tively, by the Civil War itself which provided the Ministers 
with an impregnable defence to cover all questionable 
practices. The members of the Government charged treason 
when there was legitimate criticism, spoke more to justify 
themselves to the renegade half of their own party than to 
the assembly, and did not really consult the Dail but rather 
used it, in large measure, to endorse and legitimize their 
previous actions. 
Aware that the Civil War enhanced the already sub-
stantial power of the army, Labour attempted to clarify and 
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regularize the relationship of the military to the Dail. 
The Opposition kept up a constant barrage of questions and 
criticisms in an attempt to exercise some control over the 
army. They protested against combining the offices of 
Minister for Defence and Commander-in-Chief in one man, 
arguing that the Minister should be a civilian in order to 
insure a certain degree of separation of powers. Labour 
attacked the spirit of militarism which it claimed was prev-
alent in both the National and Irregular forces. Cathal 
O'Shannon summarized the feeling of the Opposition: 
We have denounced militarism, and we have told you the 
root cause of the militarism in Ireland. The military 
spirit is as deep in one section of the Army as it is in 
another, and the reason is that both came with prestige 
out of the guerrilla warfare against England, and they 
have got such swelled heads that the only authority they 
have is the authority of the gun.83 
In late September of 1922, the debate over the 
military was exacerbated by the introduction by the Govern-
ment of the Army Emergency Powers Bill. This act establish-
ed military courts with the power to impose the death pen-
alty for such offences as unauthorized possession of weapons 
and explosives, arson, looting and destruction of property. 
The Cabinet justified this extraordinary measure as neces-
sary to save the life of the nation. The Army felt it 
needed these powers to combat successfully the chaos and 
anarchy besetting the country. General Mulcahy explained: 
83Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 1(1922): 
830. 
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We are asking for these powers that certain steps may 
be taken against people who commit murder and burn down 
property, people who are aiming at the life of the 
country. We are asking for powers to deal with these 
things, as there is no civil machinery to deal with 
them. The Army is simply standing in the gap, as it 
stood in many a gap on many different occasions before 
and we are going to stand in the gap, and dealing by 
our Army machinery against those who commit these 
crimes against the safety of the country, until such 
time as this Government is in a position to set up a 
different type of machinery to deal with it.84 
Labour resolutely opposed the Bill, claiming the 
Government was setting up a military dictatorship and ab-
dicating its responsibility to the army. It charged that 
"by handing over all power of Government and all authority 
to the Army and to the Army authorities, this Ministry is 
overthrowing this Parliament." 85 Moreover, Labour leaders 
felt that the army had neither the training nor the dis-
cipline to assume such grave responsibilities. Finally, 
they predict that if the Government embarked on a policy 
of executions, the sympathy of the people would redound to 
the Irregulars. The Government did agree to delay the im-
plementation of the act and issued an Amnesty Proclamation 
which granted pardon to all who would lay down their arms 
and cease to take part in the rebellion. The Cabinet ordered 
that the Proclamation be given the fullest publicity, with 
copies circulated in all the papers, distributed by airplane, 
84rbid., cols. 841-842. 
-
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sent to all the clergy and displayed at every Post Office.86 
However, the Republicans, for ali practical purposes, 
beaten in the field by mid-August, refused to give up and 
resorted to terrorism. They destroyed railroads, blew up 
buildings, burnt out houses and generally engaged in such 
tactics that would make it impossible for the Government to 
function either politically or economically. However, the 
guerilla warfare which had been so successful in pre-Truce 
days was proving much less so since the Irregulars no longer 
commanded popular support from the majority of the people. 
As the frustration increased on both sides, so did 
the atrocities. Extreme brutality and wanton violence 
characterized the second phase of the civil war. Both the 
National and Irregular forces were guilty. The death and 
the destruction rained on the village of Ballyconnell by the 
Irregulars was equaled by the deliberate dynamiting of 
prisoners by Free State troops at Ballyseedy. The war was 
now without honor, without decency. It is estimated that 
"Southern Ireland suffered more death and destruction in 
the Civil War of 1922-1923 than it had in the struggle 
I I 
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against England from 1916 to 1921. "87 ', 
The Government was determined ·to win at any cost. In 
86Ireland, SPOD, Minutes of the Meetings of the 
Provisional Government, P.G.28(a), Gl/3, Vol.III. 
87Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish 
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Kevin O'Higgins' often quoted phrase, "This is not going to 
be a draw with a replay in the autumn."8B On November 17th, 
with the execution of four men charged with possession of 
illegal weapons, the Government's policy of execution began. 
On November 24th, Erskine Childers, chief propagandist for 
the Irregulars, was put to death on a similar charge. Al-
though a public outcry against the Government ensued, the 
Cabinet remained unshaken in its determination. Before the 
war was over, seventy-seven prisoners would be executed. 
The Government felt that they were charged with a sacred 
trust to implement the will of the people and that they 
would honor that commitment regardless of the cost. 
On December 6th, the Irish Free State officially 
came into existence but its birth was accompanied by such an 
outbreak of violence that the government's continued exist-
ence was impaired. Liam Lynch had threatened to deal with 
all deputies who had voted for the Emergency Powers Bill and 
all active supports of the Free State in the same way the 
Cabinet was treating his forces. On December 7th, Deputy 
Sean Hales was assassinated and Deputy Speaker Padraic 
O'Maille wounded on their way to the Dail. The Government 
retaliated by executing four of their prisoners, held since 
the beginning of the war: Rory O'Connor, Liam Mellowes, 
Joseph McKelvey and Richard Barrett. The "Mountjoy Executions" 
88Terrence de Vere ~vhite, Kevin O'Higgins (London: 
Meuthuen and Co., Ltd., 1948), p.lSO~ 
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had no pretense of legality but were ordered as a calculated 
decision by a unanimous Cabinet to strike back against the 
rebels and prevent the decimation of the Dail. Kevin 
O'Higgins explained the governmentrs position: 
It was at once punitive and deterrent. The members of 
the Parliament of Ireland must be kept free and safe 
to perform their duties as members of the Parliament of 
Ireland. When one strikes at a representative man the 
crime is peculiarly horrid ••• one strikes at the people 
who gave him his mandate and who invested him with his 
representative character; and therein lies the most 
criminal aspect of the wretched crime that was committed 
yesterday.89 · 
Labour was outraged. To them, it was murder. Cathal 
O'Shannon charged: "You murdered these men - nothing short 
of murder were the executions of these men this morning."90 
Thomas Johnson characterized it as "most foul, bloody and 
unnatural ... almost the first act is utterly to destroy in 
the public mind the association of the Government with the 
idea of law. I am almost forced to say you have killed the 
new State at its birth."91 
. ' . The decision of the Government v1s-a-v1s these 
executions is difficult to evaluate. No more deputies were 
assassinated following the Mountjoy Executions. The action 
itself, however, was totally outside any legal process and 
engendered a bitterness and hostili t.y which would polarize 
89Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 2 {1922-
1923):67. 
90Ibid., col.55. 
91Ibid., col.49. 
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and dominate Irish politics for years to come. It is a 
measure of the determination of the Government that Kevin 
O'Higgins voted for the death sentence for Rory O'Connor, 
best man at his wedding earlier that year. It is also a 
measure of the tragedy of the situation. Perhaps, as one 
historian noted, "Cosgrave, O'Higgins and Mulcahy took 
harsh measures because they could not afford to be le-
nient."92 
Although the fighting continued for the next six 
months, the heart of the resistance had been broken. Liam 
Deasey, a member of the Irregular Executive, was captured 
in January of 1923. Having previously become convinced of 
the futility of continuing the struggle, Deasey agreed to 
sign and send to his fellow officers and his followers a 
document urging immediate and unconditional surrender. Lynch 
refused. De Valera objected to the Government's demand that 
the Republicans surrender all their arms. The Irregular 
forces had dwindled to approximately 8,000. Some 13,000 
men were prisoners.93 Then, on April 10, 1923, Liam Lynch, 
symbol of the resistance, was killed in a battle in the 
Knockmealdown Mountains. Now, it was just a matter of time. 
De Valera tried to negotiate terms. Using Senators 
92Joseph Curran, "Consideration of the Irish 
Revolutions: The Free Staters," University Review 5 (Spring, 
1968): 48-49. 
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Jameson and Douglas as intermediaries, the former President 
argued that the Republicans should be allowed to keep their 
arms, or at least store them until after the upcoming elec-
tion, and insisted there should be no obstacle, i.e. oath, 
to prevent any representative from participating in the 
political life of the country. The Government refused, 
demanding instead a surrender of arms and the recognition 
of and agreement to the principle of majority rule. 94 On 
May 24th, de Valera issued a proclamation: 
Soldiers of Liberty! Legion of the rearguard! The 
Republic can no longer be defended successfully by your 
arms. Further sacrifices on your part would now be in 
vain, and continuance of the struggle in arms unwise in 
the national interest. Military victory must be allowed 
to rest for the moment with those who have destroyed the 
Republic.95 
The Republicans simply hid their weapons. As the country 
had drifted into war, it now drifted into an uneasy peace. 
But the scars of the Civil War cut deep, disfiguring the 
body politic, and marring the political, social and economic 
development of the Irish Free State. 
94rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/97, G2/2, 
Vol.II. 
95calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.509. 
CHAPTER IV 
ORIGINS OF MUTINY 
The Civil War had necessitated the development of a 
large military establishment with extraordinary power and 
tremendous responsibility. The survival of the government, 
of the Free State itself, had come to depend on the success 
of the military. Even though the army had succeeded in 
quelling the rebellion, its rate of progress against the 
Irregulars and the consequent lawlessness in parts of the 
country gave rise to grave dissatisfaction. The failure of 
the Minister for Defence to keep his colleagues properly 
informed on military activities and the alleged association 
of the senior officers of the army with a reorganized Irish 
Republican Brotherhood exacerbated the discontent with the 
military hierarchy. According to the Attorney-General: 
•.. individual ministers have in the course of their 
ordinary work, met persons day by day who gave them 
unofficial accounts of disquieting happenings and such 
accounts made deeper impressions because ministers were 
not in possession of authoritative information which to 
test and weigh the stories told. Such a state of 
affairs could only breed suspicion that all was not 
well, that things were being concealed, and necessarily 
give rise to a form of great anxiety opening the ear 
the more ready to every tale that offered.l 
1Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April 1923, Kennedy 
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
119 
:il 
I 
120 
consequently, the tension in the Cabinet grew as the Cosgrave 
government attempted to evolve a satisfactory relationship 
between the military and the government. 
The chief critic of the army was Kevin O'Higgins, 
who as Minister for Home Affairs, received from the Civic 
Guards monthly reports on the conditions prevailing in the 
country. On this basis, O'Higgins claimed that 95% of the 
crime in the Free State was the responsibility of the army 
to control and contain. 2 Mulcahy countered, asserting that 
these monthly records were written" .•• in the spirit of 
wanting generally to prejudice the position of the Army and 
all persons in the Army •.. And that these reports are 
provided with a very definite knowledge that they are asked 
for, for that reason."3 The conflict between O'Higgins and 
Mulcahy would be the leitmotif throughout this entire period. 
In January of 1923, O'Higgins prepared a memorandum 
for a full Cabinet meeting on the military situation analys-
ing the state of the nation. The Minister for Home Affairs 
concluded that the Government was being threatened on two 
levels; overtly, by active Irregulars who were engaged in 
acts of violence, and covertly by passive Irregulars par-
ticipating in lawless activities. The inability of the 
2Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42, University College Dublin Archives, 
Dublin, Ireland. 
3Defence Council Meeting, 3 May 1923, Mulcahy Papers 
P7/C/322, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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Government to enforce its laws and maintain the orderly 
functions of society blatantly encouraged the rebels and 
severely retarded the economic and psychological recovery of 
the country. To combat the growing threat of anarchy, 
O'Higgins felt it was necessary that " ••• the thirty 
thousand armed men, whom the Goverrunent, on behalf of the 
Irish people is paying and maintaining, must be asked to 
perform many duties which strictly and technically, might 
be said to be those of armed police rather than of mil-
itary."4 To accomplish this, the Minister suggested that a 
special mobile force be created to deal especially with 
transgressions of the Civil law and that the a~IDY cultivate 
better relations with the civilian population t.hrough more 
courteous conduct, stricter discipline and prompt payment 
of accounts and dependents allowances. Furthermore, 
O'Higgins favored executions in every county in order to 
increase the psychological impact. He believed that "local 
executions would tend considerably to shorten the struggle."S 
On the governmental level, O'Higgins felt that the 
Executive Council "must clear our minds of technical terms, 
such as 'Government' and 'Army' and of purely artificial 
limitations of function."6 They were facing an unorthodox 
4o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
sibid. 
6Ibid. 
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situation which could only be met in an unorthodox manner. 
They should utilise the army, armed servants, to the best 
possible advantage in what mattered most, saving the life 
of the country. "It is of no avail that the towns are held 
if the country perishes; it is of no avail that the active 
Irregulars are gradually killed or imprisoned, if their seed 
flourishes and the passive Irregulars continue to enjoy 
immunity to the ruin of the idea of .law."7 Mulcahy viewed 
this memorandum as a direct criticism of the efficiency and 
efficacy of the army.8 To him, the "artificial limitations" 
were very much real definitions of responsibility and author-
ity which ought not to be tampered with by outsiders who did 
not understand the complexities of the military situation.9 
O'Higgins' receipt of the Civic Guard report for 
the month of February, 1923, precipitated a Cabinet crisis. 
A special meeting of the Executive Council was called for 
March 27 to consider the latest police analysis.lO The 
7Ibid. 
8conversation among General Mulcahy, Mrs. Mulcahy, 
and Doctor Mulcahy, 23 December 1961, Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/D/100, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
9Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
lOireland, State Paper Office Dublin (hereinafter 
cited as SPOD), Cabinet minutes, Cl/74. 
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meeting resulted in the resignation of the Army Council: 
the Commander-in-Chief, Mulcahy; the Chief of Staff, Sean 
MacMahon; the Adjutant-General, Gearoid O'Sullivan; and the 
Quartermaster-General, Sean O'Murthuile. In a letter to 
the President the following day, Hulcahy explained that the 
Cabinet discussion convinced him that his colleagues felt 
that: 
1. The progress made by the Army up to the end of 
February has not been satisfactory 
2. That the control of the Army is aloof from and is 
felt to be unresponsive to the Government and 
3. That there is some undefined divergence of purpose 
on the part of the Army, as from the Government.ll 
Although not agreeing with such an analysis, the officers 
of the Council felt that considering their grave respon-
sibilities, deciding issues of life and death, they should 
not continue to make these decisions in such an atmos-
phere.l2 Not wishing "to make difficulties" for the 
Government, they tendered their resignations as the Anny 
Council.l3 The Executive Council, however, rejected this 
course of action and, on April 9, ordered the Army Council 
to continue to function as it had in the past.l4 If the 
llArmy Sequence, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/178, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
12Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
13Army Sequence, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/178, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
14Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/81. 
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resignation of the Army Council had been accepted during 
this critical period, there would have been drastic 
repercussions. According to the Attorney-General, Hugh 
Kennedy: 
a sudden public scrapping by the high command of 
the army would be wholly misleading to public opinion 
and most unfortunate if not disastrous in its immediate 
effects. It could have but one meaning in the public 
mind, namely that things are getting worse (which I 
believe to be the reverse of fact) and the consequence 
of such a public impression would be to increase the 
nm-11 dwindling support of the Irregulars and to 
strengthen and enhearten their campaign.lS 
Kennedy's analysis of the potential dire effects of 
attempted changes on the public mind was bolstered by an 
article in the Morning Post newspaper. Thereafter, major 
albeit discreet changes in the Army became impossible. The 
paper reported the dissension in the Cabinet concerning the 
army and raised allegations about the influence of the 
I.R.B. at General Headquarters. It also predicted that the 
Army Council was to be replaced by a Cabinet Committee of 
Defence consisting of the President, Ministers for Home 
Affairs, Industry and Commerce and Defence, and the Chief of 
Staff. The Morning Post asserted that " ••• the Cabinet 
finally screwed up its courage, or to be more accurate, 
Kevin O'Higgins screwed up the rest of the Cabinet's 
courage" to move against the senior officers of the army.l6 
15Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April, 1923, Kennedy 
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
16Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 3 (1923): 
59-60. 
Although the Executive Council decided that the paper's 
report should be officially denied,l7 which Cosgrave em-
phatically did in the Dail on April 12, 1923,18 in point 
of fact, however, the main substance of the article was 
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accurate. The Cabinet did assume a more direct role in the 
affairs of the army by establishing a Council of Defence.l9 
Its members were Cosgrave, O'Higgins, McGrath and Mulcahy, 
four of the five officials listed by the Morning Post. The 
Chief of Staff was originally selected to serve on the 
Council, but later the Cabinet decided against it. 
The Council was a compromise solution. Although 
O'Higgins felt that "the results secured justified the 
intervention,"20 Mulcahy maintained that it weakened Army 
control, interrupted the final operations against the 
Irregulars and " created the psychological position that 
certain groups of Army officers were encouraged to go behind 
the backs of the Army Authorities to Mr. Joe McGrath and 
another group to Mr. O'Higgins."21 Due in part to Mulcahy's 
1 7Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/81. 
1 8Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 3 (1923}: 
60-62. 
19Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/85. 
20o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
21Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
126 
resentment at this interference in the affairs of the army 
and to the successful conclusion of the Civil War, this 
particular Council of Defence was allowed to lapse. 
As the violence caused by the Irregulars ended, 
the Government found it necessary to define and legalize 
the position of the army vis-a-vis the Free State. During 
the Civil War, the armed forces existed, quite simply, 
because they had to exist. As the Attorney-General pointed out, 
however, the army had never been "definitely constituted" 
but experienced 
a kind of natural growth in defence of the Treaty 
and the Parliament and the Government of the people. 
But its organisation and powers, the direction and 
control of its policy, the mode and authority of its 
appointments have been assumed by the Army itself -
they have never been defined~ or:expressly dSlegated 
either by the Provisional Government or by the Ard 
Chomhairle [Executive Council] or by the Dai1.22 
Throughout the latter half of 1923, the Cosgrave 
Government sponsored legislation to rectify this omission 
and regularize the status of the army. The Defence Forces 
{Temporary Provisions) Bill gave the Executive Council the 
authority to raise, maintain and control the armed forces, 
delegating the responsibility for organization and adrnin-
istration to the Minister for Defence. The Ministers and 
Secretaries Bill established a new Council of Defence, 
consisting of the Minister for Defence, the Chief of Staff, 
22Hugh Kennedy, Memorandum, 2 April 1923, Kennedy 
Papers, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General and one 
civil member who could be Parliamentary Secretary. The 
purpose of the Council was to assist the Minister in the 
administration of his department. 
In response to the growing clamour in the Dail and 
the Cabinet, but against the advice of the Attorney-General, 
the Government, for all practical purposes, abolished the 
position of Commander~:in:....Chief. Hugh Kennedy considered 
this move "premature and ill-advised" risking the possibil-
ity of a "conflict between the purely civil and the purely 
military." 23 However, the Government did follow his sug-
gestion that the position of Commander-in-Chief not be 
abolished altogether but at least "should be retained in 
the Executive Council ... whether titular or signifying 
actual military command."2 4 Thus the following confusing 
picture emerged. The Minister for Defence was no longer to 
have the joint responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, but 
rather it was to be vested in the Executive Council. How-
ever, its duties were to be exercised by the Defence Min-
ister. In addition, he would basically assume this role 
only when acting as Chairman of the Council of Defence.25 
In effect, this re-delegation of authority only meant that 
1838. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
25Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 5 (1923): 
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the Army was left without a supreme military head. More-
over, no members of the armed forces receiving full military 
pay were to sit as Deputies in the Dail. Collectively, 
these measures were obvious attempts to strengthen civilian 
control of the army and re-emphasize the fact that the 
military was responsible to the Executive Council and the 
nail. Both government and parliamentary leaders were 
anxious to erase any residual sentiment in favor of an in-
dependent or political army. 
While the Ministry and Dail were defining and le-
galizing the position of the armed forces in the Free State, 
General Headquarters was engaged in restructuring the army 
itself. In January of 1923, G.H.Q. began a major reorgan-
ization, making plans for a permanent professional establish-
ment and for the inevitable change from a war to peace time 
force. This reorganization included the formation of nine 
Brigades based on units rather than territorial area, to 
replace the present Command system, the establishment of 
three new Commands, Western, Southern and Eastern and the 
Curragh Training Camp, with a view to the centralization of 
authority in Dublin. Mulcahy believed that such a reorgan-
ization would lead to a "more effective military machine. 
On the whole the Brigade will be an ideal unit in organ-
isation - and it will be a unit of regimental strength with 
divisional organisation. It can be expanded with ease and 
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without diso~ganisation or without imparing its efficien-
n26 cy. 
Moreover, G.E.Q. was also tightening its adminis-
trative grip on the internal workings of the army. More 
accurate records were demanded as well as a close scrutiny 
of the men in the service. An Officers Training program 
was set up at the Curragh camp and the selection of officers 
became more formalized. During the early days of the Civil 
war, officers were appointed to posts "mainly and necessar-
ily for getting men of influence, and, as a corollary, men 
with good records in the National r.tovement. n 27 Now the 
criteria in the designation of officers was expanded to 
include not only pre-Truce service but also efficiency and 
suitability for the particular post. Generally, G.H.Q. 
attempted to appoint men who were already in positions of 
authority in a particular area. Eventually, however, the 
fact that there were a large number of officers who were 
surplus to the needs of the establishment became evident. 28 
The military establishment had burgeoned in war and would 
have to be pared down to meet new peace-oriented budgetary 
26Ireland, SPOD, Organisation and Establishment of 
the Army, S3442A. 
27costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
28
o•connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/l, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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estimates. By the end of the Civil War, the army numbered 
52,000 men and 3,000 officers. By January of 1924, G.H.Q. 
wanted to have only 30,000 men and 1,300 officers. Final 
projections were for an army of 18,000 men. Given the high 
rate of unemployment in the Free State and the changing 
nature of the army, demobilisation would inevitably prove 
to be a difficult and delicate task. Men who once enjoyed 
the adventure and mystique of being "gunmen" were now being 
asked either to return to civilian life or to assume less 
prestigious positions within the army. 
The demobilisation of non-Commissioned officers 
and enlisted men began in June of 1923. Men were discharged 
who were found to be undesirable either because they did 
not meet the physical standards or because their conduct 
records were questionable. Some voluntarily wanted to leave 
the army to return to civilian employment. Others were 
unwilling to accept the lower rates of pay the army was now 
offering. 29 In most respects, this phase of the reduction 
proceeded smoothly. 
Problems arose, however, when G.H.Q. began to dis-
charge officers in September-October, 1923, with the proc-
lamation of Defence Order #28. According to Mulcahy, three 
classes of officers were to be demobilised: 
29 Ibid. 
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(2) Officers whose service dates from a date subsequent 
to July, 1921, and whose services, while satisfactory, 
have been such as not to show special merit or indicate 
special qualifications. 
(3) Officers whose service dates from a date prior to 
July, 1921, and who, while having given satisfaction, 
are surplus to requirements.30 
A demobilisation grant of five pounds was offered to each 
officer, in addition to the continuation of his full salary 
for two months and half pay for the following two months. 
A special grant was given to pre-Truce officers based on the 
nature and extent of their service from 1919-1921, the 
degree to which their life style had been interrupted and 
the service rendered in the National Forces. A re-settle-
ment branch was also established in the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce to help the demobilized men back into civilian 
life. 31 
The Council of Defence prepared the first lists 
for demobilization. Approximately 763 officers were dis-
missed, primarily for marked inefficiency or lack of dis-
cipline, based on Inspection Reports. All heads of Depart-
ments, Staffs and Commands were asked for evaluations and 
recommendations for their respective officers. In mid-De-
cember of 1923, a Committee of Investigation or Officers 
Board was created to make further recommendation to the 
Council of Defence. This Board consisted of Major-Generals 
3°Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 5 (1923): 
717-718. 
31Ibid. 
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Dan Hogan, Reynolds, McKeon and O'Daly. It dealt with only 
116 cases. Since a number of officers failed to pass the 
medical examination or had voluntarily resigned, the total 
number of discharged officers as of the end of January, 
1923, was approximately 1,000. To further whittle down the 
Officer Corps, Mulcahy called a meeting in early February 
of all the General Officers Co~manding and the Council of 
Defence to decide on the final list of names to be retained, 
to be kept on reserve, or to be dismissed. The Executive 
Council was presented with this list of nominations and 
dismissals by the end of February. The Cabinet removed six 
names from the retention list, one from demobilization, and 
recommended that ten officers on the reserve list be given 
definite positions as soon as possible. 32 
Included in the first demobilization group were 
officers in the Officers Training Corps at th~ Ctirragh~ 
Many of these" ... had been several months at the O.T.C. 
that they were for all intents and purposes unemployed 
Officers, and that there seemed to be no prospects of their 
services being further availed of in, or applied for from, 
the Command from which they came."33 The first outbreak of 
trouble occurred at the Curragh on November 9, 1923, when 
32Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
33o'Connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P?/C/1, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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seven officers refused to accept their demobilization 
papers. They were placed under arrest, ·charged with dis-
obedience and tried at a General Court Martial. The muti-
nous officers protested that they were members of the old 
I.R.A. and had sworn an oath not to lay down their arms 
until Ireland was an independent Republic. Hence, they 
could not quietly accept discharge papers. Additionally, 
another factor which may have influenced them was their fear 
that they might be denied pre-Truce Supplementary grants. 
These grants had not been officially sanctioned at this 
point in time.34 All of the officers were found guilty and 
sentenced to dismissal. However, the solicitor for the 
defendants, Mr. Lamphier, appealed the convictions on the 
grounds that certain preliminary investigations, required 
by the Defence Forces Act, had not been taken. The Judge 
Advocate General upheld the appeal and advised the Adjutant-
General, the Confirming Officer, not to confirm either the 
findings or the sentence. 35 Instead of arranging for a 
new trial General Headquarters decided on a policy of leni-
ency, claiming there had been a misunderstanding among the 
men, in order to avoid any appearance of harsh action or 
34Ibid. 
35Davitt, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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victimization.36 New demobilization papers were issued to 
the officers on November 30th. The men again refused to 
accept them and, consequently, were escorted outside the 
confines of the camp. 
Meanwhile, the mutiny had begun to spread. It now 
included a number of other officers at the Curragh who, in 
sympathy with their comrades and in protest at their arrest, 
also refused to accept demobilization papers. They felt it 
was unjust to dismiss old Volunteers from the army while 
ex-British officers, Irishmen who had at one time served in 
the British army, were being retained. This second group 
was also forced to leave the camp and they were denied 
demobilization pay and grants. The disturbance involved 
approximately 60 officers and was confined to the Curragh~ 
Subsequently, all but 14 applied for and were granted 
demobilization papers. On March 29, 1924, papers were sent 
to the remaining officers and all but one accepted them.37 
The mutiny at the Curragh was important as a pre·· 
lude to the mutiny four months later, the first step in a 
series of events which would later culminate in the army 
crisis of March, 1924. The immediate consequence of the 
Curragh protest was the institution on November 26, 1923 of 
36MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/33, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
37o'Connor, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/l, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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a Cabinet Committee on demobilization to hear the complaints 
of pre-Truce officers concerning their dismissals and to 
consider the valid complaints against the retention of ex-
British officers. It was further empowered to investigate 
the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the men at the 
Curragh.38 The Committee consisted of the Minister for 
Education, Professor MacNeill, the Minister for Finance, 
Mr. Blythe and the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Mr. 
McGrath. 
The Cabinet Committee received applications for re-
instatement from 60 men, most of whom had been involved in 
the affair at the Curragh; but, in no case, was an officer 
actually reinstated. In most instances, the Minister for 
Defence noted that the officer was simply "surplus to re-
quirement."39 On December 5, 1923, the Minister for In-
dustry and Commerce resigned from the Committee because 
'' of the actual demobilisation of some of the Officers 
whose cases he claimed should be decided by the Committee"40 
He was temporarily replaced by the President.41 However, 
38Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/22. 
39r.fulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
40Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
41Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes. C2/28. 
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McGrath reconsidered his decision when he received a 
written statement from the President of the objectives and 
powers of the Committee, including a guarantee that the 
recommendations made by the Committee concerning the reten-
tion of pre-Truce officers and dismissal of those "unworthy 
to be in the army," that is, ex-British officers, would be 
binding on the Army Council.42 The Committee itself 
achieved no tangible results although it did provide an-
other opportunity for civilians to inquire into the work-
ings of the army, or as Mulcahy saw it, to interfere in 
military business. The Minister for Defence claimed that 
the incident at the Curragh would have ended any threat of 
mutiny, "were it not for the encouragement given these men 
by politicals."43 Significantly, this incident further 
strained the relations between the Minister for Defence and 
his colleagues in the Cabinet. 
As part of their defence, the officers who mutinied 
at the Curragh had claimed to be members of the "old I.R.A." 
This organization was begun in January of 1923, coinciden-
tally at the same time that the reorganization of the army 
was initiated, by a group of pre-Truce officers who felt they 
were not being treated in a manner commensurate with the 
42The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924. 
43Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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sacrifices they had made for the liberation movement. Their 
purpose was to influence the policy and character of the 
army in order to obtain for themselves more power and re-
sponsibility. -The leading figures of the old I. R.A. or 
Irish Republican Army Organisation were all former members 
of Michael Collins' Intelligence Squad - Liam Tobin, 
Charles Dalton, Frank Thorton and Tom Cullen. Even before 
Collins' death, a problem had arisen concerning these men 
and their feeling of being "let down";44 and it was only 
the intimidating force of the late Commander-in-Chief's 
personality which had kept them in line. 45 As the successor 
to Collins, Mulcahy did not have the same relationship with 
them as his predecessor and consequently, could not dis-
cipline them as effectively.46 
Through the latter part of 1922, Tobin, Cullen and 
Thorton were involved in a series of disputes within the 
Intelligence Department over rank, pay and promotions.47 
44Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/20, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
45Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland, 
18 March 1975; Neligan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
46Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland, 
18 March, 1975. 
47Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/18, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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They even had engaged in a passive strike in which reports 
were not sorted out or rated as to importance or reliabil-
ity.48 Because these officers had not done a particularly 
good job in Intelligence, they were transferred. 49 The 
problem was that most of these men, although they had per-
formed well during the Troubles, were not suited, either in 
terms of ability or mentality, to the bureaucratic work 
necessary in a peace time army.50 Tobin was made A.D.C. to 
the Governor-General; Dalton, Adjutant of the Air Serv~ce, 
and Thornton was to be appointed a Brigade Major. However, 
they were dissatisfied with these changes. For example, 
Thorton wanted to be named Director of Intelligence. Dalton 
and Tobin felt they were not given positions with enough 
authority or responsibility. In most respects, the officers 
of the old I.R.A. felt they were being ignored by G.H.Q. 
and supplanted by men who had done much less for Ireland 
than they had. Professor Hogan, former Director of Iritelli-
gence, explained the nature of their grievances: 
48Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland, 
18 March, 1975. 
49p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
50Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland, 
18 March 1975. 
139 
In the war with the Irregulars a certain number of 
officers were rather prominent at the earlier stages, 
but as the situation became worse i~ became necessary 
to select abler and more energetic officers and the 
others fell into the background. To a certain extent 
they floated about the country unattached for several 
months. Their duties were not clearly defined, ••• 
while they were dropping behind, other officers were 
going to the fore and when peace actually came they 
saw that new officers had taken front rank and they 
were in the rear rank and they were to a certain extent 
dissatisfied with their position.51 
Such grievances were exacerbated by territorial 
rivalry and possessiveness. For example, G.H.Q. had found 
it necessary during the Civil War to send Dublin officers 
to Cork. The Cork officers resented this, viewing the new 
men as interlopers who were intruding themselves into a 
situation which could best be handled by the local leaders. 
Similiarly, Dublin officers, who had been scattered through-
out the country to reinforce other commands, strongly ob-
jected to officers from the Northern Divisions taking charge 
in Dublin. They too believed they had the right to command 
their home territory.52 Such feelings of resentment could 
but add to the sense of frustration and bitterness experi-
enced by many of the officers. 
Intelligence reports described the old I.R.A. as a 
mixture of several groups, each more or less independent of 
51Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army 
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University 
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
52costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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the other. There were primarily two sections, the "Dublin 
men (gun-men and let down Officers) and Western Officers."53 
The first group consisted of "Mick Collins own gunmen. 
Bitter. Fanatical. Joe McGrath, Bill Tobin, Frank Thornton, 
Charlie Dalton etc .... The main bunch outside Dublin is the 
Western clique - ignorant and fanatical, but lacking courage 
or ability."54 The report also listed Colonel J. Ryan as a 
member with political ambitions, aspiring to form a center 
party in the Dail, whose immediate policy was "to get hold 
of T.D.'s and others, who will look after the interests of 
the old I.R.A. men, and will keep the Republican ideal 
alive. Sean Gibbon, T.D., is his principal agent."SS The 
report gives support to Mulcahy's claim that politicians 
were encouraging his men to engage in irregular and undis-
ciplined conduct. The Minister for Defence himself de~ 
scribed his dissident officers as the~ .• men who either 
deserted their posts in Cork after Collins' death, or had 
to be taken out of Cork because of their inability to deal 
with the situation there, and of their colloguing with the 
Irregulars."56 
53rbid. 
S4rbid. 
ssrbid. 
56Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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The first meetings of the old I.R.A. were held in 
January and February of 1923. Major-Generals Tobin, Dalton, 
Cullen and Ennis, Colonels C. O'Malley, P. McCrea, 
J. Slattery, F. Thornton, C. Dalton, S. O'Connell and 
S. O'Reilly attended. Liam Tobin was appointed Chairman 
and Tom Cullen, Organizer. The old I.R.A. was to be 
structured around the Battalion as the basic unit or club. 
Meetings were to be held every two weeks. Acceptability 
for membership was to be decided by the officers' "past 
and present outlook from a National point of view" and 
those approached "should be warned as to the seriousness of 
indiscriminate discussion of the organisation and its 
objects."57 Their policy was to expand their membership to 
other pre-Truce officers so that they 
when strong enough would demand a strong voice in Army 
Policy, with a view to securing complete Independence 
when a suitable occasion arose. It was also decided 
that the members of the new organisation would make 
every effort to get control of the vital sections of 
the Army and oust those undesirable persons who were 
and are holding those positions.58 
Those members of the old I.R.A. began to proselytize 
and attempted to expand their influence. The Officers 
Training Corps at the Curragh was the natural breeding place 
for discontent, or as Col. M.J. Costello of Intelligence 
described it, a "hotbed" for the growth of a mutinous 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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organisation. 59 The reason for this was that the O.T.C. 
included a number of men for whom no positions could be 
found or who were judged not suitable for command posts. 
Old I.R.A. officers utilized the Curragh camp as a recruit-
ing ground, preaching their message of resentment and in-
justice and exhorting their colleagues to propagate these 
ideas throughout the country. According to Colonel Costello: 
The organisation of which Tobin is the visible head had 
not a grip on the Army, but it made use of all the 
circumstances in an attempt to swing the general body 
of Officers with grievances, real or alleged, behind 
them.60 
On June 6, 1923, the Tobin group sent a letter to 
President Cosgrave requesting a meeting with him and the 
Commander-in-Chief "to discuss the situation and place our 
views before you as Michael Collins' Successor."61 They 
claimed to have accepted the Treaty in the same spirit as 
Michael Collins had and felt that a "genuine effort must 
now be made to keep absolutely to the forefront the ideals 
and objects for which the late Commander-in-Chief gave his 
life"62 
59costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
60Ibid. 
61Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
62Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
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On June 20, 1923, Mulcahy, Cosgrave and Kennedy, 
the Attorney-General, discussed the complaint of the old 
I.R.A. that their members were being treated unfairly. The 
President discussed the possibility that these men would 
organize themselves and put up candidates for election. 
Mulcahy stated that their alleged grievances never material-
ized into specifics and that the army must proceed with its 
work.63 Despite the Minister for Defence's attitude, a 
series of meetings ensued, during the summer of 1923, be-
tween the members of the old I.R.A. and the Executive Coun-
cil. The potential mutineers were allowed to state their 
grievances and hopefully vent their frustrations. Through 
these discussions, the Government tried to keep open the 
lines of communication and forestall any attempts at direct 
action, especially since elections were to be held in August 
of that year. The mutineers failed, however, to effect any 
change in army policy. 
The first of these discussions occurred on Monday, 
June 25, 1923, Cosgrave and Mulcahy met with Tobin, Dalton, 
Thornton and O'Malley. Tobin read an opening statement 
which began with a reiteration of their views on the Treaty, 
that they had accepted it only as a stepping stone to the 
Republic a la Collins. They claimed that Collins had told 
Tobin "that he had taken on Oath of Allegiance to the 
63Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/322, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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Republic and that Oath he would keep, 'Treaty or no Treaty'" 
and that this was their position exactly;64 Tobin then 
launched into a scathing attack on the army, in particular, 
Mulcahy and his staff. He charged that: 
the actions of the present G.H.Q. staff since the 
Commander-in-Chief's death, their open and secret 
hostility to us, his officers, has convinced us that 
they have not the same outlook as he had. We require 
a definite 'yes or no' from the present Commander-in-
Chief if this be so. 
Does the Commander-in-Chief understand the temper of 
the old I.R.A., who are now in the National Army? He 
does not. Your Army is not a National Army. It is 
composed roughly of 40% of the old I.R.A., 50% ex-
Britishers and 10% ex-Civilians. The majority of the 
Civilians were and are, hostile to the National ideals. 
In the Army you have got men who were active British 
S.S. men previous to the Truce, and who never yet have 
ceased their activities.65 
Tobin then demanded that a Committee of Inquiry be 
set up to investigate the retention and demobolization of 
officers and that the old I.R.A. be granted equal represen-
tation on it. After mentioning specific grievances he wished 
to discuss, his statement went on to condemn the reorgan-
ization of the I.R.B. Tobin's group claimed that the 
Brotherhood had been revitalized by senior Army officers only 
after the old I.R.A. had begun to organize and that it was 
a hindrance to progress, "a dishonest and corrupt effort to 
destroy any genuine effort to carry on a successful con-
clusion of Mick 's ideals." 66 While both disclaiming any 
64Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
65Ibid. 
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intention to cause another split in the army and also plead-
ing for a return to the spirit of 1920-1921, the statement 
ended with a direct threat: 
It is time this bluff ended. We intend to end it. 
Until satisfactory arrangements are come to, we will 
expose this treachery and take what steps we consider 
necessary to bring about an honest, cleaner, and 
genuine effort to secure the Republic.67 
The President responded by stating that such a 
document was totally unexpected. He had anticipated a 
friendly discussion of their prbbl·ems~ Mulcahy was incensed 
and left the room demanding to know why he should have been 
brought before the President to listen to such matters and 
refusing to discuss anything in such an atmosphere.68 
Mulcahy later claimed that this was the first in-
timation he had that the officers had grievances of this 
kind.69 His attitude toward the representatives of the old 
I.R.A. was at this time unambiguous. He described Tobin as 
a "very hard and bitter" man; Thornton as being "talkative 
and argumentative"; O'Malley as being in a "very bad aggres-
ive humour:" and Dalton as a person with "nothing to say.n70 
67Ibid. 
68Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
69Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
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With respect to the meeting itself, Mulcahy stated: 
I do not think that in any country in the world four 
officers would come in uniform and sit down in front 
of the Commander-in-Chief of that country and read in 
his presence that document .•• and that the Commander-
in-Chief would sit and listen to them.71 
Joe McGrath, however, the self-appointed mediator 
between the mutineers and the government, pressured Mulcahy 
to meet with the Tobin group again and hear them out. In 
discussing the situation with both the Minister for Defence 
and the President, the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
defended the dissident officers. He claimed that they had 
been ostracized by the Staff, had been left out of the re-
organization of other organizations, and had not been placed 
in suitable positions. McGrath felt that he himself "had 
been slighted in a number of matters and that he felt like 
making an exposure of the whole business and that he was 
not going forward for the Dail at the coming elections."72 
Consequently, Mulcahy met with Joe McGarth, Tobin, 
Dalton, O'Malley and Sean O'Connell on July 7, 1923. These 
members of the old I.R.A. again complained about the re-
tention of ex-British soldiers in the National Army at the 
expense of pre-Truce officers, specifying particular men 
and definite objections. Furthermore, the representatives 
protested the appointment of officers from the Northern 
71Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
72Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195 
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Division to Dublin, while they themselves had been carrying 
on the fight with the Irregulars throughout the country. 
They asked to be given back the Dublin Command. Thornton 
complained that he was the only pre-Truce officer attached 
to the Intelligence department and that he had no defined 
duties. He claimed to have received a verbal promise from 
the Chief of Staff that he would be appointed Director of 
Intelligence but was passed over. Moreover, the old I.R.A. 
men were unhappy that they had not been approached to par-
ticipate in the reorganized I.R.B. The essence of their 
grievances was crystallized in their feelings about the 
overall position of the army: 
It could be squared up._ A large percentage of the 
officers are gazetted, put into jobs, given a rank 
which means nothing, recognized as officers, but what 
the officers want is not so much rank as in;fluence 
in the Army.73 
Mulcahy countered their accusations by pointing out 
that he and his Staff were as much aware and appreciative 
of the services of the pre-Truce officers as the Tobin group 
but that he would not tolerate the idea that a man could 
not be in the army because he was an ex-British officere 
Mulcahy denied any knowledge of their relations with the 
I.R.B. and remarked that if these officers were former mem-
hers of the organization they should certainly know whom to 
contact. The Minister for Defence also declared "that 
73Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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their interference with the authority of those responsible 
for the Army or the assumption by them of any authority 
that did not come from their definite positions in the Army 
could not be countenanced."74 
Mulcahy thought that the dissident officers were 
dissatisfied with the results of the meeting. McGrath, 
however, felt that they were mollified since "they have got 
off some steam." 75 Intelligence reports indicate that 
Mulcahy's analysis was accurate. At a general assembly of 
old I.R.A. officers on July 22, 1923, they appointed a 
deputation to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the serious-
ness of the situation, complaining that in previous dis-
cussions they had received no guarantees that anything would 
be done to alleviate their grievances.76 The next day, 
July 23, 1923, six officers met with Mulcahy to inform him 
that they had decided to go their own way and that a clash 
was inevitable. The officers felt that they should warn 
the Minister. They also wanted to inquire if Mulcahy intend-
ded to rigidly adhere to his previous policy statements. Al-
though they again reiterated their grievances, they further 
stated that their intentions were good, asking the Minister 
74rbid. 
7 5rbid. 
76rbid. 
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to regard them as "bona fides anxious to help."77 Mulcahy 
took this as a cue to begin a rapprochment. While pointing 
out that their previous conduct belied their present claims, 
he was willing to t.ake t.hem at their word arid give them a 
chance to prove their alleged good intentions. 78 
As a result of this discussion, a somewhat unusual 
correspondence ensued between the Minister for Defence and 
the old I.R.A. Within two days, Mulcahy received a letter 
from Cullen, Slattery and O'Connell asking the Commander-in-
Chief for a signed statement containing the assurances he 
gave them at the last meeting. According to the officers, 
Mulcahy agreed to the following: 
1. That we appoint three representatives to deal 
directly with you on matters which are considered vital 
to the progress of the Army on National lines with 
a view to the complete independence of Ireland. 
2. That our representatives be accredited with having 
absolute honesty of purpose and ideals. 
3. We on our part assure you that we are not attached 
to any Political Party, nor are we likely to be, but 
we cannot too strongly urge upon you that we are in 
absolute agreement with you as regards concluding 
portion of paragraph No.l.79 
Mulcahy gave them the assurances they demanded. However, 
he did add one proviso. On matters dealing with "the 
progress of the Army on national lines with a view to the 
77Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers; P?/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
78Ibid. Mulcahy's notes on this meeting are rather 
incomplete-r:n-view of the letter he received from the old 
I.R.A. officers two days later. 
79Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
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complete independence of Ireland," it was to be understood 
that it was "of necessity, a personal and private arrange-
ment and not indicative of sectionalism of any kind in the 
Army."80 Obviously Mulcahy was trying to protect himself 
against charges of fostering societies in the army or using 
the army for political purposes. He concluded by reaffirm-
ing his desire to keep open the lines of communication with 
the men who had done so much for Ireland, especially having 
himself witnessed the disastrous situation brought about 
b . 1 . d . d d' 81 y 1so at1on an m1sun erstan 1ng. In a letter dated 
August 7, 1923, which subsequently was acknowledged by 
Mulcahy, the old I.R.A. appointed Major-General Tom Cullen, 
Colonel Ben Byrne and Comdt. Mick Hehir as their represen-
tatives in all future discussion with the Commander-in-
Chief.82 It was alleged by McGrath and the mutineers that 
Mulcahy agreed to arrange a meeting between the dissident 
officers and the Quartermaster-General, O'Murthuile, a lead-
ing figure in the I.R.B., for the purpose of securing rep-
resentation for them on the governing body of the Brother-
hood. However, the mutineers claimed that the promise was 
never carried out.83 
80ibid. 
81Ibid. 
82Ibid. 
83The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924; The Truth 
About The Army Cris1s, with a Foreword by Major-General Liam 
Tobin Issued by the Irish Republicn Army Organisation, 
Summerhill, Dublin, p.6. {Hereinafter cited as The Truth 
About The Army Crisis.) 
Nothing more was heard from these pre-Truce 
officers until October of 1923 when they wrote Mulcahy 
requesting that he take action to prevent the demobili-
zation of certain officers. 84 The Minister for Defence 
never replied. He considered this letter both improper 
and irregular and open to serious misinterpretation if 
read by anyone not familiar-·with the situation., 8 5 
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Mulcahy viewed any attempt to dictate who should or should 
not remain in the National Forces as a major breach of 
army discipline. Since June, Mulcahy's attitude toward 
the old I.R.A. had become more and more ambiguous. 
Despite his denials,86 he was probably trying to placate 
the dissident officers until after the elections in 
August. This would explain his refusal to answer the 
letter of October, after the elections, despite his 
earlier cordiality. He was also likely under pressure 
from his colleagues, especially McGrath, to reach some 
agreement with the old I.R.A. men. Mulcahy himself claimed 
that the interviews were "distasteful to him and that the 
84Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
85Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Co~mittee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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correspondence with the Tobin group was not profitable in 
any way. 87 Clearly the Minister for Defence was playing 
for time. He evaluated the threats of the old I.R.A. as 
being "the bluff of children" and did not think them" 
capable of organising an organisation that could do any 
damage.n88 Consequently, Mulcahy believed that the problem 
would work itself out when the reorganisation of the army 
was complete, when there would be definite positions with 
specific duties for each officer who would also be subject 
to strict army discipline. He felt that "the time was not 
opportune to face the problem direct in view of the mili-
tary, political and financial situation then existing."89 
By summer and early fall of 1023, G.H.Q. had ac-· 
quired definite and detailed knowledge of the old I.RaA. 
Intelligence reports provided information on membership, 
arms and objectives.90 Professor James Hogan, Director of 
Intelligence in August of 1923 wrote to the Chief of Staff, 
General Sean McMahon, warning him that officers were 
87Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
88Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
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organizing throughout the country. He stated that: 
These Officers have been asked to sit in judgment on 
the question of Army control and on their brother 
Officers. They have constituted themselves a final 
Court of Appeal. I submit that in any Army there can 
be but one line of authority, and that any departure 
from that leads to insubordination.91 
Letters also reached Portobello Barracks, the headquarters 
of the army, concerning the attempt of the I.R.A. organ-
isation to suborn officers •. One such letter stated; 
I have just been told that there is a movement being 
organised in the army by and among the I.R.A. men, 
which was described to me as mutiny against the 
replacement of I.R.A. officers by ex-Britishers and 
the reduction of the grade of the former.92 
Moreover, although the Tobin group did not take 
credit for the Curragh Mutiny of November of 1923, those 
who had refused demobilization papers did claim to be 
members of the old I.R.A. Furthermore, Colonel Patrick 
Madden and Commandant Mullooly, the two officers who ap-
peared as character witnesses on behalf of the rebellious 
officers and helped them with their defence were old I.R.A. 
men. According to the Judge Advocate-General, Major-General 
Davitt, the Tobin organisation was clearly interested in 
the defence of these men.93 After the Curragh Mutiny, with 
91Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army 
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/6, University 
College Dublin Archives, Dublin~ Ireland. 
92Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
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the establishment of the Cabinet Committee on demobilisation, 
the leaders of the I.R.A. organisation claimed that they 
were given a guarantee by McGrath that their decisions would 
be binding on the Army Council. This is the substance of 
the communication that McGrath received from the President 
when he temporarily resigned from the Committee. 94 Clearly, 
the Tobin group was quite prepared to use the Curragh 
incident to their own advantage and took the opportunity to 
press their demands on the government through McGrath. 
The problem of the old I.R.A. continued to simmer 
through January of 1924. Early in the year,word reached 
Portobello Barracks that the organisation intended to take 
direct action by seizing a number of barracks and rifles 
and issuing terms to the Government. G.H.Q. quietly took 
the necessary precautions, informed the co~nanding officers 
to prepare for trouble and relocated certain troops. Al-
though nothing happened,the senior officers of the army 
were beco~ing concerned. In a memorandum to President 
Cosgrave, concerning the I.R.A. organisation, the Minister 
for Defence wrote: "The organisation may not be a very 
great danger but in the near future it can possible be a 
far greater danger than the Irregular one."95 
94The Truth About The Army Crisis, p.7. 
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Mulcahy informed the President that he also was 
concerned about the encouragement give·n the old I. R.A. by 
a certain Cabinet Minister, i.e. Joe McGrath. The Minister 
for Defence predicted that unless the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce disassociated himself from this group and 
turned over whatever information he had, the time would 
come when these officers would try to dictate unacceptable 
terms to the Government, raising the possibility of 
another civil war.96 Mulcahy was of the opinion that "this 
Cabinet Minister thinks he is, or has, some control, over 
the organisation but he is only being made use of and as 
soon as his personal opinion conflicts with those in the 
Organisation, he will cease to have influence."97 Al-
though the Minister for Defence was critical of McGrath's 
handling of the re-settlement board for demobilised men, 
he pointed out to President Cosgrave that he, nevertheless, 
still supported both the Minister and the Executive and 
expected the same support for his department.98 From this 
statement, so indicative of Mulcahy's mentality, the Minis-
ter for Defence was shown to be very much a party man. 
This attitude would later enable him to remain loyal to a 
government which would treat him and his senior officers so 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
98Ibid. 
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shabbily not two months later. 
Analyzing the state of the army, the Minister for 
Defence expressed apprehension over the problems of 
demobilisation and the maintenace of discipline. He reaf-
firmed his intention not to retain any officer who was un-
suitable or did not have the proper attitude towards the 
military code of behavior. Decisions involving demobiliza-
tion or discipline would be made by the proper army author-
ities. Interference by the Executive Council or any par-
ticular Minister, Mulcahy felt, should be made on the basis 
of a general principle that would be applicable to all cases, 
and could be stated in a memorandum. The Minister for 
Defence envisioned creating an efficient Army machine, sub-
ject to the highest standards. He prophetically foresaw 
one potential difficulty still to be overcome, "that these 
men must be weaned away from the idea and the use of 
arms."99 Moreover, the large number of men that had to be 
rewoven into the fabric of normal life and "the fact that 
their temper is what it is, increases the desirability for 
taking them away from the Army and putting them back into 
civil life and increases also the responsibility that lies 
on that particular department [Industry and Commerce] to 
see that they are placed back into Civil life."lOO 
99 Ibid. 
lOOibid. 
Consequently, Mulcahy had a discussion with the 
President and McGrath on January 26, 1923. According to 
the Minister for Defence, this meeting convinced him "of 
the soupdness of my proposals relating to demobilisation 
etc. and that there was no element of danger in the sit-
uation."lOl Mulcahy claimed that his proposals for the 
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army with respect to nominations and dismissals would have 
brought "matters to a head and I have no doubt in my mind 
that the whole position could then be satisfactorily dealt 
with and it would have been but for the interference and 
encouragement of certain politicians."l02 Perhaps Mulcahy 
was over-optimistic regarding his ability to control the 
old I.R.A. In any event, the divisiveness in the Cabinet 
was clearly a contributory factor. Although engaging in 
conduct unbecoming officers of the Free State Army, the 
mutinous organisation could at least hope for a sympathetic 
hearing in the Executive Council. Despite all the meetings 
and discussions, trouble was not avoided. Tobin and Dalton 
presented an ultimatum to the Cosgrave Government. It was 
mutiny. To many, it seemed like an invitation for a second 
civil war, an invitation that fortunately was ultimately 
declined by all sides. 
lOlibid. 
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.CHAPTER V 
'l'HE MUTINY 
The mutiny officially began on March 6, 1924, when 
Liam Tobin and Charles Dalton presented an ultimatum to the 
Cosgrave government. They demanded changes in the army and 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the direction the Free 
State had taken since the Treaty. Dressing their demands 
in the rhetoric of republicanism, the mutineers declared 
that they and the Irish people had accepted the Treaty only 
as a stepping stone to a republican form of government and 
that the government had betrayed this ideal. They demanded 
a conference with representatives of the government to 
discuss their interpretation of the Treaty and set the 
follo-vring conditions: 
(a) The removal of the Army Council 
(b) The immediate suspension of army demobilisation and 
reorganisation.! 
If the government did not comply with these demands, they 
threatened to take appropriate action: 
lThe Truth About the Army Crisis, with a Foreword 
by Major-General Liam Tobin, Issued by the Irish Republican 
Army Organisation, Summerhill, Dublin, p.l2. (Hereinafter 
cited as The Truth About the Army Crisis}. 
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In the event of your Government rejecting these 
proposals we will take such action that will make clear 
to the Irish people that we are not ·renegades or 
traitors to the ideals that induced them to accept the 
Treaty. Our Organisation fully realises the serious-
ness of the action that we may be compelled to take, 
but we can no longer be party to the treachery that 
threatens to destroy the aspirations of the nation.2 
Tobin's letter was apparently handed to the 
President by Mr. McGrath at or about ten o'clock in the 
evening on March 6. The Minister for Defence was not inform-
ed until 10:30 the following morning.3 Officers from 
throughout the country supported the mutineers. Many of 
them fled with arms and equipment. During the crisis, 49 
officers resigned from the army in sympathy with the muti-
neers, including 3 Major Generals, 5 Colonels, 17 Comman-
dants, 12 Captains and 12 Lieutenants. 4 Fifty officers 
absconded with war materials which included 11 Lewis guns, 
21 Rifles, 1 Grenade Rifle, 35,400 rounds of .303 ammuni-
tion, 41 Grenades and 1 Revolver.5 
On March 7, 1924, the Executive Council ordered the 
2Ibid. 
3Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
4MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
5"Intelligence Report," 24 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny 
File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/196, Uni~ersity College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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A military search party vis-
ited several houses in Dublin, including'the one of Mr. 
McGrath; but the two officers eluded capture. In protest 
against the decision of the Executive Council, the Minister 
for Industry and Commerce tendered his resignation to the 
President. However, he continued to fulfill his duties 
until March 19, 1924. In an interview with the Irish 
Independent newspaper, McGrath explained that he resigned 
because he" ••• refused to be a party to starting a blaze 
which he believed would have consumed the country. He said 
that "he would not be a party to taking action against a 
body of men who were responsible very largely for the birth 
of the Free State and for its life since."7 His action, he 
claimed, "saved the country from a catastrophe. ••8 McGrath 
believed that the impact of his resignation both forced the 
government into a more conciliatory position and also had 
a moderating effect on the mutineers. 
On March 10, 1924, the Minister for Defence 
released the following statement to the Press concerning 
the Mutiny: 
6Ireland, State Paper Office Dublin (Hereinafter 
cited as SPOD), Cabinet minutes, C2/60. 
?The Irish Independent, 19 May 1924, p.S. 
a Ibid. 
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Two Army officers have attempted to involve the Army 
in a challenge to the authority of the Government. This 
is an outrageous departure from the spirit of the Army. 
It will not be tolerated. Particularly will it not be 
tolerated by the officers and men of the Army who cherish 
its honour. They will stand over their posts and do 
their duty to-day in this new threat of danger in the 
same watchful, determined spirit that has always been 
the spirit of the Army.9 
Apparently, however, the Executive Council was not as 
convinced as Mulcahy was that the spirit of the army was to 
be trusted. To handle the crisis, they appointed the Chief 
of the Civic Guard, Eoin O'Duffy, formerly a senior officer 
in the army, to the position of General Offi~er Commanding 
the Defence Forces of Sarostat Eireann.10 In effect, they 
re-established the position of Commander-in-Chief for 
O'Duffy. In the Dail, President Cosgrave explained the new 
appointment as simply a strengthening of the personnel of 
the Headquarters Staff, part of the plan to deal with the 
threat of mutiny.ll However, some members of the government 
believed it was necessary to appoint O'Duffy in order to 
avoid the appearance of a faction fight within the army 
itself. They felt that the leaders of the army had become 
tainted by their association with the I.R.B. and could not, 
therefore, effectively deal with the mutineers, the old I.R.A. 
1896. 
9The Irish Independent, 19 May, 1924, p.So 
lOireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/62. 
llireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924) : 
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O'Higgins, in particular, advocated this policy. 12 Mulcahy, 
on the other hand, resented the appointment of O'Duffy, 
characterizing him as an outsider who was out of touch with 
the military.l3 
as: 
In the Dail, the President described the ultimatum 
••. a challenge which no Government could ignore with-
out violating the trust conferred on it •••• The attempt, 
such as it is, is not against a particular Government, 
it is a challenge to the democratic foundations of the 
State, to the very basis of Parliamentary representation 
and of responsible Government.l4 
The President refused to discuss any of the political issues 
set forth in the document, viewing any such debate as in-
defensible. He claimed that "this Government had never dis-
cussed questions of politics with Army officers."l5 Consid-
ering the series of meetings which took place between the 
mutineers and members of the Executive Council, Cosgrave was 
obviously employing a very narrow definition of the word 
"politics". At best, the President's statement was mis-
leading; at worst, a deliberate falsehood. 
The Minister for Defence outlined for the Dail the 
military situation throughout the country. Incidents of 
officers absconding with arms had been reported in Roscommon, 
12Ibid., col.2218. 
13Ibid., cols.2229-2230. 
14Ibid., col.l896 
15Ibid. 
r 
Gormanstown, Baldonnel and Templemore barracks. A small 
number of resignations had been received; especially in 
oublin. Mulcahy's evaldation was that: 
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There is a certain atmosphere of threat, that a large 
number of officers throughout the Army are preparing to 
resign if the threat contained in the letter to the 
Government is not carried out; that they are prepared 
to set themselves up in arms in defiance against the 
Government is another threat. There is only one part 
of the country in which there are possibly any ramifi-
cations of any danger and this is the County Cork.l6 
The Chief of Staff was sent to Cork to stabilize that area, 
and a new Commanding Officer was appointed there. 
The Minister for Industry and Commerce publicly re-
pudiated the government's policy. Although he disclaimed 
any agreement with the Tobin-Dalton document, McGrath an-
nounced his resignation to the Dail, charging that the 
present crisis was "brought about by absolute muddling, mis-
handling and incompetency on the part of a Department of 
State."l7 A full discussion on these charges was scheduled 
in the Dail for the next day. The military crisis generated 
a political crisis and the Government was forced to face 
both a potential revolt in the army and also dissension with-
in Cumann na nGaedheal, as a series of party meetings would 
later demonstrate. 
Cumann na nGaedheal party meetings were held at 
16rbid., col.l900. 
17rbid., col.l897 
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various times throughout the army crisis,l8 with a "rather 
well regimented section within the Party giving a certain 
qualified support to the Mutineers."l9 Interestingly, 
despite their protestations about parliamentary government 
and the responsibility of the Executive Council to the Dail, 
the Government, practically speaking, treated the army 
crisis as an intra-party dispute, giving more information to 
and engaging in more discussion with its party members than 
with the Dail Deputies. In fact, Mr. Thomas Johnson, leader 
of the Opposition party, was not informed by the Executive 
Council immediately upon their receipt of the ultimatum and 
was given no information about the crisis until the Dail 
convened on March 11. As he told the Irish Independent: "I 
don't know any more about the business than I have read in 
the newspapers." 20 In the Dail, the Labour Party leader 
castigated the Government for its treatment of the Irish 
Parliament: 
We read of a meeting of the Government Party which lasted 
five hours. No doubt matters affecting the State as a 
whole and the conduct of the Executive Council were 
under review at that party meeting ..•• The Executive 
Council is not responsible to the Dail and to the country 
18o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
19Ibid. 
20The Irish Independent, 10 March, 1924, p.7. 
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for the government of the country, I make the assertion 
that much of this trouble has resulted from a failure 
to recognise responsibility to the Dail as distinct from 
responsibility to the Party.21 
On March 11, a party meeting was called specifically 
to evaluate the Government's policy towards the mutineers. 
It lasted six hours and, from all accounts, McGrath was the 
star performer. Although Mulcahy was also present, he did 
not engage in any substantial debate with his colleague.22 
McGrath claimed that the mutiny was not a mutiny at all, but 
rather a dispute between two rival secret organisations, the 
old I.R.A. and the I.R.B. He charged that the staff at 
G.H.Q. had reorganised the Brotherhood and consequently "from 
that point of view, they were in exactly the same case as 
the mutinous officers, namely Major-General Tobin and Colonel 
Dalton, who organised another secret organisation. " 23 
McGrath had personally tried to bring the two groups to-
gether but had failed.24 A lengthy discussion of the I.R.B., 
the old I.R.A. and the role of secret societies in the army 
ensued, which further strengthened the convictions of those 
who, like O'Higgins and his ally, Patrick Hogan, the Minister 
21Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924}: 
1987-1988. 
22p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid. 
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for Agriculture, already had begun to suspect that some 
changes in the army had to be made. 
McGrath's position was that the government had mis-
interpreted the March 6th document. The mutinous officers 
were old friends, former comrades of the members of the 
Executive Council. They could not be expected to adhere to 
a strict disciplinary code under these circumstances. 
According to the Minister for Industry and Commerce, Tobin 
and Dalton wrote "to the friends and colleagues of yester-
day, with whom they had consulted and agreed to accept the 
Treaty, demanding an interview to discuss what they consid-
ered a departure from the real Treaty position."25 McGrath 
concluded that the Government over-reacted to the ultimatum 
solely out of the fear that the document might at some time 
be published.26 
McGrath finally prevailed. The Party members agreed 
that the Minister should approach the mutineers and induce 
them to accept the following terms: 
That the men concerned in the recent trouble in the 
Army undertake to undo, so far as they can, the mis-
chief created by their actions, and on their so doing 
the incident will be regarded as closed.27 
The exact meaning of this statement was later disputed by 
2367. 
25The Irish Independent, 19 May, 1924, p.S. 
26Ibid. 
27Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
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the party members. McGrath claimed that he was given to 
understand that there would be no "victimisation," that the 
officers involved in the crisis would be reinstated once the 
terms of the agreement had been fulfilled and the manner of 
effecting their return had been arranged.28 Some of his 
colleagues in the Cabinet disagreed and denied that any 
promises had been made or any "bargain struck" with the 
mutineers.29 Instead, they claimed that they had only 
agreed to treat the men involved in the crisis in an "extra-
ordinary fashion," that is, not to charge them with mutiny. 
Rather, they would provide the mutineers with a way out of 
their difficulties by offering them lenient terms and en-
abling them to retreat from the position of the ultimatum. 
Thus, the Cabinet hoped to avoid any further trouble.30 
The mutineers stated that the Government and the 
Party, through McGrath, had offered them the following 
terms, which they had accepted: 
(a) The setting up of a Committee of Enquiry into Army 
administration. In the event of this Committee finding 
for the removal of the members of the Army Council, they 
to be replaced by neutral officers who were not connect-
ed with either side. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid., col.2407. 
30p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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(b) The personnel of the Army to be reviewed with the 
object of making it an I.R.A. Army. All men with active 
service records, even though demobilised, to be placed, 
so long as the Army estimates did not exceed 4,000,000 
pounds. 
(c) Suitable arrangements to be arrived at whereby 
all our officers and men would return to their posts 
with any arms removed from same, it being distinctly 
understood that there would be no victimisation. There 
were to be no further raids or arrests, and both sides 
were to co-operate in preserving order.31 
In fact, on Harch 12, 1924, the Executive council 
decided to institute a full enquiry into the administration 
of the army. The Minister for Industry and Commerce was to 
be consulted about the manner in which the investigation 
would be conducted. The Cabinet minutes state very clearly 
that the proposed enquiry was established because of the 
discussion in the Dail the previous day.3 2 Obviously, this 
refers to McGrath's charges of muddling, mishandling and 
incompetency in the army. More than likely, this is par-
tially true. The Government did want to avoid a full scale 
discussion in the Dail on the army and the promise of an 
inquiry would satisfy and silence McGrath. However, the 
l'.rmy .Inquiry Committee was probably also a result of the 
party meeting and the bargain concluded with the mutineers. 
Further proof of this can be seen in the decision of the 
Executive Council at that same meeting to adopt a moderate 
position towards the mutinous officers. Whether McGrath 
misunderstood the intentions of the Government, whether he 
31The Truth About the Army Crisis, pp.l3-14. 
32rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/64. 
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was deliberately misled or whether he pursued an independent 
policy is not clear. In any event, the tabinet decided that 
those officers who had absconded with arms, when arrested, 
should be afforded the opportunity to restore the stolen 
property and, then, be released on parole. Furthermore, the 
cases of those officers who had resigned were to be individ-
ually reviewed by the Minister for Defence who would make 
recommendations to the Executive Council, who would decide 
what action should be taken. 33 This was certainly not., how-
ever, carte blanche reinstatement. 
During the afternoon of March 12, Cosgrave announced 
to the Dail the government's intention to establish an Army 
Inquiry Committee. This had the desired effect on HcGrath 
and he announced that he would make no further statement, 
neither elaborating nor corroborating the charges he had 
made the previous day against the Ministry of Defence. When 
the Dail resumed later that same evening, the President dis-
closed that he had received a second document from Tobin and 
Dalton rescinding the original ultimatum. These two officers 
stated that they had sent the earlier document "with the 
sole object of exposing to the Government and the represen-
tatives of the people what we consider to be a serious 
menace to the proper administration of the Army."34 The 
mutineers went on to profess their loyalty and allegiance 
3 3rbid. 
34The Truth About The Army Crisis, p.l4. 
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to the state, ~cknowledging the supremacy of civil author-
ity over the military and deploring the detrimental effects 
of sections and organisations within the army which they 
realized tended to nsap allegiance from the only and proper 
constitutional authority, viz, the Government of the people 
which we fully recognise." 35 Tobin and Dalton concluded 
that they would be satisfied if their actions resulted in 
the army situation being corrected. No mention of ,the 
Treaty ~-1as made. The mutineers explained that this second 
document was written in return for the government's prom-
ises and was delivered to the President "to enable the 
Government to explain its change of front to the Dail and 
the public."36 
Upon receipt of the second Tobin-Dalton letter, 
the government's official attitude toward the mutiny under-
went a volte face. No longer was it a serious threat to the 
democratic institutions of the Free State. As of March 12, 
it was merely a foolish action, not to be taken at face 
value. The government's position was articulated by Kevin 
O'Higgins. Although acknowledging that the original ulti-
matum constituted "mutiny plus treason," the Minister for 
Home Affairs revealed that the Executive Council had deter-
mined that this document was merely a reaction against 
abuses and irregularities in the army. The mutiny had been 
35rbid. 
36rbid. 
r 
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germinating for some time and thus the need for an inquiry. 
The investigation into the administration of the army would 
decide the validity of the charges McGrath levelled against 
Mulcahy and his department. The other members of the Execu-
tive Council, according to O'Higgins, had been too preoc-
cupied with their own Departments to have had "any intimate 
or detailed knowledge of Army administration, sufficient 
knowledge, sufficient information, to enable them to form a 
definite view as to whether the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce would be right in what he would say, or the Minister 
for Defence?"37 
The Minister further explained that the government 
had been wrong in its original evaluation of the ultimatum. 
Although Tobin and Dalton might have used the parlence of 
mutiny, that was not what they really meant. He explained: 
if the document were taken at its face value it 
would be simply the Four Courts situation over again. 
It was represented to us that it need not be taken, and 
ought not to be taken, at its face value •••• We were 
told that these men, while they might have written a 
foolish, an almost criminally foolish document, were not 
really taking up the position of challenging the funda-
mental right of the people to decide political issues 
here, whether these issues be domestic or internation-
al.38 
The Vice-President justified the government's new policy on 
the basis of enlightened pragmaticism: "It is all opportun-
ism, if you wish, but in the handling of national affairs, 
37Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2001. 
3 8Ibid., cols.l997-1998. 
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and in the handling of very delicate situations, there must 
needs be opportunism." 39 Sometimes it was best not to be 
doctrinaire. O'Higgins pointed out that a special relation-
ship existed between the army and the government because 
these men could claim responsibility for the birth of the 
Free State. Although this unique situation demanded a less 
rigid attitude on the part of the Executive Council, the 
Cabinet, without question, would not allow any challenge to 
the authority of Parliament and the supremacy of the people 
to go unanswered. 
The Deputies were not satisfied with the govern-
ment's explanation. Serious charges had been levelled 
against a Department of State and they wanted further informa-
tion. They were not content to wait for the proposed 
inquiry, about which they had been given no details. Further-
more, the Dail deputies demanded to know more specifically 
about the government's handling of the mutiny. What was 
the current status of the officers involved? What action 
did the government propose to take against them? This was 
especially important since they were still in possession of 
stolen arms and equipment, despite the protestations of 
loyalty and good intentions contained in the second letter. 
The Government refused to elaborate. Concerning 
the proposed inquiry, the President merely said that the 
details had not yet been decided. He did not say whether 
39rbid~ col.2000. 
~
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the officers involved in the crisis would be retained in 
the army, nor did he offer any idea as to how the Government 
intended to deal with these men. Cosgrave simply ignored 
Mr. Johnson's query as to why Tobin and Dalton were still 
using their military titles. All that O'Higgins said, 
regarding the cause of the mutiny, was: "Steps were taken 
to deal with that situation; immediate steps. Steps are 
still being taken to deal with that situation.•40 No one 
from the Government benches mentioned any kind of negoti-
ations or arrangements made with the mutineers, either 
directly or through an intermediary. O'Higgins did not 
disclose who informed the government of the real attitude 
of the mutineers, that the ultimatum was not to be taken at 
face value. Moreover, Cosgrave even claimed he did not 
know how the second document came into his possession. 41 
All the Ministers totally neglected the role of McGrath. 
Obviously, one suspects that President Cosgrave received 
the second document from McGrath and simply thought it 
politic at this point not to involve directly one of his 
Ministers of State in the mutiny. All in all, the actions 
of the government were reminiscent of the worst features of 
political back-room dealings. As an editorial in the Irish 
stated: 
40rbid., col.l996. 
4lrbid., col.2018. 
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Mutiny is mutiny, and, with all respect for Kevin 
O'Higgins, who must have been acutely. uncomfortable 
yesterday, twenty-four hours cannot change it into a 
merely frank expression of military discontent, not even 
twenty-four hours of treatment in the secret alembic of 
the Cumann na nGaedheal.42 
McGrath's role as the self-appointed mediator be-
tween the mutineers and the Government managed to be both 
obscure and ubiquitous. His friendship with the mutineers 
dated back to their common association with Collins and his 
Squad during the Anglo-Irish war. He was partially moti-
vated by a sincere desire to help his former comrades attain 
suitable positions and to avoid trouble. While viewing 
himself as a peacemaker, he over-estimated the number of 
followers of Tobin and Dalton and their influence on the 
army. 43 It is also likely that he had personal ambitions 
and visions of acceding to power as head of a new party or 
as a strong force in a coalition. 44 
Although the government elected not to mention 
McGrath's role in the army crisis, G.H.Q. was kept fully 
informed as to his activities. Intelligence reports in-
dicated that "the entire situation turns on Joe McGrath. He 
is in complete control of the organisation, through Tobin 
etc. and both he and they are of the opinion that he holds 
4 2The Irish Times, 13 March 1924, p.6. 
43Interview with Lt.-Gen. M.J. Costello, Dublin, 
Ireland, 8 September 1975. 
44
"Intelligence Report," 1 April 1924, Tobin Mutiny 
File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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the 'ship hand' in the Government .... McGrath says he is 
sorry he did not demand more. He is hailed as the 'big 
man.'" 45 Consequently, the Intelligence unit kept a close 
watch on the Minister for Industry and Commerce. It follow-
ed his activities so carefully that when, on March 16, the 
army authorities arrested one of the mutineers, Captain 
George Ashton, and the possibility of trouble arose, it was 
able to report on the Minister's telephone conversation with 
the President and the Vice-President. That evening, 
McGrath called Cosgrave, who was ill and unable to come to 
the phone. Then he telephoned O'Higgins and informed him 
that Ashton's arrest would create trouble "unless it was 
seen to." 46 O'Higgins asked him why he did not approach 
Mulcahy. Eventually McGrath agreed to call the Minister 
for Defence. Obviously, the army was taking the mutiny 
much more seriously than the government and was zealously, 
perhaps over-zealously, trying to guard against any unfore-
seen developments. 
McGrath was also involved in the government's dis-
cussions concerning the terms to be offered the mutineers. 
Mulcahy had suggested that, due to the similarity of their 
statements, the resignations of officers from various parts 
of the country were part of a conspiracy which "did not 
45
"Daily Summary of Intelligence," 14 March 1924, 
Mutiny Intelligence, Mulcahy Papers, RM 50/13/15, University 
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
46Ibid., 16 March 1924. 
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intend to confine itself to resignation alone."47 Therefore, 
the President should immediately accept these resignations, 
and not give them the opportunity to reconsider. Further~ 
more, Mulcahy thought that those officers who had left their 
posts or \'~ere absent "'i thout leave should be charged with a 
suitable offence as part of a conspiracy to mutiny. Pending 
the investigation of a court martial, they would be allowed 
out under open arrest. For those officers who had abscond~ 
ed with a~ms or taken other definite action, the Minister 
believed that they should not only be charged, but also held 
under close arrest until they returned the stolen material. 
Only then would he consider their being allowed out under 
48 
open arrest. 
However, after the President consulted with UcGrath, 
Mulcahy aod O'Duffy, the Executive Council decided on more 
lenient terms. Cosgrave communicated this to McGrath, 49 and 
Mulcahy ioformed the senior officers of the army~ In a 
memorandu~ dated March 18, to the Chief of Staff, the Adju-
tant-General, and the Quartermaster-General, the Minister 
for Defence informed them that the mutineers were to be 
dealt wi to, 11 from the point of view of arrest on the lines 
indicated: 
4 7 "Memorandum, 11 15 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny File, 
Mulcahy Papers, P?/B/196, University College Dublin Archives, 
Dublin, rreland. 
48 Ibid. 
49Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/67. 
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1. By Thursday, the 20th instant at 6 p.m. all arms 
and equipment removed from barracks to be returned 
to the place or places from which they were taken. 
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2. Persons concerned in the removal of such material 
to surrender at the place from which such material was 
taken to the officer now in charge of that place. 
3. After such surrender on presenting parole to the 
officer in charge such parole will be accepted, and 
the persons concerned allowed out under open arrest. 
4. Absentees from duty shall also surrender by 6 p.m. 
on Thursday, the 20th instant, and on their parole 
being presented, it will be accepted. They will be 
allowed out under open arrest. 
5. Thursday is only mentioned as a convenient date to 
allow a certain amount of time, but it is desirable 
that no delay should be occasioned in giving effect 
to the terms of paragraphs 1,2,3, and 4.50 
What the government intended to do with the men who 
surrendered is not clear. The orders from the Adjutant-
General to the G.O.C.'s referred to an investigation of 
charges and a trial by court martia1.51 However, McGrath, 
while denouncing the government's terms as being ndeliber-
ately framed to make it as bitter as possible for those men 
to swallow," claimed that he told the mutineers that nthey 
would have to surrender their arms and to go through what-
ever machinery was necessary to maintain discipline in the 
Army and to get back to their positions and to do what they 
could in restoring the status quo."52 Thus, McGrath 
50
"Memorandum, 11 18 March 1924, Tobin Mutiny File, 
Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, University College Dublin Archives, 
Dublin, Ireland. 
51Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
52Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
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interpreted the government's position as being that, al-
though some type of disciplinary action would be brought 
against these men, they would be reinstated. What is clear 
is the intention of the Executive Council to have the offi-
cers involved in the mutiny turn themselves in voluntarily 
as soon as possible and thus avoid any precipitous action on 
either side. 
Meanwhile, General Eoin O'Duffy had become dis-
satisfied with his ne,., position as General Officer Command-
ing the Defence Forces. O'Duffy was unclear about his exact 
status and uncertain as to what was his relation to the 
Defence Council and the Executive Council, and whether he 
was empowered to form an advisory committee of the G.O.C.'s. 
The Cabinet discussed these issues and decided that O'Duffy 
could become a member of the Defence Council if he so 
desired, that the Minister for Defence would arrange for him 
to see the Executive Council when necessary and that, al-
though he was free to consult with any or all of the Cornrnand-
ing Officers, he should not refer to them as a Council.53 
On March 14, the Government enlarged O'Duffy's responsibil-
ities by also appointing him Inspector-General of the Defence 
Forces. Cabinet minutes reveal that a lengthy discus~ion 
was held concerning his powers, duties and functions, and 
that "it was arranged that a formal statement of these powers 
etc. should be prepared by the Attorney-General in 
53rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/63. 
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consultation with the Minister for Defence and that the 
necessary instructions should be issued by the latter to the 
Army. ••54 
O'Duffy was not satisfied. In a letter to the 
President, he described his position as "obscure," and 
claimed he had found he had not sufficient power. He said 
that he understood that it was the Executive Council's in-
tention that he "should be responsible to the Minister for 
Defence for the Defence Forces, and ••• should have full 
authority and control over every Department and Service of 
the Army." 55 Now it appeared to him that he did not have 
such authority. If he was not given the necessary power, 
O'Duffy threatened to resign and return to his position as 
Commissioner of the Civic Guard. The Executive Council, 
therefore, decided on March 18 that: 
A statement prepared by the Attorney General setting out 
the functions of the Inspector General was considered 
and approved and it was ordered that it be gazetted 
immediately. 
An outline of the powers and functions of the G.O.C. 
of the Defence Forces having been agreed on, it was 
arranged that the Minister for Defence and the Attorney-
General should prepare a formal statement of these 
powers etc. and submit it to the Executive Council at 
its Meeting on the follmdng day. 56 
General O'Duffy was to be consulted before any final 
54Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/65~ 
55Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
56rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/67. 
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statement was issued. The exact status of O'Duffy on March 
18 is important because it was the cause· of controversy 
between the Cabinet and Mulcahy. During the evening of 
March 18, the Minister for Defence approved military action 
against the mutineers. Mulcahy later claimed that he took 
this step (subsequently referred to as the Parnell Street 
raid,) without consulting O'Duffy because his official 
position had not been formalized.5 7 In this confusion, two 
things are evident: 1) that it was the intention of the 
Government that O'Duffy should handle the crisis, since he 
was brought back into the army for that very purpose; and 
2) that, technically, whether O'Duffy was a functioning 
Commander-in-Chief, especially in view of his threatened 
resignation, was questionable. 
General Headquarters had been informed that a meet-
ing of mutinous officers was being held at Devlin's Pub in 
Parnell Street, an establishment formerly used by Michael 
Collins during the Anglo-Irish war. There is speculation 
that the purpose of the gathering·was to stage a coup or 
formulate plans to kidnap the entire Cabinet. 58 Mulcahy 
himself may have been worried about the unpredictable nature 
of these men.59 In any event, a party of nine soldiers was 
57 rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2276-2277. 
58Leon O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground (Totowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), p.212. 
59rnterview with Col. Dan Bryan, Dublin, Ireland, 
18 March 1975. 
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dispatched to the pub. Upon arrival, they ascertained that 
a number of armed mutineers were inside. Since the troops 
had no authority to raid the public house, they informed 
the officers inside that they would be arrested as soon as 
they came out and then telephoned the Adjutant-General, 
O'Sullivan, for further instructions. O'Sullivan ordered 
them to enter the pub, preferably without using force. 
Reinforcements were sent. The government troops surrounded 
the area, and evacuated the civilians. Upon entering the 
public house, they found that "the 'Mutineers' had barri-
caded the stairs and were evidently prepared to fight, as 
guns were plainly discernible in the dark." 60 Since a fight 
was likely, the Adjutant-General was again telephoned. He 
gave orders "to force the place" and arrest the entire party. 
Meanwhile, a number of the mutinous officers, possibly 
including Tobin and Dalton, escaped across the rooftops. 
The government forces then proceeded up the stairs where 
they found the mutineers concealed between two roofs. The 
mutineers called for the government troops to surrender. 
Colonel MacNeill, the officer in charge of the raid, coun-
tered with his own demand of unconditional surrender. After 
MacNeill agreed not to fire on the mutineers, they gave 
themselves up. Eleven officers were arrested. Seven 
revolvers, one automatic weapon and fifty rounds of ammu-
60"Report on Operations-Parnell Street Area 18/19 
March," Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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nition were confiscated. There were no casualties. Al-
though no documents were found, a large.quantity of paper 
had been torn up, indicating to the commanding officer that 
had the troops "arrived an hour later a very interesting 
'bag' would have been got, as preparations for a meeting 
had been made in one of the rooms in Devlin's."61 Accord-
ing to the mutineers, their offi9ers surrendered because 
they realized the "seriousness of the situation" and were 
"unwilling to be a party to a new outbreak throughout the 
country which would have occurred if blood had been 
spilled."62 
Sometime between the army's arrival at the pub at 
approximately 9:30 and the capture of the officers, some 
time after midnight, two of the mutineers unsuccessfully 
attempted to telephone various members of the government, 
excluding the Minister for Defence. They probably wanted 
to inform them of the army's presence and to ask them to 
call off the raid. Meanwhile, McGrath, accompanied by Mr. 
Dan McCarthy, T.D., had arrived at Devlin's and immediately 
called Eoin McNeill, the Minister for Education, to inform 
him of the army's action. McNeill then telephoned the 
Minister for Defence and told his secretary that a raid was 
in progress at the pub and that McGrath was there. The 
secretary offered to have Mulcahy, who was not available at 
6lrbid. 
62The Truth About the Army Crisis, p.l5. 
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that moment, call the Minister back; but McNeill declined, 
saying he was just passing on the information he had 
received. The secretary commented that it seemed that 
McNeill "wanted to wash his hands of the matter."63 Inter-
estingly, McNeill would later claim that the raid was more 
serious and more grave than mutiny.64 
The prisoners at Devlin's pub were taken inside the 
public house. McGrath vigorously protested the army's 
action, claiming it was neither authorised by the govern-
ment nor entirely legal since the raiding party only had 
warrants for the arrest of three of the men. The command-
ing officer informed the Minister that his instructions 
were to arrest the whole party and that a warrant was not 
necessary when officers were engaged in conduct prejudicial 
to good order and military discipline. The military report 
of the raid described McGrath as being "very disagreeable" 
and stated that he himself would have been detained save 
for the fact he was a member of the government and "under 
the influence of drink."6S After the arrests had been 
completed, the report to G.H.Q. records the following: 
63Memorandum, Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/B/196, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
64Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2273. 
65"Report on Operations-Parnell Street Area 18/19 
March," Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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"Mr. Joseph McGrath ••• asked permission to stand the 
prisoners a drink - permission was not refused in the cir-
cumstances."66 The Parnell Street raid, for all practical 
purposes, ended any real threat of mutiny. Attention now 
shifted away from the mutineers to the Army Council. 
The Executive Council met in the morning of 19 March 
1924. President Cosgrave was ill and thus not in attendance. 
The activities of the previous evening sparked a general 
debate on the army. The Cabinet concluded that the Parnell 
Street raid had violated government policy and, subject to 
the approval of the President, decided to ask for the res-
ignation of the Chief of Staff, the Adjutant-General and the 
Quartermaster-General from their administrative posts and 
to recommend to the President that the Minister for Defence 
be removed. General O'Duffy was to be placed in complete 
control of the army. 67 Mulcahy, having left the Cabinet 
meeting to allow further discussion and thus unaware of his 
colleagues' position concerning his status, resigned in 
protest of the decision to dismiss his staff. 
Mulcahy contended that the Parnell Street raid had 
been conducted in accordance with the Defence Forces Act, 
and even the Executive Council could not circumvent the law. 
66rbid. It is interesting to note that when O'Higgins 
read this report to the Dail, he omitted, on the advice of 
Mulcahy, the description of McGrath as under the influence 
of drink. McGrath was obviously aware of the contents of 
the report and challenged the Minister to read it, claiming 
it was untrue. 
67rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/68. 
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The arrangement made with the mutineers did not have the 
effect of law. Rather, "it simply advised officers of a 
possible attitude that might voluntarily be adopted within 
the next few days by officers who had committed offences."68 
Subsequently, the Adjutant-General, speaking in his own 
defence before the Inquiry Committee, supported this position. 
He said: "I got no order not to arrest persons chargeable 
with any offence; I got a memorandum"69 
In response to the Cabinet's decision, Generals 
O'Murthuile and O'Sullivan resigned both their administra-
tive posts and their commissions. General MacMahon, who was 
in Cork at the time of the raid, refused to acquiesce unless 
the reasons for his dismissal were clearly and specifically 
stated. In a letter to Mulcahy, the Chief of Staff wrote: 
I respectfully submit, Sir, that I will not resign as I 
consider that an apparently voluntary submission of my 
resignation would be equivalent to an expression of 
acquiescence in a policy that will ultimately involve 
the Army in a political crisis • 
... I request ... that I be informed of the nature of 
my Military offence and afforded the opportunity, to 
which I am entitled, of refuting any such charge or 
innuendoes.70 
Despite his protests, MacMahon's allegiance was never 
68Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
69o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
70Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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seriously in doubt. When one of his officers suggested the 
possibility of G~H~Q. repudiating the government's measures, 
the Chief of Staff reprimanded him sharply. 71 However, be-
cause he refused to resign, the Government relieved him of 
his administrative post and withdrew his commission.72 
MacMahon's letter exemplifies the difficulties that the Army 
Council was confronted with. Although its members were 
being slandered by unnamed accusers, vilified by rumour, 
sacrificed to gossip and dismissed without explanation, 
military discipline prevented them from retaliating. 
MacMahon's resignation provides an insight into the 
relationship between O'Higgins and Cosgrave. The President 
wrote to the Executive Council requesting to know the exact 
circumstances which had made the dismissal of the Chief of 
Staff necessary. He also protested against learning about 
such decisions from the newspapers. 73 O'Higgins informed 
him of the particulars and added: "We quite agree with you 
that where possible major decisions should not be finally 
arrived at without some contact or consultation with you."74 
This correspondence reveals that Cosgrave was attempting to 
7lrnterview with Lt. Gen. M.J. costello, Dubl~n, 
Ireland, 8 September 1975. 
72rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/71 
73rreland, SPOD, Army Mutiny File, S3678A. 
74rbid. 
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protect his prerogatives as President and was certainly not 
content to be a passive spectator in the crisis. It tends 
to contradict the interpretation that O'Higgins handled the 
army crisis and emerged as the strong man of the Cabinet,75 
and supports the view that O'Higgins' strength "has been 
exaggerated and Cosgrave's under~estimated."76 Seemingly, 
no major decisions \'lere made which Cosgrave did not approve 
of. If a power struggle was being waged within the Cabinet, 
the President was trying to keep the ambitions of O'Higgins 
in check. This view is further stxengthened by an examina-
tion of a minor yet significant inciden·t involving the Pres-
ident's decision to assume, upon Mulcahy's resignation, the 
portfolio of the Minister for Defence. With Cosgrave still 
not in attendance, the Executive Council, subject to the 
President's approval, decided that the following statement 
should be issued to the Press: 
The President has decided, subject to the approval of 
Dail Eireann, to take up the duties of the Ministry of 
Defence. During the illness of the President~ the Vice-
President will act for him in that Ministry.7t · 
After consultation with the President, the statement was 
amended to read: 
75calton Younger, Ireland~s Civil War {London: 
Fontana Books, 1968), p.582. 
76Brian Farrell, Chairman or Chief (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1971), p.24. 
77Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/69. 
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The President had decided, subject to the approval of 
Dail Eireann~ to undertake the duties of the Ministry 
of Defence.?~ 
In the Dail, the Government announced its dismissal 
of the Army Council. The ensuing debate itself was not very 
enlightening. Little or no protest, except for Mulcahy's 
speeches, was made over the firing of the three generals or 
the resignation of the Minister for Defence. However, the 
mutineers, their raison d'etre, their grievances, and their 
future received a great deal of attention. The men who put 
down the mutiny were being treated severely while the men 
who actually threatened the State were being petted and pam-
pered. This anomaly resulted from the need of the Government 
and the Dail to assert their control over the leaders of the 
army, their fear of the power the army had accumulated 
during the civil war and the anti-military spirit which had 
developed as a reaction against the horrors, the excesses 
and even the very fact of the civil war. Moreover, the 
mutineers had a number of Deputies who were quite prepared 
78Ibid. Mrs. Mulcahy relates an interesting incident 
about O'Higgins' ambitions. She says that "At the time of 
the blow up when Dick resigned and he (O'Higgins) went to 
the trouble of telling him he would have had to resign in 
any case- he needn't have said that- but at that time •.. 
Mrs. Cosgrave came to see me and she said 'O'Higgins is 
terrible' and more or less sympathised with me about Dick 
and then she said, 'he is after Willie, he wants Willie to 
resign.' I never heard any more after that about it. I 
think she gave me to understand that he came to see him and 
told him to resign and of course we both came to the con-
clusion that what O'Higgins wanted was to be the head of 
everything himself". Conversation between Hays and Mulcahy, 
22 Oct. 1964, Mulcahy Papers, P7/D/78, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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to press their case for them and to convince the Government 
and the Dail that the mutiny was merely a foolish reaction 
to the injustice and the abuses of the army. Mulcahy stood 
alone.. The promise of an Army Inquiry Committee effectively 
precluded the possibility of an informative and detailed 
debate. 
Kevin O'Higgins once again argued the case for the 
government. He began by reviewing the events of the army 
crisis and then stated that the Parnell Street raid, under-
taken without the knowledge and consent of O'Duffy, appoint-
ed specifically to deal with the crisis, could have resulted 
in disaster. He explained that the Executive Council regard-
ed the raid as: 
••. cutting across what was Government intention and 
Government policy with regard to an extremely delicate 
national position. But I do not want any Deputy nor any 
member of the general public to come to the conclusion 
that the resignation of certain high Army officers was 
demanded by the Government simply and solely as a result 
of last night's activities. That is not the situation. 
At a discussion which took place the day after this 
document was presented, the view was expressed at the 
Executive Council that this particular personnel was 
not the personnel to deal with a mutinous revolt.79 
He justified the resignations as being in the best interests 
of the people and cautioned against interpreting the Govern-
ment's action as a capitulation to the specific demand of 
the mutineers that the Army Council be dismissed. The 
Cabinet had reached its decision, in spite of the ultimatum, 
79rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2215-2216. 
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not because of it. Regardless of how valuable their past 
services had been to the State, and regardless of the valid-
ity of the charges against them, O'Higgins maintained that 
the members of the Army Council were no longer useful and 
thus had to be dismissed. He claimed that ''these officers 
are no longer efficient in the Public Service, and have not 
a useful future before them in these three administrative 
posts."80 
O'Higgins charged that the state of the army, racked 
by secret societies was not good. He felt that the army was 
not properly subject to impersonal discipline and that 
something in the nature of a sense of proprietorship had de-
veloped among members of the Army Council. O'Higgins then 
levelled a most serious accusation, charging that the Execu-
tive Council feared that "the Army was not unequivocably, 
unquestionaly, without reserve, simply the instrument of 
the people's will."81 
Although restrained by the promise of an Inquiry 
which he felt would be the proper forum for an examination 
of these matters, the ex-Minister for Defence defended him-
self and his staff. Mulcahy informed the Dail that he had 
resigned because he could not "stand over condoning mutiny 
to such an extent as to foster it and to prejudice discipline 
in the Army," and because he did not agree with the changes 
80rbid., col.2219. 
Blrbid., col. 2217. 
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in the administration of the army, especially during the 
critical period of reorganisation.8 2 With respect to the 
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Parnell Street raid, he reiterated what he had argued in the 
Cabinet, that the Adjutant~General had simply been follow~ 
ing the law and carrying out his responsibilities. The 
Executive Council had merely made suggestions as to the terms 
to be offered the mutineers. Neither he nor his subordinates 
could be so derelict in their obedience to the military code 
nor so lax in maintaining discipline so as to "allow offi-
cers, either by deserting their posts, or by taking away 
material belonging to the Army, or by engaging in a conspir-
acy that might have had disastrous results, to talk and meet 
openly and publicly in the streets or in the country." 83 
Mulcahy explained that he failed to consult O'Duffy 
because his position had not been formalized. He added that 
the new Commander-in-Chief's attitude had been that he 
"could not take up his responsibilities unless his position 
was defined, and he could not be expected to take up his 
responsibilities or issue orders until this was done."84 
His resentment of the appointment of O'Duffy, whom he con-
sidered out of touch with the Army, surfaced and he contended 
t.hat someone from within the army should have been appointed. 
82rbid., col.2225-2226. 
83rbid., col.2226. 
84rbid., col.2232. 
r 
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Mulcahy emphatically denied the charges otHiggins 
had made against the army, claiming that the attitude of the 
Executive Council was based on nothing but rumors and gossip. 
He defended his staff, pointing out that they had scrupulous-
ly kept themselves out of politics and had endeavored to 
mold a non-political and disciplined army, despite interfer-
ence from certain members of the Cabinet. He revealed that 
the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General had 
previously informed him that they intended to resign (prob-
ably because of growing criticism of their work and them-
selves) but that he had persuaded them to continue to per-
form their duties. Now they were being summarily dismissed 
without cause or explanation, simply "told to drop their pens 
and clear out."85 In response to O'Higgins' accusation that 
the army was not an obedient servant of the State, Mulcahy 
pointedly reminded the Dail that it was only because the 
army was unquestionably obedient to the Government that the 
Cabinet dare dismiss the entire Army Council. He declared: 
I say that it is an absolute mis-statement of fact, and 
if people were very concerned from that particular point 
of view, I suggest to the Dail they would not take the 
extraordinary steps that the Executive Council are taking 
to-day in removing the three principal officers of the 
Army.86 
The ex-Minister for Defence then explained that the serious-
85Ibid., col.2231. 
86Ibid., col.2230. 
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ness of the situation had forced him to consider appealing 
to the Dail over the Party, but his respect for the Execu-
tive Council and his reluctance to interfere with their 
work prevented him from taking such action. He might have 
added that it was not in his nature to go against his own 
Party and its Government, unlike McGrath who seemed to suffer 
from none of these inhibitions. 
During the course of the debates, the Government's 
attitude fluctuated. A controversy had arisen over the 
Cabinet's treatment of the officers arrested during the 
Parnell Street raid. They had been released on parole on 
March 21 after agreeing to the terms set forth by the govern-
ment in the memorandum of March 18.87 The Executive Council 
agreed to extend the deadline for the remaining officers to 
surrender. McGrath objected to this policy. He maintained 
that since the action of the army had violated the agree-
ment made with the mutineers, the arrested men should have 
been unconditionally released. O'Higgins, however, dis-
agreed. He argued that the detention of the prisoners was 
not a violation of the agreement even though their arrest 
may have been. He now claimed that "when it was undeniable 
that a mutinous revolt seemed imminent and seemed under 
Providence inevitable, it would not be a proper thing to 
release these prisoners without at least some assurance 
being given by them that they would not become leaders in 
87rreland, S~OD, Cabinet minutes, C2/72. 
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any such mutinous revolt." 88 O'Higgins' position contradict-
ed his own and his colleagues' earlier claims. If a "muti-
nous revolt seemed imminent," the army certainly would have 
been justified in raiding Devlin's pub. This new attitude 
reflected the true feelings of the government. The Execu-
tive Council had used the Parnell Street raid to rid itself 
of the Army Council and the Minister for Defence. Despite 
long standing problems, the raid was the immediate and 
forcing issue used to convince the Cabinet and the Dail to 
dismiss the senior officers of the army. The "worse than 
mutiny" act, the Parnell Street raid, was now being vindi-
cated by the very people who six days earlier had condemned 
it. 
McGrath and his supporters argued that the Govern-
ment should reinstate the mutineers, that in fact, they had 
promised this if the officers would make amends. The muti-
nous officers had already begun to return the stolen arms 
and equipment, although to McGrath and not to their co~mand­
ing officers, as proof of their "sincereity and good faith,"89 
and then resigning in protest at what they described as the 
"dishonesty, lack of faith and fair dealing" of the Govern-
ment in extracting concessions from their "hostages."90 
88 Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924) : 
2363. 
89The Irish Times, 25 March 1924, p.S. 
9°The Truth About the Army Cr~sis, p.lS. 
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The Government in turn was quite prepared to accept their 
resignations with a friendly "'Go in peacie, friend, as a 
civilian'" attitude.91 McGrath viewed the government's 
attitude as a distinct and definite violation of both the 
spirit and substance of prior agreements. Although no one 
seemed particularly concerned with the three generals who 
had been unceremoniously dismissed, certain of the Deputies 
exhibited a great deal of sympathy for the mutineers, regard-
ing them as misguided and mistreated officers. Such senti~ 
ment seems misplaced. The generals may have technically 
violated the spirit of gonver~ment policy but only to quell 
a rebellion, not foment one. 
Although O'Higgins publicly disclaimed any sugges-
tion that the Executive Council in dismissing the Army 
Council had acquiesced to the mutineers, the appearance of 
surrender was strong, especially since the reorganisation of 
the army had been delayed,9 2 partially meeting another of 
the mutineers' demands. As an editorial in the Irish Times 
pointed out: 
Everybody will agree with Mr. O'Higgins that the estab-
lishment of discipline in the Army is a vital necessity; 
but most people, \ve think, will have much sympathy with 
General Mulcahy's position. Mutiny has been condoned, 
and resignation has been the fate of those responsible 
persons who refused to condone it. Soldiers are simple 
91Ireland, nail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2365. 
92 IbJ.'d., 1 2425 co . . 
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men, but they can put 'two and two together. 1 The 'two 
and two' in this case are represented by the facts that 
the mutinous ultimatum demanded the removal of the Army 
Council and that the Army Council has been removed.93 
The mutineers themselves felt that the dismissal of the Army 
Council was a justification of their actions. 94 Neverthe-
less, no serious repercussions resulted from the removal of 
the Council, no acts of revenge or retaliation by members 
of the army loyal to their leaders, a fact which must stand 
as a tribute to the work of the Army Council in molding an 
obedient and disciplined force. 
The Army Mutiny of 1924 was the final echo of the 
Civil War. It represented the last vestige of the Volunteer 
mentality, of an independent political army. The situation 
caused by the mutineers precipitated a Cabinet crisis during 
which two Ministers resigned and it brought the conflict 
between O'Higgins and Mulcahy to a climax. Their antagonism 
had not been personal (O'Higgins had recommended Mulcahy to 
succeed Collins as chairman of the Provisional Government) 
but rather the result of differences in temperment, tech-
nique and personality. Each in his own way had been respon-
sible for their differences and consequently the strain in 
the Cabinet. 
O'Higgins was obsessed both with his belief that the 
army was inefficient and not disciplined, and with the alleged 
93The Irish Times, 20 March 1924, p.6. 
94The Truth About the Army Crisis, p.l5. 
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influence of the I.R.B. on its senior officers. His acquaint-
ance with and knowledge of both were slight and thus he 
allowed himself to be affected by complaints and grievances, 
most of which were the natural result of massive demobiliza-
tion and reorganisation. His fear and distrust of the I.R.B. 
stemmed from the fact it was a secret society. He mis-
interpreted the propaganda of the American wing of the 
Brotherhood concerning the necessity and desirability of a 
thirty-two county republic for Ireland, believing it repre-
sentative of the Irish sector. 95 Moreover, he seemed un-
aware both of the very real problems which the army, because 
of its origins, had to overcome, and the significant progress 
it had actually made. 
Mulcahy can be criticized for his insensitivity to 
the needs and fears of his civilian colleagues whose ex-
perience with the Irregular revolt had made them leary of 
the army's power. His failure to keep his colleagues totally 
informed, even though the demands of his office were over-
whelming, was not only not politic but also created an at-
mosphere in which rumor and suspicion could flourish. 
Mulcahy resented criticism of and interference with his 
department. The Parnell Street episode exemplified his 
attitude of handling army affairs in his own way. His 
resentment of and failure to consult with O'Duffy gives 
95Interview with Lt. Gen. M.J. Costello, Dublin, 
Ireland, 8 September 1975. 
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credence to the view that Mulcahy continued, albeit uncon-
sciously, to act as both the Minister for Defence and the 
Commander-in-Chief.9 6 
The traditional interpretation of the mutiny has 
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been that the decisive action of O'Higgins upheld the prin-
ciple of civilian control of the army. 97 Although the 
events of the mutiny certainly reiterated and reinforced the 
authority of the government over the military, the policy of 
the Executive Council did not support this concept. Rather, 
it was the acquiescence of the Army Council in resigning at 
the request of the Cabinet. The Government's policy had 
been one of compromise, vascillation aildinconsistency. De-
spite the excuses and allegations, the fact remains that the 
Cosgrave government was willing to come to terms with men 
who had threatened the State. The mutineers voluntarily 
resigned fro~ the army; they were not court martialed. 
Only with respect to the three generals did the Cabinet act 
in a determined manner. By submitting their resignations on 
the demand of the government, and by appearing before the 
Army Inquiry Committee a few weeks later, the Army Council 
adhered to and upheld the principle that the Irish Army was 
subordinate to the Irish Government. If the Army Council had 
96Interview with Col. Dan Bryan, 18 March 1975, 
Dublin, Ireland. 
97see, for example, F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the 
Famine, and John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twent1eth Century. 
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defiantly refused to obey and had publicly argued that it 
was being sacrificed to the demands of the mutineers, it 
would have moved Ireland to the verge of another civil war, 
and raised the specter of a military dictatorship. The 
resignations of Mulcahy, MacMahon, O'Sullivan, and 
O'Murthuile were visible proof of their beliefs and set an 
important precedent vis-~-vis the role of the army in the 
Irish Free State. Their actions dramatically demonstrated 
their adherence to the precepts of democratic rule and to 
the right of the people to determine the direction of the 
State. The Civil War was finally over. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ARMY INQUIRY COW1ITTEE 
To allay criticism and embarrassing questions and 
to satisfy the demands of McGrath and the mutineers, the 
government established the promised committee to investigate 
the recent disturbances in the army. It proved to be a 
highly effective device. By the time the Committee had 
issued its report in June of 1924, both the political and 
the military crises had been sufficiently defused to pre-
clude any attempt on the part of Dail Eireann to reignite 
them. 
The mandate of the Committee was "to enquire into 
the facts and matters which have caused or led up to the 
indiscipline and mutinous or insubordinate conduct lately 
manifested in the Army." 1 The terms of reference were ex-
panded to include an investigation into the state of dis-
cipline and an evaluation of the charges of "muddling, mis-
management and incompetency in the administration of the 
army."2 Ironically, the events of the mutiny itself were 
outside the scope of the Inquiry. The members of the Com-
lireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2502. 
2rbid.:2502-2503. 
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mittee were: J. Creed Meredith, chairman, a judge who in 
the pre~l916 period had been one of Redmond's nominees to 
the Volunteer Executive; Gerald Fitzgibbon, a former deputy 
of the Dail; P. McGillian, Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
succeeding McGrath, D.J. Gorey, T.D., and Major Bryan Cooper, 
T.D., representing three of the major parties in the Dail, 
Cumann na nGaedheal, the Farmers Party and the Independents, 
respectively. The Labour Party refused to nominate anyone 
because its leadership felt that the inquiry should be a 
committee of the Dail, responsible solely to it, with all 
the power and stature such status would confer, and not 
merely a departmental committee appointed by the Executive 
Council.3 The Committee as finally established by the govern-
ment was severely handicapped. It had no power of subpoena, 
nor right to examine witnesses under oath. Moreover, the 
hearings were to be closed to the public. 
Mulcahy and the three generals dismissed from the 
Army Council were not satisfied with these arrangements. In 
fact, when the government first announced its intention to 
hold an inquiry, the three senior officers wrote to Mulcahy 
requesting a public investigation: 
We, Sir, by cause of our appointment, have had to suffer 
in silence the insinuations and innuendos that the Army 
has at its head Officers in whom there is not full con-
fidence. We have also had, for the past year or more 
3Ibid.:2481-2842. 
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to suffer the interference with Army discipline, with 
utter disreg~rd of consequences, displayed by certain 
Army Officers and others who have now, by threats of 
revolution and mutiny, created a situation unprecedented 
in the history of regularly governed countries.4 
Consequently, they requested an inquiry in order »to be in 
a position to establish a case in public and to place the 
responsibility for these recent regrettable happenings on 
the proper shoulders regardless of what may be thus in-
volved."S Mulcahy pressed the government for a public in-
vestigation under expanded terms of reference to delve into 
the actual events of the mutiny and which would be fully 
empowered to compel testimony under oath and assess respon-
sibility. However, he did not agree to accept the Govern-
ment's limited format in order to "see the nature of the 
evidence in black and white, and in order to give myself 
and the officers concerned in this inquiry an opportunity 
of putting down in black and white what we desire to put 
down." 6 Clearly believing that any investigation into the 
recent crisis and the charges made against the army would 
vindicate the Army Council, he wanted an opportunity to 
defend himself and his staff. 
Thus, despite their dissatisfaction, Mulcahy and 
4Tobin Hutiny File, ~-iulcahy Papers, P?/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
5 rbid. 
6rreland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 6 (1924): 
2825. 
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the th:r:;-ee generals represented by legal counsel, agreed to 
appear before the Inquiry~ However, neither McGrath, who 
levelled the accusation against the Army Council, nor the 
mutineers, who precipitated the crisis, would testify before 
the Committee, despite the Presidentts promise that there 
would be no victimisation,7 and the Executive Council's 
decision that no criminal prosecution or charge ·\-.rould .·result 
from any testimony.8 Because it lacked the power to subpoena, 
the Inquiry could not compel their testimony. The Tobin~ 
Dalton group claimed that, since the government had broken 
previous agreements and had not dealt with them in good 
faith, to recognize and attend the Inquiry "after the lesson 
we had learned would have been to invite the authorities to 
fool us once again and to lend ourselves to the fooling of 
the nation."9 McGrath tried to persuade them to participate, 
but failed. Therefore, the ex-Minister himself decided he 
could neither appear as their spokesman nor substantiate his 
charges against the Army Council without the corroborating 
testimony of the mutineers. 10 
7Ibid.:2669. 
8Ireland, State Paper Office (hereinafter cited as 
SPOD), Cabinet minutes, C2/81. 
9The Truth About the Army Crisis, with a Foreword 
by Major-General Liam Tobin, Issued by the Irish Republican 
Army Organisation, Summerhill, Dublin, p.lS. (Hereinafter 
cited as The Truth About the Army Crisis.) 
lOireland, SPOD, Army Hutiny File, S3678B. 
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The Committee held forty-one meetings, and examined 
twenty~seven witnesses. Itts discussions ranged from the 
very serious charges of the Minister for Home Affairs to the 
complaint of an officer concerning the amount of S\vearing 
that went on in the army. Generally, the hearings dealt with 
four main topics: 1) the origins of the mutiny; 2) demobi-
lization; 3) the role and status of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood; and 4) the general condition of the army. After 
its investigation was completed, the Committee submitted an 
official report, subsequently published, to the Executive 
Council. In reality, however, there were two reports. The 
Chairman, Meredith, signed the published report subject to 
reservations. He submitted his reservations in his own 
draft report to the Cabinet, which was not published because 
it contained portions of the evidence presented to the 
Committee, which was not to be made public. 11 Meredith felt 
that he could in good faith sign the official report because 
it contained no positive statement with which he did not 
agree.l 2 However, his unpublished conclusions went beyond 
the official findings and strongly criticized Mulcahy and 
his handling of the crisis. Nevertheless, although believ-
ing that Mulcahy may have been guilty of "mismanagement," 
he did not feel that the charges of "muddling or incompetence" 
11Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, C2/106 and C2/108. 
12"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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could be sustained,l3 
With respect to the genesis of the mutiny and the 
development of the old I.R.A. organisation, the Committee 
confirmed Intelligence reports of the period and the evalua-
tion of General Headquarters on the Tobin-Dalton faction. 
The Committee felt that the men involved in the mutiny had 
been a problem even before the death of Michael Collins and 
that their grievances concerned their loss of power and 
position, which were exacerbated by the fact that some, at 
least, aspired to positions for which they were not qual-
ified.14 During the course of the hearings, the Committee 
learned that many of the officers participating in the mutiny 
had been involved in some of the most dangerous assignments 
of the Anglo-Irish war. However, although they may have 
been good "gunmen," they had difficulty accepting discipline 
and submitting to authority.lS One witness even claimed that 
the strain of their war-time activities had caused them to 
suffer a kind of shell shock.l 6 They naturally gravitated to 
1 3Ibid. 
14Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.6. 
15o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
16Russell, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Commit-
tee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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one another and formed an organisation based on a common 
sense of anger and frustration. They had looked upon Collins 
as their leader, spokesman and protector, and were antago-
nistic to the new leadership at G.H.Q.l7 In effect, the 
mutineers felt let down and left out. 
The Committee heard conflicting testimony on the 
efficacy of the policy pursued by the Army Council once it 
became aware of the serious threat posed by the old 1.R.A. 
Sean Hac.r·1ahon, the ex-Chief of Staff, described how G.H.Q. 
viewed the potential mutineers: 
We •.yere a\vare of the existence of the Tobin Organisa-
tion and on January 1st we decided that the information 
we had as to their intentions was such that we could 
not have anything to do with them in the matter of 
parley, that our duty was to see that Army Officers were 
reasoned back to their simple Army allegiancei that the 
time must come when if it is not possible to do this, 
these Officers must be asked to resign from the Army, 
that the Army must be our first and last consideration.l8 
Professor Hogan criticized such a policy, maintaining that 
the members of the old I.R.A. should have been dealt with as 
soon as it became clear that these men were trying to seduce 
other officers away from their allegiance to the army and 
attempting to foment rebellion. 1 9 Mulcahy, in his defence, 
17Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
18 h . b f . 
. Hac:Ha on, Test1mony e ore the Army Inqu1.ry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/14, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
19Professor Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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testified that once the reorganisation scheme had been com-
pleted, duties clearly allocated, and a greater opportunity 
to retrain officers available, the trouble would have evap-
orated. However, interference in the internal workings of 
the army and encouragement given by the politicans to the 
mutineers prevented this. 20 Such interference and encour-
agement were reoccurring themes throughout Mulcahy's 
testimony. 
The Inquiry Committee vindicated the attitude of 
the Army Council with respect to the mutineers. It held 
that the old I.R.A. was a mutinous organisation bent on 
using the army for political purposes and engaged in conduct 
contrary to the dictates of military discipline. Specifi-
cally, the Report stated: 
That the organisation of which they were members did not 
regard the Army as a non-political servant of the State, 
but as an engine to be used if necessary, and to be kept 
in a condition to be used, for that purpose or obtain-
ing personal and political objectives. That they con-
templated the use of the Army, so controlled for the 
purpose of imposing their views upon the Civil Govern-
ment . 
••• They attempted to dictate to G.H.Q. and to the Govern-
ment upon Army administration, putting forward claims as 
a group and relying upon their organised force in sup-
port of their contentions. 
That their objects, and the methods by which they desired 
and attempted to achieve them, were wholly incompatible 
with discipline and the obedience which an Army must 
render to the Government of any Constitutional State.21 
20Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
21Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.6. 
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However, Chairman Meredith strongly criticised 
Mulcahy's attitude in his dealings with the mutineers during 
the summer of 1923. Overall, the Chairman believed that 
Mulcahy did not handle the problems of the old I.R.A. of-
ficers "in a direct and straightforward manner."22 He felt 
that Mulcahy should have been more sympathetic to the griev-
ances of the members of the old I.R.A. and that his be-
haviour toward them was inconsistent and misleading. 
Meredith claimed that the written assurance which Mulcahy 
gave the mutineers 23 created the impression that he "was 
willing, at least in his private capacity, to go behind the 
back of the Cabinet and join hands with an [mutinous and 
political] organisation and assist the organisation in 
getting control of the Army for a particular purpose."24 
Furthermore, Mulcahy's subsequent failure to answer the 
specific demands of the old I.R.A. led them to believe they 
had been "tricked", caused them to feel "exasperated," and 
intensified their sense of grievance. 25 Meredith also de-
rided Mulcahy for not being sufficiently appreciative of the 
serious problem posed by the mutineers and for not antic-
22"chairman's Draft Report," Hulcahy Papers, 
P/7/C41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
23see Correspondence of 25 July 1923, Chapter 4, 
pp.l49-150. 
24"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, 
P/7/C41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
25Ibid. 
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ipating trouble~ Although believing that, once the old 
I.R.A. came into existence, mutiny was basically inevitable 
Meredith felt that Nulcahy's handling of the situation "in 
his own way" was not calculated to reduce the threat but 
rather to increase it. He charged that, given all the cir-
cumstances, "it is impossible to exonerate General Mulcahy 
from all blame in respect of his handling of the admittedly 
difficult problem of dealing with the I.R.A. Organisation 
and the group that promoted it. There was mismanagement on 
his part."26 
Meredith's criticism of Mulcahy is only partially 
valid. The attitude of the ex-Minister for Defence toward 
the potential mutineers was ambiguous, and to a degree, 
inconsistent. With two months hindsight, Meredith had no 
trouble arguing that a different course would have been 
wiser. However, Meredith's analysis and judgment of Mulcahy's 
action, displays a distinct lack of understanding of the 
climate of the times and the history from which the army 
emerged. 
Mulcahy's dealings with the old I.R.A. paralleled, 
to a large extent, Collins' meetings with the Irregulars 
prior to the Civil War, both men entering into negotiations 
to preserve army unity. Mulcahy himself alluded to the 
tragedy of the Civil War when he told the representatives of 
the mutineers that he wished to keep open the lines of 
2 6rbid. 
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communication, having witnessed the disaster which resulted 
from the breakdown in negotiations in 1·922. 27 Moreover, the 
timing of the crisis, closely following the conclusion of 
the Civil War, in an atmosphere permeated with violence and 
punctuated by a quick readiness to resort to the gun, must 
have influenced Mulcahy's actions and reactions. Understand-
ably, the Commander-in-Chief would have wanted to avoid a 
showndown by stalling for time. This strategy was also 
designed to give the reorganisation plan itself an oppor-
tunity to smooth over the difficulties. In stating in his 
report that "if you have a cause you can stand over, the 
time is always ripe to face problems in a direct and straight~ 
forward manner,"28 Heredith displayed an acute lack of aware-
ness of the political and military realities of the situa-
tion. Maintaining stability, the upcoming elections and 
pressure from his Cabinet colleagues were all factors con-
tributing to Mulcahy's attitude and actions towards the old 
I.R.A. 
Meredith's charge that Hulcahy was guilty of com-
plicity with and gave his approval to the mutineers because 
of his written assurance is unfair. Mulcahy, not unlike 
most other nationalists of the time, in all likelihood, did 
27Tobin Mutiny File, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/195, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
28"Chairrnan's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/41, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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ultimately desire a totally free and independent Ireland. 
To admit this, however, is not to say that he would have used 
his position or person, in any way, to effect such a change. 
He himself clearly stated that this was a personal and not 
a Ministerial feeling. Mulcahy's view that the army was a 
non-political servant of the state not only was a constant 
theme in his speeches and correspondence but was also cer-
tainly supported by his actions. To suggest otherwise is at 
best a gross misrepresentation of his position. 
In examining the problem of demobilisation, the 
Committee stated: "We believe that in all the circumstances 
the Army Council honestly endeavoured to deal fairly with 
the question of demobilisation.n29 In light of the testi-
mony presented, it concluded that the process of demobili-
sation was fraught with difficulties and complications. The 
large number of men who were to be released, the high rate 
of unemployment, the claims of pre-Truce soldiers, the 
problem of territorial rivalries, and the transition to a 
peace-time force were all factors which were calculated to 
increase the pressure and tension which normally accompanies 
mass demobilisation. In addition, the Committee cited "the 
fact that the interval between the cessation of hostilities 
and the promulgation of a demobilisation scheme gave oppor-
tunities for the development of a certain amount of organised 
29Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.S. 
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opposition to demobilisation," and that sufficient time had 
not been available to develop a "non-political and purely 
soldier type of mind in the Army," as factors which helped 
put a severe strain on Army administration. 30 The Committee 
believed that the first overt act of mutiny was the refusal 
of a group of officers at the Curragh to accept their 
demobilisation papers. Although not of the opinion that 
this caused the later mutinous acts, the Committee felt ''it 
may have influenced subsequent mutineers by producing the 
impression that mutinous conduct would not be severely 
punished."31 
With respect to the retention of ex-British soldiers 
in the army, one of the constant complaints of the old I.R.A., 
the consensus of the testimony was that this issue had been 
used for propaganda purposes and had become a rallying point 
for the dissidents, a common grievance around which other-
wise disparate individuals could unite.32 General MacMahon 
provided the Committee with some interesting statistics. 
According to him, the number of ex-officers from other armies 
who had been retained in the army was 155, 80 of whom had 
3oibid. 
31Ibid., p.s. 
32costello, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/25, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Russell, Testimony before the 
Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/29, University 
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Professor Hogan, 
Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Hulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/25, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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had pre-Truce service. Of the remaining 75, 40 were tech-
nical officers with specialized skills, such as medical or 
legal training. Furthermore, Mad1ahon estimated that before 
reorganisation, the army had been composed of approximately 
25 per cent post-Truce and 75 per cent pre-Truce officers. 
After reorganisation, approximately 90 per cent were pre-
Truce officers and only 10 per cent post-Truce.33 Problems 
seemingly existed with the type of individuals who were 
being retained, some of whom may have been associated with 
the British forces during the Anglo-Irish war. The Corn ... 
rnittee concluded that the old I.R.A. Pregarded it as essen-
tial that the Army should be officered and controlled by 
men of, or in sympathy with, their views and especially that 
ex-British officers be elirninated." 34 
With respect to the general issue of dernobilisation, 
Meredith agreed with the finding of his colleagues. However, 
he strenuously objected to Mulcahy's dealings with the 
Cabinet Committee on dernobilisation, which had been set up 
following the trouble at the Curragh. He felt that the 
Minister had not given the applicants the special consider-
ation they were promised, but rather, Mulcahy had dismissed 
them as being "surplus," after having delayed discussion in 
33MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
34Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.6. 
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the Cabinet Committee by waiting until the final reorgan-
isation scheme had been completed before sending the com-
mittee members the appropriate files. Consequently, the 
final lists of officers to be retained, demobilised or 
placed on reserve was completed before any action could be 
taken by the Cabinet Committee. Although the Executive 
Council had the power to prevent publication of the scheme, 
any delay in dealing with this most pressing issue would 
have been dangerous. In effect, Mulcahy thwarted the in-
tentions of the Executive Council in setting up the 
Committee. 35 
Meredith disputed Mulcahy's claim that the mutiny 
would never have developed in the manner in which it did but 
for the interference and encouragement given the officers by 
certain politicians. The Chairman believed that both McGrath 
and O'Higgins, as members of the Council of Defence and the 
former as a participant in the demobilisation committee, 
merely acted in accordance with their specified duties. 
Meredith viewed Mulcahy's charge of interference as "unproved 
and ungenerous" and exonerated McGrath as being a "well-
intentioned peacemaker," editorializing that "well-intention-
ed peacemakers do not generally fare well in this country, 
and Deputy McGrath seems only to have suffered the usual fate 
3S"Chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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of those who try to throw oil on the troubled waters."36 
This was an extremely kind, if not naive, analysis of 
McGrath's role. Although an active peacemaker, McGrath was 
also a spokesman for the mutineers, providing them with a 
direct line to the Executive Council, and the political lead-
er of a group which included the mutineers themselves and 
their vocal supporters. Meredith obviously chose to ignore 
McGrath's healthy political ambitions. Similar.ly, the Chair-
man does not condemn O'Higgins' relationship with a disgrun-
tled officer which took place without the knowledge of the 
~1inister for Defence and certainly was outside the accepted 
code of military conduct.37 
The role of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and 
its influence on the army was a particularly interesting and 
illusive thread which the Committee attempted to untangle. 
The role of the I.R.B. had been tangential to the events of 
the army crisis. The old I.R.A. had considered itself a 
rival organization to the Brotherhood and had, in their orig-
inal ultimatum, singled out the Army Council for dismissal 
because they believed it was the center of a revitalized 
I.R.B. Moreover, one of the reasons the government decided 
that the leaders of the army were no longer useful and not 
able to deal with the mutineers was that its members were 
associated with the I.R.B. Given the origins of the army 
36 Ibid. 
3 7see below, p.232. 
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and the role the Brotherhood had played in the liberation 
movement, it was natural that the officers would also have 
been members of the I.R.B. However, the Committee's judg-
ment was that, although there would have been no mutiny but 
for the existence of the I.R.A. organisation, "its activities 
were intensified by the revival or reorganisation of the 
I.R.B. with the encouragement of certain members of the Army 
Council, the lack of confidence and want of intercourse 
between these two sections of Army officers, and the failure 
of both to appreciate their position as servants of the 
Sta·te. n38 
The status of the Brotherhood was a central issue 
for the Army Inquiry Committee. The I.R.B., like the rest 
of the country, had been divided over the Treaty and was 
badly, if not, fatally, split during the Civil War. Current 
historical opinion is that "from February 1922 the I.R.B. as 
a national organisation ceased to function."39 Because its 
Supreme Council failed to act decisively during the crisis 
period, the revolutionary movement began to disintegrate, 
a process foreshadowed by the earlier action of the I.R.B. 
in abdicating its traditional claims that its Supreme Coun-
cil was the legitimate government of the Republic and its 
head, the president of such a government. Obviously, its new 
38 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.6. 
39John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The I.R.B. From the 
Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies, 20 (March 1976): 
32. 
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position reflected the changing political situation in 
Ireland with the establishment of Dail Eireann. However, 
political initiative and hence political control had now 
passed from the I.R.B. to the Dail.40 
Meredith cited Sean O'Murthuile, Quartermaster-
General, as the "prime mover" in reorganizing the Brother-
hood.41 After Collins' death, O'Murthuile, as Secretary of 
the supreme Council, called a meeting of the senior members 
of the I.R.B. In August of 1922, O'Murthuile was not yet 
Quartermaster-General but rather Commandant of Kilmainham 
jail. In a letter to Mulcahy, he requested that the 
cowmander-in-Chief meet him at the Adjutant-General's office, 
Portobello Barracks, "to consider certain questions in con-
nection with the organisation and the death of the late 
com..rnander-in-Chief."42 O'Murthuile felt that certain doc-
uments which had been in Collins' possession should be 
secured. He explained to the Committee: 
I felt that I was the person to move in the matter of 
winding up General Collins' affairs in as far as they 
were concerned with the matters that we had joint re-
sponsibility in, and on August the 31st, 1922. I asked 
a few of his Colleagues to meet me to discuss the 
4°Ibid., pp.31-32. 
4l"chairman's Draft Report," Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
4 2Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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situation, to take over his I.R.B. papers, etc. nothing 
whatever was done except to secure that all documents 
were preserved and the conditions of things noted for 
reference later.43 
The Inquiry discussed the propriety of an officer 
sending this type of letter to his Commander-in-Chief. 
Mulcahy defended such action by saying that it was merely a 
circular form letter sent to all those who would attend the 
meetings, implying no disrespect. 44 However, Meredith 
believed that, regardless of the form and intent, such a 
letter must, to a certain extent, have impaired authority.45 
The Committee heard conflicting evidence on the re-
organisation or resurrection of the I.R.B. Those opposed to 
the Army Council, in particular O'Higgins and Patrick Hogan, 
the Minister for Agriculture, maintained that the Brother-
hood had died after the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish war and 
that it should have been left in its moribund state. 46 Hogan 
went so far as to say that reviving the I.R.B. was mutiny 
because 11 anything that weakens the allegiance that the 
43o'Hurthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/13, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
44Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36 University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
45
"chairrnan's Draft Report," Hulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
46p. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; O'Higgins, Testimony 
before the Army Inquiry Cowmittee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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soldier bears to the Government is mutiny, and all the more 
seriously if done officially." 47 O'Higgins told the Com-
mittee that he heard of efforts to revive the Brotherhood 
being made at meetings of officers from various parts of the 
country held at Portobello Barracks under the chairmanship 
of O'Murthuile. However, when he confronted the Minister of 
Defence with this information during a Cabinet meeting, 
Mulcahy denied it and also disputed O'Higgins assertion that 
the Headquarters•staff was practically the "inner" or "upper" 
circles of the society.48 In addition, O~Higgins further 
charged that the I.R.B. was revitalized to combat the old 
49 I.R.A. 
The Army Council emphatically denied that the I.R.B. 
had ever ceased to function. 50 Admittedly, a reorganisation 
of the Brotherhood had occurred sometime between the end of 
1922 and the beginning of 1923, but this had been necessi-
tated by the existing military situation. When the Army 
Council realized that the Irregulars were attempting to take 
over the organisation and use the weight of its historic 
47P. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/24, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
4Bo'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
49Ibid. 
50Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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appeal and traditions for their own purposes,51 the senior 
members of the Organisation agreed that steps had to be 
taken to consolidate their position in order to insure that 
the Brotherhood would remain in the hands of those loyal to 
the State.52 Reorganisation thus took place not to exclude 
the officers of the old I.R.A. nor as a counter-organisation, 
but to safeguard it against Irregular control, to preserve 
its tradition in the best interests of the Free State. 53 
Recent historical research supports this view. 54 Moreover, 
Mulcahy stated that there were never any I.R.B. meetings 
attended only by army officers and that "no member ever at'"' 
tended any meeting in his capacity as Army Officer. ,,55 
Because of the delicate political situation, the 
leaders of the Brotherhood chose not to involve, in their 
Slo'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Mulcahy, Testimony before the 
Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/36, University 
College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
52o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
53o•sullivan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/12, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
54see, for example, John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The 
I.R.B. From the Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies, 
20 (March 1976); and Leon O'Broin, Revolut1onary Underground 
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976). 
55Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin 
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plans for the reorganisation of the I.R.B., members who were 
also in the government, in order not to put them in a com-
promising position and to avoid the possibility that "members 
of the government might be inhibited in their relations with 
the British if it could be said that the I.R.B. was function-
ing with their full knowledge and connivance."56 With re-
spect to the Minister for Defence, the Brotherhood attempted 
to keep him informed yet not involved. O'Murthuile explained: 
General Mulcahy, himself, though he was informed, was 
never placed in the position that he would have to stand 
over everything we did. He was more of a free lance in 
this matter. It was not fair, we felt, that General 
Mulcahy should be bound by any steps we proposed to take 
and that he should be free in view of his position and 
of the responsibilities he would have, but that he 
would be in a position to know whether anything that 
happened was a danger or otherwise to the Government. 57 
The leaders of the I.R.B. were obviously sensitive to the 
anomaly of perpetuating a secret revolutionary society in an 
independent Irish Free State. However, the Inquiry Committee 
did not approve of its discretion, but felt that Mulcahy 
should have taken "the earliest opportunity of informing the 
Executive Council of the proposed reorganisation of the 
I.R.B."58 
56Leon O'Broin, Revolutionary Underground (Totowa, 
New Jersey; Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), p.214. 
57o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/32, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
58 Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.9. 
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A meeting between members o~ the Executive Council 
and the Army Council took place on June 10, 1923. The con-
ference was arranged to discuss a letter which Sean 
O'Murthuile received from Sean O'Hegarty regarding the re-
quest of Tom Barry, an Irregular leader in Cork, to use the 
I.R.B. as a medium to affect a reconciliation between the 
National Forces and the Irregulars. Although the Civil War 
was officially over, violence continued to plague some areas, 
especially in the South. The letter stated: 
T.B. Barry, an officer in the Organisation in Cork County 
appeals to the I.R.B., to intervene with its influence 
to stop the now unnecessary and therefore vindictive 
pursuit of members of the Irish Republican Army (called 
the 'Irregulars') all over the country by Free State 
Troops, these members having now for the most part 
dumped their arms and offering no resistance, for the 
purpose of enabling him to create such a feeling as will 
allow a fusion of the I.R.B. elements which now are 
warring on both sides, so that the ideals of the Organ-
isation may not be lost sight of, and for the purpose 
of counteracting the sinister reactionary elements which 
are rapidly gaining control of the life and Government 
of the country.59 
Mulcahy, interpreting O'Hegarty's letter in conjunction with 
other reports he had received, concluded that Barry \"lanted 
to release the Irregular army from its allegiance to the 
De Valera government, in hiding and illegitimate, and hoped 
to form a "National Organisation," secret, political and 
containing the best men from both sides. In return for 
amnesty for those not arrested and parole for certain pris-
oners, Barry would agree to the open destruction of arms and 
S9Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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the disbandment o~ his forces. 60 The ~inister for Defence 
considered this to be an important development and discussed 
the matter with MacNeill and O'Higgins. 
In his conversation with MacNeill, Mulcahy pointed. 
out that the recognition of the Supreme Council by Barry was 
important since he was one of the leading figures of the 
rebel movement. The Minister for Defence believed that the 
Supreme Council could be used a "a Body to whose wishes the 
leaders of the Irregular side could acquiesce in matters of 
disbandment and arms without feeling humiliated."61 Both 
agreed that it was a politically delicate situation and that 
a conference with other members of the government was 
necessary. 
Mulcahy's subsequent conversation with orHiggins is 
instructive because it reveals the conflicting attitudes the 
Ministers held with respect to the I.R.B. Mulcahy reiterat-
ed what he said to MacNeill concerning the "pivotal" position 
of the Supreme Council. More importantly, however, he ac-
knowledged that "we#" probably meaning the Army Council and 
its senior officers, fully controlled the policy of the 
Brotherhood and then prophesied: 
60Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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That its ?olicy could bear the light of day. That it 
was almost obvious that in two years' time perhaps that 
it, as a political organisation with political ideals, 
would be as open as ••• the Irish Volunteers. 
That while, ultimatelyf persons connected with the 
present Government might not, and from the point of view 
of effective National development, should be asso'C..:. 
ated with it, that it was essential they should control 
its moulding and development at the present time.62 
Mulcahy clearly envisioned the development of the I.R.B. 
into a more open society and was cognizant of the problems 
inherent in any attempt to involve the army intimately with 
the Brotherhood. However, he concluded that this \'las less 
of a danger than allowing the society to slip from loyal 
hands. 
O'Higgins, on the other hand, argued that there was 
a "very great danger" of men being appointed to key positions 
solely on the basis of membership in the I.R.B., that this 
would lead to "serious abuses and serious weaknesses," and 
that, in fact, he believed that certain officers held their 
positions only because they were members of the Brother-· 
hood.6 3 Mulcahy denied this. He claimed that I.R.B. member-
ship had never been a criterion for appointment and that it 
was "absurd" to think it would happen in the future. 64 
O'Higgins testified that he reiterated his disapproval of the 
I.R.B. to the Minister for Defence and said: 
62rbid. 
63rbid. 
64rbid. 
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I replied tha,t I did not wish to leave him under any 
misapprehension, that though I was a member of the I.R.A. 
in pre-Truce days I had the stronge~t possible objection 
to it or to any other Secret Society in the altered con-
dition of things, that I believed that an organisation 
of that nature would be bad for the Army and for the 
country.65 
Significantly, this conversation reveals the wide chasm which 
separated the two :t-1inisters. 
On June 10, 1923, President Cosgrave, MacNeill and 
O'Higgins met with Mulcahy, MacMahon and O'Murthuile. The 
Committee heard conflicting testimony concerning the purpose 
of the meeting and its final outcome. O'Higgins claimed 
that it was called primarily to deal with the reorganisation 
66 
of the I.R.B. Both Mulcahy and O'Murthuile stated the 
primary purpose was to discuss the letter the Quartermaster~ 
General had received about Barry and that this led into a 
general discussion of the Brotherhood. 67 The timing of the 
meeting and Mulcahy's earlier conversations with his two 
colleagues do indicate that the meeting was called to discuss 
the O'Hegarty letter, but it is also likely that the greater 
part of the meeting dealt with specific questions concerning 
the I.R.B. 
O'Higgins testified that both he and MacNeill 
vigorously opposed the reorganisation of the I.R.B. and 
pointed out to the generals the potential which existed for 
65o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
66Ibid. 
226 
unconstitutional beha,vi.ol;' and the deleterious effects it 
would have on the army. So energetic and emphatic was their 
di6approval that, according to O'Higgins, " finally the 
President stated that it must not be allowed to develop into 
a wrangle and dispersed the meeting." 68 However, the 
Generals left the meeting feeling that they had explained 
their position and were understood by the Ministers. Mulcahy, 
viewing the meeting optimistically, claimed that: 
the other three members of the Government did not under-
take to give any definite advice, nor to give any defi-
nite instructions and I was perfectly satisfied after the 
meeting that they were satisfied that any Army Officer 
who had any responsibility in respect of the I.R.B. was 
doing what appeared to him to be the best and the most 
wise thing in all our circumstances here, and that they 
could not suggest better. 
Apprised of the position, the three other Ministers 
did see at least some reason for the position and they 
did not forbid it.69 
President Cosgrave, speaking in the Dail, said that none of 
the three Ministers had been in favor of continuing the 
Brot~erhood, that they had not been asked for advice and that 
"information as to the existence of this organisation was put 
67Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; O'Murthuile, Testimony 
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Dubl~n Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
69Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
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to them and not one o;t; them supported it in any way~"70 
Obviously ~1ulcahy felt that by not proscribing the I.R.B., 
his colleagues at least had come to some understanding with 
him. He was wrong. 
One issue which received a great deal of attention 
from those opposed to the I.R.B. was the question of 
membership in the Brotherhood and its influence on promo~ 
tions and advancement in the army. No specific proof in 
support of this claim surfaced, although this was not sur~ 
prising given the secret nature of the organisation. Most 
of the witnesses were merely speculating and repeating 
current rumors. Patrick Hogan summed up such testimony when 
he said: "I had sens.ed it was there, at least I had sensed 
that there were things happening which I could not explain 
by ordinary reasoning."71 The members of the Army Council 
emphatically denied the charges that officers were either 
retained or demobilized depending on their standing in the 
I.R.B. They demanded that their accusers produce evidence 
and not merely groundless hearsay and gossip.72 The 
Committee agreed with the Army Council. The Report stated: 
70Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 7 (1924): 
3148. 
71P. Hogan, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
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"It has not been prayed to us that any appointments or promo-
tions t~re made by reason of member of, or influence corrupt-
ly exercised by the I.R.B."73 Current literature supports 
this interpretation, judging that ~Mulcahy and others in-
valved in the I.R.B. reorganisation were not promoting mem-
bers of the I.R.B. in the national army at the expense of 
others." 74 However, the Inquiry did believed that the exist-
ence of a secret society created a "natural suspicion't among 
non-members and "undermined confidence in the impartiality 
of the Army Council and higher comrnands."75 
The Army council was not unaware of nor insensitive 
to the dangers of a secret society existing within the army. 
Prior to 1924, the generals had believed that it was in the 
best interests of the State that they and other senior 
officers guide the I.R.B. However, their testimony revealed 
that all of them now felt that within the next few months, 
by August, 1924, a clause should be inserted into the new 
Defence Forces Act forbidding members of the army from also 
being participants in any secret society. They believed 
without question that such an undertaking would be loyally 
73 Irelartd, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.7. 
74John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, "The I.R.B. From the 
Treaty to 1924," Irish Historical Studies, 20 (March 1976): 
38. 
75Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.7. 
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obeyed.7 6 The position of the Army Council was that only 
then, in 1924, had the danger sufficiently passed that they 
could contemplate this step. They now knew that the need 
for a revolutionary society had passed and that it was time 
to turn away from the gun to other more constructive 
pursuits. Sean O'Murthuile stated: 
that the future activities of the I.R.B. should be 
directed toward turning to the social and political 
atmosphere with the programme of any Government working 
towards the National and economic advancement of the 
Irish geople without regard to parties or party influ-
ence.77 
Clearly, the extreme suspicion and fear exhibited by some 
members of the Executive Council was unfounded. Had the 
army crisis not precipitated the Cabinet's rash action, the 
Army Council would have moved to eradicate the I.R.B. as a 
secret revolutionary society within the army. According to 
Mulcahy, the I.R.B. was just used nas a stock to beat us.n78 
The final judgment of the Inquiry Committee was, 
overall, a stinging indictment of the Army Council. The 
76Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
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University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland; 
MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy 
Papers, P7/C/36, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, 
Ireland. 
77o'Murthuile, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/13, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
78Hulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/35, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
230 
report concluded; 
We consider that the reorganisation of the I.R.B., car-
ried out as it appears to have been by the actual heads 
of the Army, was a disastrous error of. judgment, and 
accentuated a mutiny which might not have occurred at 
all, and which could have been more firmly suppressed 
if those in authority had not weakened their position 
by leaving themselves open to the charge of acting in 
the interest of a hostile secret society.79 
The final issue investigated by the Committee was 
the general state of the army, in particular, the question 
of discipline. During the hearings, the Inquiry once again 
was confronted with conflicting evidence. l1ost of the wit-
nesses agreed that discipline in the army was not only good 
b . 1 d.l . . 80 ut, more 1mportant y, was stea 1 y 1mprov1ng. Professor 
Hogan stated that there had been "an extraordinary improve-
ment" in the army during the period from December, 1922 until 
April, 1923, but with the cessation of hostilities, a slight 
breakdown in control occurred.8l The consensus was that 
disciplinary problems had been primarily due to inexperience 
and a lack of firm guidelines. As the army administration 
79Ireland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry Committee, 
Report, 1924, p.6. 
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became more systematized and more formalized, conditions did 
and would continue to improve. There was some speculation 
that the mutiny would have a deleterious effect on the army, 
undoing all previous efforts to inculcate the soldiers with 
a non-political frame of mind. When General MacMahon was 
sent during the crisis to stabilize the Cork command, his 
message, in essence, was that the army must stay out of 
politics and adhere to strict military obedience and dis-
cipline.82 Testifying before the Committee, the former Chief 
of Staff expressed fear that the mutiny may have caused the 
army to become repoliticized, that "men who had forgotten 
all about politics had been brought back to them." 8 3 
Not unexpectedly, the chief critic of the army was 
Kevin O'Higgins. The Minister reiterated the charges he had 
made in the Dail. Specifically, he said: 
(a) ..• that the Army was breaking up into factions, 
societies or combinations; 
{b) That the personal equation was too much in evidence 
in the Army, and was re-acting most unfavourably on 
discipline; 
(c) .•. that the Army was not unequivacably, unquestion-
ably without reserve, simply the instrument of the 
people's will ..• 
(d) That the ex-Minister for Defence throughout the year 
previous to his resignation did not stand for stern, 
impersonal discipline in the Army and that the names of 
82Tobin ~1utiny File, .l-1ulcahy Papers, P7/B/196, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
83MacMahon, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
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certain officers were submitted to the Executive Council 
for rank and position under the reorganisation scheme 
against whom grave charges had been made without being 
satisfactorily rebutted.84 
In his testimony, O'Higgins revealed that he had 
been in contact with Colonel Jephson O'Connell, a disgruntled 
officer in charge of Inspection. O'Connell had approached 
the Minister in September of 1923, in a clear breach of dis-
cipline, because "the condition of the Army demanded the 
immediate attention of the Government."85 O'Higgins did not 
inform Mulcahy but instead used O'Connell as a source of 
information throughout the next year. O'Connell reinforced 
O'Higgins' feelings about the shortcomings of the army. In 
his lugubrious testimony, O'Connell heartily condemned the 
administration of the army, charging favouritism, financial 
waste, ignorance, lack of discipline and respect, inefficiency 
and lack of loyalty to the Government.86 
Before the Coromittee, O'Higgins launched a devastat-
ing and vicious attack on Mulcahy. He accused the Minister 
for Defence of trying to "buy off" the mutineers by offering 
them good positions in the reorganisation scheme but claimed 
84o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/21, University College 
Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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Mulcahy had failed because the Pprice was not big enough,P87 
There is no evidence to support this position especially in 
light of the mutineers' adverse feelings about their ap-
pointments. In fact, according to government policy, their 
pre-Truce service made these men eligible for special con-
sideration. O'Higgins attacked Mulcahy for meeting with the 
Tobin-Dalton group and for not taking any action to "vindi-
cate outraged discipline." 88 This is a difficult posture 
for O'Higgins to assume considering that 1) when the Army 
Council tried to "vindicate outraged discipline," they had 
been dismissed by the Cabinet with O'Higgins leading the 
attack; 2) the President had initiated the meetings, not 
Mulcahy, and periodically had discussed the situation with 
him; 3) the Minister for Industry and Commerce, McGrath, had 
urged Mulcahy to participate in these meetings; and 4) 
O'Higgins himself, as spokesman for the Executive Council, 
did not uphold strict discipline but rather had excused the 
mutineers and called a direct threat against the State a 
"foolish action." 
In his final criticism, O'Higgins accused Mulcahy 
of not understanding and not fulfilling his role as Minister 
for Defence and member of the Executive Council. He told 
the Committee: 
87o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College 
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I could not get away from the impression that the Min-
ister for Defence came to the Executive Council not so 
much as a colleague to do business with colleagues as in 
the capacity of a delegate ••• almost as a man coming to 
the Executive Council to hold a watching brief for •.• 
the Army in the Executive Council •••. There was a lack 
of candor. There \vas a cloud bank between the Army and 
the Executive Council ..•• It was if what went on within 
the Army was no business of the other members of the 
Executive Council.89 
One of the reasons for O'Higgins' hostility to 
Mulcahy was the unfortunate incident which occurred at 
Kenmare, County Kerry in July of 1923. This case is impor-
tant because it became a cause c'l~bre with Kevin O'Higgins, 
proving to him that there was a lack of impersonal discipline 
and impartiality in the army. It is also interesting because 
it highlights some of the social conditions then existing in 
the Free State. The Inquiry Committee spent a great deal of 
time investigating the evidence of the incident. 
The relevant facts of the occurrence are quite 
simple. On June 2, 1923, the McCarthy sisters allegedly 
were assaulted by three men dressed in army uniform. The 
women claimed that they were dragged from their home, motor 
grease rubbed in their hair, beaten with Sam Brown (army) 
belts, kicked and stepped on. Major-General o•oaly, G.O.C. 
of the Kerry Command and Captains Flood and Clarke were all 
implicated. Inter-personal relations and prior history, 
however, added other complications. 
The McCarthy sisters, Flossie and Jessie, daughters 
89Ibid. 
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of Dr. McCarthy, had been particularly friendly with two 
officers stationed in Kenmare, Captain Harrington and Lieu-
tenant Higgins, a relative of Kevin O'Higgins. These offi-
cers frequently had visited the McCarthy house, allegedly 
returning to the barracks often at a very late hour and under 
the influence of alcohol. Horeover, Harrington and Higgins 
had been suspected of involvement in the burning of the 
furniture and the home of Mrs. Hartnett, a widow who had 
sympathized with the Irregulars during the Civil war. 
Captain Flood, one of the accused, had testified against the 
two officers at the hearing following the fire. Because of 
Harrington's and Higgins' behaviour during their visits with 
the sisters and because he believed that the plot to burn 
Mrs. Hartnett's house was actually devised at the McCarthy's, 
Major-General O'Daly had placed the house off limits, an 
order ignored by both officers. O'Daly himself had personal-
ly overheard, during a visit there, an exchange between 
Harrington and Dr. McCarthy concerning the desirability of 
taking retaliatory action against the widow. In addition, 
O'Daly's decision not to invite the two women to a Command 
dance had caused further antagonism between the G.O.C. and 
the McCarthy family.90 
A Military Court of Inquiry, consisting of Major-
General Reynolds, G.O.C. of the Cork Command, President, 
90"court of Inquiry Report," Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/42, 
University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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Colonel James Shiels and Commandant John Aherne, was held 
late in June. The two sisters stated that they had recog-
nized one of their assailants as Captain Flood. Further 
testimony established that O'Daly, Clarke and Flood had 
been out of the barracks together at the time of the assault, 
admittedly within close proximity to the McCarthy house, and 
that they had been drinking champagne that evening. How-
ever, the three officers claimed that they had walked to 
O'Sullivan's hotel and bar to make sure there were no offi~ 
cers drinking after hours.91 
The Court of Inquiry's findings were mixed. All 
three members agreed that the evidence had established that 
Captain Flood was involved in the attack. Major-General 
Reynolds felt that the identity of the other two assailants 
had not been established. Colonel Shiels believed that 
O'Daly and Clarke, although not actually participating, knew 
about the crime and were in the vicinity. Commandant Aherne 
thought that Captains Flood and Clark and Major-General 
O'Daly were all guilty.92 
The Judge Advocate-General told the Adjutant-General 
that the officers should be tried at a Court Martial. He 
recommended that they be recalled to G.H.Q. and O'Daly re-
lieved of his command. They should be informed of the 
charges against them and given a week to write their expla-
9lrbid. 
92rbid. 
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nations. If these proved unsatisfactory, Capt~ins Flood 
~nd Clarke were to be placed under close arrest and Hajor-
General O'Daly formally arrested but, if he agreed to stand 
trial, allowed to remain at liberty.9 3 Davitt discussed the 
possibility of allowing O'Daly the alternative of resigning 
his commission but advised against it. He counseled; 
This ••• would savour of weakness and an attempt to cloak 
matters and besides would not avert the scandal of the 
McCarthys themselves instituting civil or criminal pro-
ceedings. Moreover, in view of the part played by the 
Minister for Home Affairs this course would appear to 
be impossible.94 
The situation "YTas further complicated by the fact 
that once the Defence Forces Bill became law, at the end of 
August, nobody could be tried for an offence committed prior 
to the passage of the Act. The Judge Advocate-General ex-
plained that the military authorities "could not try any 
military offence committed prior to the passing of the Act, 
because these offences were not strictly offences before the 
act passed."95 Before the Defence Forces Act, military 
crimes had been dealt with on the basis that a state of war 
was in existence. 
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On August 3 1 1923, Davitt had an interview with the 
Minister for Defence. Mulcahy believed that the evidence 
against Major-General O'Daly was not sufficient to order a 
Court Martial and "that the scandal of trying a General 
officer and the publicity following it would result in more 
harm than good," especially since he felt O'Daly would not 
be convicted.96 Although he agreed that O'Daly would prob-
ably be acquitted, Davitt argued that it would be in the 
best interest of both the army and the officers involved to 
hold a trial. Mulcahy ended the interview by deciding to 
submit the matter to the Attorney-General for his considera-
tion.97 
Kevin O'Higgins brought the Kenmare case to the 
attention of the Executive Council. The Minister for Home 
Affairs had received a letter from Dr. McCarthy and had in 
turn written the President. 98 At a special meeting of the 
Cabinet, on September 17, 1923, it was decided to seek the 
advice of the Attorney-General. O'Higgins dissented and 
instead recommended "that the Officers, against whom in the 
opinion of the Judge Advocate-General a prima facie case had 
been made, be asked whether they or anyone on their behalf 
would challenge the legality of a court martial in connection 
96rbid. 
97rbid. 
98rreland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/146 and Cl/148. 
with this matter."99 O'Higgins was suggesting that the 
Officers voluntarily submit to a trial since the Defence 
Forces Act had been passed. His idea, however, found no 
support among the members of the Cabinet.lOO 
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The Attorney-General submitted his opinion to the 
Executive Council on 27 September 1923. Essentially, he 
upheld Mulcahy's decision not to institute court martial 
proceedings against otoaly and his officers. He not only 
evaluated the evidence but also provided a social commentary 
on the aspiring country Catholic bourgeoisie. 
In reviewing the evidence on the Kenmare case, 
Kennedy felt it necessary to reconstruct the atmosphere, the 
social milieu in which the incident occurred, in order to 
achieve a clearer and more complete understanding, The 
Attorney-General, describing, not entirely without bias or 
prejudice, the type of people involved in the Kenmare inci-
dent, wrote: 
In the first place, let us see who the complainants are. 
They are not city people and their mentality as witness-
es and generally must be considered in the light of their 
own history and environment. We all know the type of 
Catholic bourgeoisie which existed in Irish country towns 
and villages under the British regime. It formed a small 
social group consisting of the doctor, the local district 
inspector of the R.I.C., perhaps with luck the county 
99Ireland, SPOD, Cabinet minutes, Cl/149 
lOOibid. 
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inspector and the bank clerks. This group had distinctly 
Brttish leanings because of its social aspirations and 
reached through the Protestant grocer to attain to an 
occasional smile from the country family.lOl 
Kennedy then went on to analysize the relationship between 
this particular class and the British Army: 
When during the war conditions following on 1916, British 
Military were scattered through the country, their offi~ 
cers however temporary, were cultivated by the ladies of 
this social type. It is humiliating to have to confess 
that when the 'Black and Tans' and the Auxilliaries 
followed in the train, many of the girls of this social 
stratum were easy associates - possibly intrigued by the 
combination of uniform, southern English accent and re-
puted careers in the British Army. 
It seems clear that the McCarthys were of this type and 
this fact cannot be lost sight of in assessing the evi-
dence offered in support of the story.l02 
The Attorney-General contrasted this attitude with their 
feelings toward the new Irish Army: 
Officers of the National Army have been in many cases the 
butt for people of this kind and especially the broad 
doric of Dublin had seemed a vulgarity after the accents 
of British Military and Auxilliaries. Occasionally 
officers of the National Army are accepted into this 
select circle, .. as for instance, Captain Harrington, whose 
father was a member of the British House of Commons and 
a Barrister-at-law, or Lieut. Higgins, who had been a 
Bank Clerk in Tralee. 
One may assume that in the intimate relations that sprung 
up between the McCarthys and these two elect officers, 
the general status and character of the National Army was 
often the subject for pitiful comment.l03 
After having discussed the social characteristics of the 
lOlopinion of Attorney-General Hugh Kennedy on 
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McCarthysf the Attorney-General finally examined the evidence. 
He found that »there is not one shred or title of evidence in 
all the papers put before me to justify a charge against 
either Major-General O'Daly or against Captain Clark of 
having taken part in such an outrage."l04 Kennedy felt that 
the evidence against captain Flood primarily depended on the 
statements of the two sisters which he thought to be contra-
dictory. Each of the women had identified a different 
assailant as the Captain· Moreover, Kennedy was skeptical 
of the women's charge that they had been beaten and kicked 
since there was no evidence that they had required medical 
attention and had not been in any noticeable physical dis-
tress when visited by the military authorities immediately 
after the incident. The Attorney-General decided that not 
only was there no direct evidence against Captain Flood but 
what evidence did exist was not only of the "flimsiest char-
acter but .•. quite contradictory."lOS He did not believe 
a conviction could ever be obtained. Kennedy recommended, 
if the McCarthy family were not satisfied, that they insti-
tute civil or criminal proceedings.l06 
Kevin O'Higgins had not been satisfied with the 
outcome of the Kenmare investigation and, in his testimony 
before the Committee, charged favoritism and cover-up. He 
104Ibid. 
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believed that the failure to prosecute had been the "death 
knell of either discipline or efficiency in the Army."l07 
O'Higgins felt that the officers should have been relieved 
of their commissions if there was proof, even though not 
necessarily legally conclusive, that they had not met the 
standards which the government expected. The Minister had 
been distressed by the fact that Captains Clarke and Flood 
were to be retained in the reorganisation scheme and that 
Mulcahy had offered Major-General O'Daly the position of 
Vice G.O.C. of the Western Command with the rank of Colonel. 
O'Higgins had blocked the nominations of Clarke and Flood in 
the Executive Council. O'Daly chose to resign. 
Addressing criticism over his decision not to pros-
ecute O'Daly and his selection of him as one of the officers 
on the G.O.C. Officers Demobilisation Board, ~1ulcahy claimed 
O'Daly had special knowledge of the Dublin command, a 
troublesome section as the events of the mutiny demonstra-
ted.lOS He dismissed the accusations of those who held that 
the Kenmare incident had a negative effect on the armyl09 
1° 7o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
1° 8Mulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/37, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
109o'Higgins, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/23, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland; Russell, Testimony before the Army 
Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/20; Professor Hogan, 
Testimony before the Army Inquiry Committee, Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/25, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
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and defended his position~ 
Generally, in the case of any Officer who has given 
distinguished service of lasting benefit to his Country, 
and shown himself in difficult and varying circumstances 
to have been a thoughtful and a bold soldier, I was not 
prepared lightly, and on no evidence, to place him in · 
the degrading position of answering to a low charge.llO 
Meredith's report cited the Kenmare case as proof 
of the necessity for having a civilian as Minister for De-
fence. He believed that, as a military man, Mulcahy was 
reluctant to bring charges against a high ranking officer and 
was loathe to bring discredit on the army. The Chairman 
thought Mulcahy had been wrong in not acting as soon as the 
Kenmare incident occurred.lll The Inquiry Report stated that 
the decision to drop the Kenmare case was ~a grave error of 
judgment" on the part of General Mulcahy. The Committee 
believed that, although it did not contribute to the mutiny, 
"it did militate against discipline generally by encouraging 
suspicion in the minds of officers and others that the Army 
Authorities were disposed to hush up charges against persons 
high in authority."ll2 
llOMulcahy, Testimony before the Army Inquiry 
Committee, Mulcahy Papers, P7/C/10, University College Dublin 
Archives, Dublin, Ireland. It is interesting to note that 
four years after the event, Dr. McCarthy was still writing to 
O'Higgins demanding monetary compensation for their expenses 
in the matter and for their sufferings, loss of health and 
mental torture. Ireland, SPOD, Kenmare File, 83341. 
lll"chairman's Draft Report, .. Mulcahy Papers, 
P7/C/41, University College Dublin Archives, Dublin, Ireland. 
112rreland, Executive Council, Army Inquiry 
Committee, Report, 1924, p.9. 
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The Report concluded that no evidence existed to 
support the charges of muddling, mismanagement and incom-
petence on the part of the Chief of Staff; that the Quarter-
master-General, although committing a disastrous error of 
judgment in reorganising the I.R.B., had no other charges 
relevant to the Inquiry made against him; that the Adjutant-
General had not been negligent nor trying to shield offenders 
in handling cases involving high ranking officers; and, in 
the Kenmare case, he strictly followed the advice of his 
adviser, the Judge Advocate-General.ll3 In spite of these 
findings, only MacMahon was reissued his commission. 
The Army Inquiry Committee Report was presented to 
the Dail in June of 1924. General Mulcahy branded it a 
"national humiliation" and announced his intention to intra-
duce in the Dail a motion to reinstate the three generals, 
in effect, a motion of censure of the Executive Council.ll4 
It was to be a futile gesture. 
On June 26, 1923, Mulcahy moved that the Dail con-
demn "as contrary to the best interests of the State the ill-
considered action of the Executive Council" in removing the 
Army Council and the "subsequent failure of the Executive 
Council to act upon the Report of the Army Inquiry Com-
113Ibid. 
114Ireland, Dail Eireann, Official Report 7 (1924) : 
24 9 o-.2so2. 
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mittee~Pll5 The ensuing debate was unimpressive~ Because 
the Executive Council refused to publish either the evidence 
presented to the Committee or the Chairman's reservations, 
the deputies were being asked to vote on a motion about which 
they had very incomplete information. For this very reason, 
the Labour Party, for example, decided to abstain completely 
from voting on Mulcahy's motion. 
Most of the debate consisted of a reiteration of 
positions previously stated during earlier discussions on the 
army. Mulcahy asked the Dail to reinstate the generals 
because, however grudgingly, the Report did not uphold the 
charges against them. He detailed the herculean service the 
three men had performed for the Free State and charged that 
"these officers were swept away to satisfy the personal 
wishes of certain members of the Executive Council and to 
satisfy the demands of certain mutinous officers for their 
removal.nllG Mulcahy claimed that he introduced the motion 
with regret but that he had to because these former members 
of the Army Council were being unfairly victimised by per-
sonal prejudices and his sense of public duty demanded it. 
In rebuttal, O'Higgins restated his position concerning the 
problems and inadequacies of the administration of the army 
and stated that the Army Council had been dismissed because 
of "a lack of confidence and that lack of confidence was 
11 5rbid.:3110. 
116rbid.:3113 
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proved and justified by the Pa~nell Street incident."ll7 
However, it was the President who set the to:ne of the Govern-
ment's position when he said: 
That particular incident which occurred three months ago 
is an incident which in my opinion, ought to be dead and 
buried and ought not to be resurrected, no matter what 
its influence was either at that time or now.ll8 
The motion to censure the Executive Council was subsequently 
defeated. 
Despite the cost, the Cosgrave government had sur-
vived both the military and political crisis caused by the 
mutiny. Its victims were Mulcahy, MacMahon, O'Murthuile, 
and O'Sullivan, four of the men most responsible for winning 
the Civil War and preserving the Irish Free State. Their 
resignations, and the army's passive acceptance of the govern-
ment's decision, was a tribute to their success in creating 
an obedient, non-political fighting force. Out of the crisis 
of mutiny came the affirmation that Ireland was to be govern-
ed by the will of the people and not by the dictates of her 
generals. 
ll?Ibid. :3159-3160. 
11 8Ibid.:3150. 
CONCLUSION 
The Irish Army Mutiny of 1924 directly influenced 
the development and formation of the Irish Free State, having 
a significant impact on both its immediate and ultimate 
political structure. It was instrumental not only in deter-
mining the direction post-colonial Ireland would take but 
also in shaping its leadership, furnishing valuable clues to 
the puzzle of the Cosgrave government. The Mutiny provides 
an insight into the workings of the Executive Council, high-
lighting both the relationship between the government and 
the Dail and the particular characteristics of the individual 
Cabinet members. During the crisis, the Cosgrave govern-
ment continually treated the legislature in a dictatorial 
manner, using it as a rubber-stamp rather than as a body to 
whom it was ultimately responsible. Cumann na nGaedheal 
party meetings had more influence on government and state 
policy than Dail sessions. Although the Cosgrave government 
had shown itself to be weak, vascillating and compromising 
when dealing with the mutineers, when threatened, it dis-
played a remarkable ability to maintain itself in power, 
despite numerous challenges and inner conflicts. 
The Army crisis exacerbated the tension already 
existing in the Cabinet between O'Higgins and Mulcahy, 
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culminating in the latter's resignation. Mulcahy was the 
"army man," insensitive to the feelings of his civilian 
colleagues, intensely protective of the army and his pre-
rogatives as Minister of Defence, but loyal to his staff, 
party and government. Mulcahy, in the tradition of Michael 
Collins, incorporated unto himself both political and mil-
itary power. However, he did not have the force of character, 
the heroic stature necessary to fulfill Collins' legacy. 
Moreover, the advent of peace made his colleagues more 
critical of the army and more concerned with vindicating 
civil supremacy. Although Mulcahy was himself totally ded-
icated to the formation and development of an Irish army 
which would be loyal to any Irish government and above po-
litical involvement, he unfortunately provided his nemesis, 
O'Higgins, with sufficient ammunition to force his removal. 
Always the loyal soldier, despite his resignation and motion 
of censure, he patiently waited until his party and govern-
ment recalled him into the Cabinet as Minister for Local 
Government in 1927. 
Throughout the crisis, O'Higgins, ambitious, strong 
and single-minded, was almost fanatical in his determination 
to cleanse the army of its leadership and involvement with 
secret societies, so much so that he seemed to have lost his 
perspective. Frequently, interfering with the administration 
of the army, he violated, by meeting and communicating with 
an Army officer without the knowledge and consent of the 
Minister for Defence, not only the standards of military 
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conduct but also the norms imposed by the concept of 
collective responsibility. He did not ·trust H.ulcahy or the 
Army Council and had no appreciation for the very real dif-
ficulties that they had to labor under and try to surmount. 
However, O'Higgins was clearly dedicated to restoring law 
and order in Ireland and seems, in his dealings with the 
army, to have been motivated and influenced by this objec-
tive. 
~lcGrath' s position remains shadowed and unclear. 
He seemed to have exerted ·influence over Cosgrave and the 
Cumann na nGaedheal party and was obviously persuasive, 
motivated both by his desire to help the mutineers and by 
his mvn personal political ambitions. However, his exact 
relationship with the mutineers was and is not clear. Al-
though he repeatedly stated that he did not condone mutiny, 
he probably had never quite accepted the concept of a non-
political army. Whether he would ever have used the army 
or its discontented factions to attain power, if given the 
opportunity, is debatable. Clearly, he overestimated the 
influence of Tobin and Dalton on the army and his own ability 
to maintain a political party. 
President Cosgrave, as the leader of a government 
which tenaciously clung to power and maintained its control 
over the Dail, was able to survive political challenges and 
misfortunes to remain President until 1932. He managed to 
keep in check the ambitions of his subordinates and assert 
himself as leader in a determined but unobtrusive manner, 
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while holding together a Cabinet often filled with dissension. 
A strong impression remains that Cosgrave was always in 
control, allowing nothing to happen of which he_did not 
approve. 
While Cumann na nGaedheal successfully surmounted 
any immediate challenge to its supremacy, the crisis inflicted 
long term damage. Both Mulcahy and McGrath represented a 
particular type of nationalist, both of which were now lost 
to the Party. Coupled with failure to effect a successful 
change in the boundary with Northern Ireland, the events of 
the army mutiny left the impression that the party was now 
outside the nationalist tradition, depriving it of some of 
its vital centers of political organisation throughout the 
country. Many of the people associated with the mutiny 
eventually joined Fianna Fail. The government's handling of 
the crisis managed to alienate both those who supported the 
mutineers and those who supported the Army Council. The 
Irish Army Mutiny of 1924 thus contributed to the decay and 
stagnation which would beset Cumann na nGaedheal and hence 
unwittingly aided the coming ascendancy of de Valera and 
Fianna Fail. 
The Army Crisis of 1924 also proved fatal for the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood. The mutiny provided the 
government with an opportunity to ruthlessly abandon the men 
and the machinery which had made the Free State possible. 
The Executive Council openly and defiantly announced that 
the leaders of the army, the men most responsible for winning 
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the Civil War, and the I.R~B., the bulwark of the revolu-
tionary movement, were no longer useful or necessary to 
Ireland. Obviously, the position of a secret society within 
a liberal democratic state had become increasingly ambiguous. 
However, the Cosgrave government did not seem to recognize 
the contributions which the I.R.B. had made to the liberation 
struggle and overestimated its influence and power after the 
Civil War. The Brotherhood had ceased, by 1924, to be an 
active revolutionary organization and did not pose a threat 
to the government. In any event, the crisis marked the 
official demise of the I.R.B. as a significant and powerful 
force within the army. From 1924 on, all members of the 
army had to swear that they did not belong to any secret 
society. 
The crisis clearly demonstrated the change which 
had taken place within the army. The independent spirit 
which had characterized the Volunteers and the early forces 
had basically disappeared. By accepting the dismissal of its 
leaders without recourse to violence, the army showed it had 
made the transition from a politically involved and independ-
ent guerrilla force to a professional and disciplined national 
Army. Most significantly, however, the Irish Army Mutiny of 
1924 upheld and affirmed the supremacy of constitutional 
rule in Ireland. The early years of independence were years 
of precedent setting decisions which shaped and molded the 
new state. As a country just emerging both from a successful 
struggle for liberation and a devastating civil war, imbued 
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with a strong t~adition of revolutionary nationalism and a 
chronic addiction to violence, one of its most important 
institutions was the army. Consequently, the relationship 
between the military and the duly elected civilian govern-
ment became crucial. The Civil War had been the first test 
of the new state's authority, but it was tinged with too 
many peripheral issues to provide a clear and unequivocal 
answer. The Mutiny of 1924 clarified and strengthened the 
position of the army as the unquestioning and obedient 
servant of the state. 
Since the beginnings of the revolutionary movement, 
the power of the military vis-~,_vis civilian authority had 
never been clearly delineated. The Mutiny clarified the 
ambiguous relationship which existed between the army and 
the government. At a time when the government was preoccu-
pied with the process and problems of state-building, and a 
substantial and influential segment of Irishmen had not 
yet accepted the legitimacy of the new state, this crisis 
could have precipitated a military coup d'etat. By submit-
ting their resignations on the demand of the government, 
regardless of the validity of the decision, and by appearing 
before the Inquiry Committee, when those who had caused the 
crisis and those who had levelled the charges against the 
army, refused to testify, the Army Council clearly and 
unequivocally upheld the principle that the Irish army was 
subordinate to the Irish Government. Its action established 
an important precedent with respect to the balance of power 
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within the state. It demonstrated that peaceful change in 
the leadership of the army was not only possible but desir-
able, and helped free Ireland from the reoccurring threat of 
military intervention in the political structure, a 
situation not uncommon in countries emerging from colonialism. 
Moreover, by peacefully resigning the Army Council demon-
strated the strength of the parliamentary tradition in Irish 
politics and its impact on the leaders of the liberation 
struggle. The actions of the four generals, men who embodied 
the doctrine of physical force nationalism and who could 
legitimately have claimed to be the heirs of 1916, clearly 
reflected the inter-dependence between these two strands 
of Irish nationalism. Thus, the legacy which the future 
political leaders of Ireland inherited is a blend of Parnell 
and Pearse, of the Irish Parliamentary Party and the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood, a fact which helps to explain the 
high degree of stability which the Irish Free State was 
able to achieve. 
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